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Synopsis.
The aim of this paper is to show how industrial technology and material procurement 
influenced the development of British warship design and construction for the period 
1760 to 1830 using the construction of HMS Victory as and archaeological base to work 
from. While much has been written about ship construction, technology and materials, 
these subjects have to some degree remained divorced from each other and thus need to 
be analysed collectively. To achieve this, this dissertation has been formulated into two 
parts;
Part I covers the initial orders to build the Victory, the concepts of ship design, 
construction technique, and the materials employed when she was initially built. It also 
covers the designer and his contribution to ship development at the period and the 
possibility that he was influenced by current French shipbuilding practices. In brief, this 
section highlights the implications and possible inadequacies of general ship design in 
C.1760.
Part II discusses the actual technological and constructional development of the Victory 
throughout her active career. The issues raised through this examination show that she 
very much reflects general ship development at the time. Besides endorsing the 
significant influence of industrial expansion, this section also emphasises the point that 
much can be learnt by analysing the ship using the same techniques as employed on an 
archaeological site. Sadly, the latter point has long been neglected, therefore, one of the 
objectives of this paper is to demonstrate that by archaeological investigation of 
individual timbers, a new dimension can be added to our understanding of structural 
development and building practices. To achieve this, I have chosen to examine HMS 
Victory as the most suitable three dimensional source, as her active working life falls 
within the dates specified above.
Introduction.
Some 232 yçjars after her initial launch the Victory is now preserved at Portsmouth where 
she serves as both Flagship for the Second Sea Lord/Commander-in-Chief Naval Home 
Command, and as a public heritage attraction. Still retaining her formal official naval 
prefix of H.M.S., to the public she is affectionately known either as The Victory or 
Nelson's Victory due to her obvious connection with the ‘immortal hero’ Admiral Lord 
Nelson, the victor of the Battle of Trafalgar, the two are now synonymous.
Being one of few surviving historic warships much work has been published regarding 
history and subsequent restoration which commenced in 1922. Her restoration, initially 
driven by the visionary efforts of the Society for Nautical Research, ensured the survival 
of this renowned Trafalgar veteran. Ironically the only other Trafalgar vessel to survive 
into the 20“' century was the French 74 gun ship Duguay-Trouin. Having escaped from 
the battle she was captured two weeks later by Admiral Strachan. Renamed as the 
Implacable, she remained in service until 1855. After this date she was used as a boys 
training ship until the Second World War. Found to be in very poor condition, and 
without funding, she was finally scuttled off the Owers on 2 December 1949. As for the 
other British ships that fought at Trafalgar, most had been disposed of by 1830. The 
Temeraire, immortally captured in Turner’s painting, went to the breakers in 1838, and 
the last, the frigate Naiad, was sold off in 1866 to become part of a coal depot at Callao, 
Peru. ^
Throughout her ‘active’ service the Victory, like any other Naval warships past or 
present, underwent many refits, repairs and modifications, the latter very much governed 
by progress in ship technology and construction technique. In all, her general appearance 
had varied considerably from ‘as built’ in 1765 to her last ‘great repair’ 1814 -16. 
Though restored to her current Trafalgar configuration, i.e. 1800-03 rebuild, the ship is 
in fact a compromise between this and her rebuild of 1814-16 and earlier alterations 
carried out in 1810. Compromise or not, we cannot judge our forebears too harshly for 
the errors incurred during the initial 1922 restoration programme as ship restoration and 
interpretation of this magnitude had never before been conceived let alone put into
practice. Accepting this salient point, the Victory albeit not 100 per cent authentic, 
effectively became the ‘teething ring’ of all later historic ship preservation projects both 
on a national and international scale.
As a result of this undertaking we have today such ships as; the frigates Trincomalee and 
Unicorn, USS Constitution and Constellation', mercantile vessels such as the Cutty Sark 
and SS Great Britain. I have here omitted the equally important archaeological finds 
such as the ancient Egyptian royal barge belonging to Khufo (Cheops), various Nordic 
vessels, the Swedish 17th century warship Vasa and our own Tudor Mary Rose, the 
reasons for which relate to ‘conservation’ rather than ‘restoration’. More recently 
restoration has been guided towards the ‘metal’ ships; H.M.S. Warrior and Gannet, 
Minerva, Belfast, and Cavalier, not forgetting various submarines. This list is not 
exhaustive for it does not reflect the myriad of small craft seen around our coast, or 
other projects be they large or small, local or world wide.
The subject of the Victory has perhaps been overwritten and definitely over modelled 
irrespective of accuracy. Much has also been published since 1922  ^ covering Naval 
architecture, construction and rigging of such ships in addition to the established works 
of Deane, Sutherland, Stalkaart, Murray, Steel, Peake, Fincham, and Charnock.  ^ The 
objective of this thesis is to analyse what influenced the alterations made to the Victory’s 
design, construction and appearance from her designer’s conception on the drawing 
board to circa 1825, the last pertinent date before her present 1803-05 reconstruction.
To re-iterate it could be asked: What more is there to know about the Victory, surely this 
subject has already been over written ? For the past three quarters of a century the ship 
has, to a degree, retained some innermost secrets. In truth, re-evaluation of the 
evidence indicates that we do not fully comprehend the entire subject, all too often our 
understanding relates to the written sources of the period and that the real evidence faced 
before us has been ignored. To add, besides the contemporary works published between 
circa 1760 and 1850, our current interpretation primarily revolves around the host of 
existing papers produced by the Admiralty and the Navy Board. Though these
documents are a valuable resource, neither these or the contemporary publications 
provide a ‘coal face’ bearing on the subject.
Modern methods of archaeology need to be applied. This is evident from projects like the 
Mary Rose which fortunately has been subjected to the full archaeological treatment 
much dictated by today’s scientific approach to the object. Unfortunately for other ships 
under preservation, this school of practice has been somewhat neglected until recent 
years. Irrespective of the written source, which must not be discredited, undertaking 
detailed surveys is the only method of comprehending the true development of any 
particular ship, and the actual applied working practices governing it. Too much 
evidence is either lost or ignored during the restoration process in order to get the ship 
open to visitors or to eradicate decayed material. Moreover, the other contributory 
factor relates to cost, be it either for quick financial return or restrictive in that it does 
not permit restoration to be undertaken in the correct manner. ^
This is exactly what has happened to the Victory. To be fair, this fault cannot be directed 
towards the actual restoration team. Any failure in account for the academic approach 
lay primarily with the policies dictated by the relevant committees and the ‘owners’ 
policies, which in Victory’s case are the Royal Navy and the Dockyard. Again, any 
criticism on this count is undue as the concept of addressing ship restoration together 
with archaeology was not an accepted policy until recent years. As a result, little remains 
of the original ship for us to analyse, the ‘stable door being closed after the horse has 
bolted’.
This problem is further compounded by virtue that the ship had undergone several 
rebuilds during her active career, excluding her reconstruction during the 1920s. 
Naturally each time this happened, material, be it timber, copper or iron, etc. was 
removed from the ship and replaced with new, an acceptable fact for any ship in service. 
Obviously, a high proportion of what we consider as archaeological information simply 
disappeared. What is unacceptable is that once the Victory became an ‘historical artifact’ 
and conservation began, formalised recording should have been executed. More 
exasperating is the fact that timbers bearing builders ‘rase’ marks were initially
destroyed. With them went crucial evidence that could have provided us with a better 
understanding of the actual methodology of ‘on site’ work practices. Irrespective of 
improved recording techniques employed during current restoration, the need for the 
dockyard shipwrights to complete deadlines leaves little time for archaeological record 
keeping. Likewise, though skilled in their craft, these shipwrights were not sufficiently 
trained in archaeological practices to undertake the task of carrying out historical 
analysis, and in reality, there was nobody else to do the job. Moreover, surveying the 
hull when the opportunity did arise, could not be fully executed as archaeological 
analysis in its present form is a relatively new science. Hopefully its application, albeit 
rather late, can still prove that there is much to learn from the Victory. ®
In reality the hull of the Victory contains a spectrum of the various alterations made to 
ship construction and the corresponding industrial technology that evolved between circa 
1760 and 1830. In this context, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate how, by careful 
analysis using archaeological disciplines, the supposedly silent timbers can speak. Not 
only does the fabric of the ship disclose a progression in wooden construction technique, 
it also presents to us, through application, the development and expansion of the iron, 
copper and alloy industries. Furthermore, it also shows the advances made in ordnance, a 
matter that relates to battle strategy and protection and subsequently ship design itself. 
In effect, the ship as an archaeological artefact reveals in microcosm, the broader world 
of reasoning, technology and industry on a national and international scale and the 
intercontinental policies that dictated the procurement and movement of raw materials.
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PART I.
Design Conception.
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Chapter 1.
Design, Construction and Materials.
On the 13“' December 1758 Parliament, under the leadership of Pitt the Elder, passed a 
Bill to build twelve new warships, one of which was to be a 1st rate of 100 guns. The 
proposed building programme was needed in order to expand the fleet to meet the 
demands of the intercontinental struggle with France known as the Seven Years War. 
The actual order for the construction of a new rate ship was recorded within the 
minutes of the Navy Office 6 June 1759.  ^ This decision was made after approval of the 
sheer draught also dated 6“' June. In consequence the following instruction was given;
Sheer draught proposed for building a First Rate ship o f 100 guns at HM. Yard at 
Chatham pursuant to an order from the Rt. Hon, Lords Commissioners o f the Admiralty 
o f 13th December last and o f the dimensions undermentioned viz.
Length on the gun deck -186 ft.
Length o f the keel for tonnage - 151 f t  3.5/8 in.
Breadth moulded - 50 f t  6 in.
Breadth extreme - 51 f t  10 in.
To carry on the lower deck 30 guns o f 42 pounds 
To carry on the middle deck 28 guns o f 24 pounds 
To carry on the upper deck 30 guns o f 12 pounds 
To carry on the after deck 10 guns o f 6 pounds 
To carry on the forecastle 2 guns o f 6 pounds
Admiralty office 
J. Cleveland 
15th June, 1759.
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After decisions had been finalised by the Government, the Navy Board directed the 
Commissioners of Chatham Dockyard to prepare a dock for this purpose. This 
instruction, which was implemented on the July 1759,  ^ read as follows;
By the Principal Officers
and Commissioners o f his Majys. Navy.
Pursuant to the order from the Rt. Hon. the Lords Commissioners o f the Admiralty 
dated the 13th December 1758 and 14th o f last month, these are to direct and require 
you to cause and be set up and built at your yard a new ship o f 100 guns agreeable to 
the draught herewith sent you and o f the dimensions set down on the other side hereof, 
and you are forthwith to prepare and send us in due form an estimate o f the charge o f 
building and fitting for sea the said ship, and providing her with masts, yards, sails, 
rigging and store to eight months ’ proportion. For which this shall be your warrant. 
Dated at the Navy Office the 7th July, 1759.
Richd. Hall Tho. Slade. G. Adams.
Th. Brett.
The keel was laid down in the Old Single Dock at Chatham on the 23*^“ July the same 
year. The site of this historic dock still exists today, albeit the dock has been extensively 
modified. The proposed 100 gun ship about to be built was not actually named Victory 
until agreed by the Navy Office 30“' October 1760. This vessel was to be the fifth ship in 
the Royal Navy to bear this name. This name was probably chosen because 1759, the
‘Years of Victories’ or Britain’s ‘Annus Mirabilis’, had become the turning point of the
Seven Years War, the French being defeated at Quebec, Minden, Lagos, and Quiberon 
Bay. Her original elaborate figurehead, which was removed during her 1800-03 refit, 
ornately portrayed these events.
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The overall design work was undertaken by Sir Thomas Slade who became the 
Surveyor of the Navy in 1755 once Anson had taken office as the First Lord of the 
Admiralty in 1751.
The fact that the order dated 15 June 1759 gives the Length o f keel for tonnage, 
suggests that the draught for a yet umnamed 100 gun ship may already have been in 
hand. Although not absolutely essential for the purpose, a full draught makes the 
computation of the Length o f keel for tonnage much simpler. Length o f keel for tonnage 
could only be calculated from known dimensions these being: Length on the gun deck; 
extreme breadth; and height of the wing transom, the latter being taken from the upper 
side of the keel.  ^ This point would not have applied prior to and during the legislation 
of the 1745 Establishment where all specifications were predetermined. Unfortunately, 
much to the embarrassment of the Navy Board, the 1745 Establishment had emphatically 
proved a failure within five years of its legislation thus it was now essential to depart 
from such rigid ruling if any form of innovative design was to progress.
The ship was completed a little under 6 years later, and ‘launched’ on the 7th May 1765. 
At this period, all 1st Rate ships were actually built within an enclosed dry dock, they 
being too large to construct in the conventional manner on a slipway; the Victory was not 
actually launched (in the broadest sense), but simply ‘floated offi the dock. Initial 
construction work was overseen by the Master Shipwright, John Lock, but unfortunately 
he died in 1762 and was succeeded by Edward Allin. With the pressure of war it was 
expected to complete the ship within 30 months however with hostilities drawing to a 
close in 1763 the urgency to complete the Victory was less critical and work was 
reduced. Her overall cost amounted to £63,176. 3s. Od. Today this figure would 
equate to approximately 250 million pounds, the cost of building a capital warship such 
as a Through Deck Cruiser.
The design of any warship, whether it is constructed of timber, iron or steel, or a 
combination of these materials is related entirely to its desired function, or, to use an 
alternative phrase, must be ‘fit for purpose’. Throughout history the criterion governing 
naval architecture principally remains unchanged inasmuch that it chiefly depends on the
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demands dictated by the pertinent nation and/or fighting ship owner. Furthermore these 
factors are also controlled by both the geographic environment in which the ship is 
operated, and the mode of fighting commonly used at the period. Irrespective of these 
factors, there are three fundamental elements involved in building a naval warship, each 
of which influence the end product which inevitably is usually a compromise of these 
attributes. The three factors are: Design, Construction and Material.
Design primarily relates directly to the ‘combat’ factor required of the vessel, offensive 
or defensive (in general, a combination of both). To expand, the concepts that lay 
behind the design of the ancient Greek Trireme and Bireme diiffer completely from those 
of the 18th century man-of-war. Likewise the principal requirements of vessels built 
during the Middle Ages, the ‘longship’ for example, are completely different from the 
two aforesaid ship types. Taking the Trireme as an archetype, the design of this form of 
vessel was such that according to Professor John Morrison its “seaworthiness was 
sacrificed to the requirements for maximum performance as a guided missile in battle”. ^
The sophisticated design of the Trireme is fully directed towards attaining the high speed, 
and impetus, necessary to pierce and sink enemy galleys with its integral built ram. 
Unlike any other warship (with the exception of a Fireship) the Trireme was itself the 
actual weapon, operated in the manner of a sea-borne ‘lance’ or ‘dart’. To achieve this 
two design factors had to be accounted for: First, there was a ram which was fitted direct 
to the keel in order that the entire hull withstood impact: Second, the vessel had to be 
lightly built with a narrow beam which together with a shallow draught provided a small 
prismatic cross section where resistance was reduced to a minimum. The waterline length 
to breadth ratio of the recent built replica Trireme Olympias is approximately 1: 0.125. 
Compared to the medieval and 18th century vessels, (whose length to breadth ratio was 
about 1: 0.33 and 1: 0.28 respectively), the Trireme was a particular innovative design 
for its time. Trials carried out on the Olympias revealed that, under oars only, a speed of 
6 knots could be achieved from a standing start in 30 seconds and a cruising speed in 
excess of 7 knots was easily attained, hence its effectiveness. Speeds of this magnitude 
were confirmed by Herodotus who recorded that one vessel covered 70,000 orguiai in a
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day.  ^ This distance equates to 700 stadia or approximately 74 nautical miles. By 
calculation this provides an average speed of 7.37 knots for the hours of daylight the 
vessel was under oar. ^
Unfortunately their light construction was only suitable to the native waters of the 
Mediterranean whereas more stoutly built vessels were necessary for Northern waters. 
To conclude, the Trireme was by design, suitably ‘fit for purpose’. Primarily used in the 
offensive mode as an oar powered missile it was in reality a defensive weapon that could 
be rapidly called upon and launched from any shore to fulfill its role.
The ‘raison d'etre’ of the 18th centuiy man of war was to provide a ‘stable floating 
fighting gun battery’ and thus, by comparison to the aforesaid ship types, the ship of the 
line, was by far, a more complex machine. To expand from an eighteenth century 
viewpoint; “A First rate ship, fully equipped and under way, this being beyond doubt 
the most superb engine that the mind o f Man has ever conceived”. “ Design was 
centered towards multifarious aspects before a draught was started. These principles, 
according to Murray, were; ^
1. To make a Ship carry a good Sail.
2. To make a Ship Steer well, and Quickly Answer the Helm.
3. To make a Ship carry her Guns well out o f the Water.
4. To make a Ship go smoothly through the Water without pitching hard.
5. To make a Ship keep a good Wind.
Besides good sailing qualities, speed and manoeuvrability, each of which were governed 
by underwater shape, other factors had to be considered. These were;
1. Large storage capacity; thus a ship could operate independently from base port for 
long periods.
2. Ability to withstand the onslaught of enemy shot in order to protect the ship’s own 
gun crews.
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To attain the above criteria the ratio between length, breadth and depth had to be 
carefijlly balanced together with a suitably computed keel length. For the Victory the 
relevant dimensions are as follows;
Length - 186 ft (56.73m). This dimension is taken on the level of the lower gun deck 
between the fore side of the rabbet at the stem post and after side of the rabbet at the 
stern post.
Breadth - 51 ft 10 ins (15.8m). This dimension is the extreme breadth measured from the 
outer face of the ship side planking at the widest point.
Depth - expressed as ‘depth in hold’ is in this case 21 ft 6 ins (6.56m). This dimension 
was measured between the underside of the lower gun deck planking to the upper 
surface of the ‘strake next the limbers’. Realistically this figure was an ‘artificial’ figure 
used for calculating capacity when determining contracts and does not refiect the true 
depth of the hull between the load water line and the base of the keel. The quotient given 
does not account for the depth of the keel, false keels, and fioor timbers, and thickness 
of the limber strake. Dimensions for these components are;
ft. ins.
Keel 1 9
1st False Keel - 0 6
2nd False Keel - 0 4
Floor Timber 1 11
Limber Strake 0 6
Total Depth - 5 0 (1.53m)
To this add the following;
‘depth in hold’ 21 6
Height between underside of lower 2 9
gun deck plank and port sill
29
To this subtract;
Height between gun port sills and 5 3
load waterline
Total 24 0 (7.32m)
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This figure closely equates with the actual draught: 22 ft (6.71m) afore and 24 ft (7.32m) 
abaft, the mean being 23 ft (7.02m) and thus a true representation of the real depth.
Keel Length - all draughts provide a ‘length of keel for tonnage’, which again is an 
‘artificial’ working figure employed to determine a ship's tonnage for contract purposes. 
It does not fully relate to the actual physical length of the keel. The true length of the 
Victory's keel, (dimension taken off the draught) measured from the back of the stern 
post to the fore part of the boxing, is 166 feet* (50.63m). This is often referred to as the 
‘tread of the keel’.
From these figures the relationship between length, breadth and depth can be determined, 
these are;
Length to Breadth = 1: 0.28.
Breadth to Depth = 1: 0.44.
In approximation these proportions are 1/3 and 1/2 respectively, quotients that 
correspond to those authorised some 140 years earlier, evidence stating; ‘....for the depth 
must never be more than half nor less [than a] third thereof and the length never less 
than double nor more than treble the breadth \ Evidently a suitable set of proportions 
formulated on experience had long been determined to attain a reasonable compromise 
between stability, capacity, speed and manoeuvrability for sailing warship design. Any 
alteration made between the relative ratios would greatly effect the overall performance 
and requirements of a ship. In short this means;
Change in Length: Increase = Greater hogging and sagging problem.
Effectively reduce proportional breadth (see below). 
Reduce manoeuvrability.
Decrease = Reduce hogging/sagging problem 
Improve manoeurability.
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Change in Breadth: Increase = Improved righting motion thus less rolling; greater
stability for ordnance.
Decrease = Greater instability; righting motion and metacentric 
height compromised.
Change in Depth: Increase = Greater buoyancy; lower centre of gravity.
Raising of metacentric height; greater righting motion. 
Greater stability for ordnance:
Greater capacity.
Decrease = Less buoyancy; higher centre of gravity.
Reduction of metacentric height thus greater instability; 
Reduced capacity.
In addition to the above, the ratio between the ship’s length (186 ft or 56.73m) and the 
length (or tread) of the keel (166 ft or 50.63m) has to be considered. This computes 
to 1: 0.89 which by comparison to ships built to the 1719 Establishment is greater. "  
This is mainly due to a reduction of the rake angle of the stern post introduced c.1750. 
Prior to this date the rake was considerably greater, (see Table 2/3 Chapter 2). This 
modification improved steering as the rudder acted more efficiently when hung close to 
the vertical plane. To facilitate this the heel of the stern post was moved aft. If the 
alternative alteration was made, e.g. moving the head of the post forward, gun deck 
length would be reduced. In effect there is a marked change after 1750. This fact is 
expanded further in Chapter 2. Alterations had also been made to the angle and 
curvature of the stem post the purpose of which was to accommodate greater support to 
the foremost ordnance. This again affected keel length though not significantly.
The other main factor that influenced buoyancy and stability was displacement which was 
given in Tons Burthen. Again this figure was attained primarily for contractual 
requirements and was determined as follows;
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Length of Keel for Tonnage x Extreme Breadth x Extreme Breadth
94
151 ft 3.3/4ins x 51 ft 10 ins, x 25 ft 11 ins.
94
151.302 f t  X 51.833 ft x 25.92 ft.
94
203275.96 = 2162.51/94 Tons Burthen
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This however did not really reflect the actual capacity of water displaced, finding this 
measurement was at the period a very convoluted mathematical exercise which, due to 
its complexity, is omitted here to retain brevity. Examples of the pertinent calculations 
are clearly laid out in works by Steel and Rees. Close inspection of Steel reveals 
that this work, albeit with considerable additions, is based on an earlier anonymous work, 
the Shipbuilders Repository, published in 1788; in places Steel has copied whole 
passages verbatim. Likewise, Rees is virtually a copy of Steel.
Understanding the underwater shape of a vessel was very important. Though vessels 
having a deep draught and greater breadth tended to be slower, they potentially pointed 
(steered) well and sailed better when close hauled. At best most square rigged ships 
could steer 5.1/2 points (62 degrees) off the wind. The Victory herself sailed about 6 
points (67.1/2 degrees) under reasonable conditions. Another point that proved 
important was where the greatest breadth was disposed, i.e. the ‘dead flat’. Ideally this 
was either placed at the centre of length or a little before it. The latter was considered 
best as with a fuller bow the ship divided the water better then, by virtue of her 
underwater lines aft, provided a smoother run towards the rudder thereby attaining more 
effective passage through a fluid and improved steering. This point is expounded fully in 
Chapter 2.
Turning to construction, building technique had by 1759 reached a particular zenith 
inasmuch that experience dictated the basic principles. Though constructed after the 
1745 Establishment much of the scantlings and dimensions applied to the Victory
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correspond to the Establishment specifications. Moreover some dimensions also relate 
to those found in the Shipbuilders Repository circa 1788, however this is quite probable 
because the ship was repaired shortly before. Analysis today shows a complex variety of 
specifications primarily as a result of many repairs and rebuilds.
In brief construction was as follows: First the keel, which formed the ‘backbone’ of the 
vessel, was laid. This comprised six lengths of straight elm 21 inches (53.34cm) square in 
section carefully scarphed and bolted together. The length of the scarphs were to be no 
more than twice the ‘room and space’; i.e. 5 feet 6 inches (1.66m). Fitted on top of 
the keel was the hog or rising wood made from oak. Being made slightly wider than the 
keel, this acted as the seating for the frames that provided the body shape of the ship. 
The hog rose in height at the extremities forming the deadwood, that at the after end in 
effect formed a knee to support the stern post.
Next the stem post together with its inner post, wing transom, fashion piece and 
associated transom beams were integrally fitted together and erected in one component 
forming the aftermost boundary of the hull. A ship of this size would require a single oak 
tree to make the stern post. The heels of the stern and inner posts were tenoned into the 
keel. Likewise the stem post, manufactured from selected pieces of compass oak, was 
raised up at the fore part of the keel to form the foremost boundary of the hull. Its heel 
was located to the fore part of the keel with an intricate scarph called the ‘boxing’. For 
additional strength the inner side of the stem post was supported with a secondary stem, 
also made from oak, called the apron. This was further backed by the stemson which 
itself was a continuation of the keelson.
The frames, or bends that dictated the actual hull form were next fitted. All square 
frames were fitted at 90 degrees to the keel and thus subsequently lay in the transverse 
plane. The foremost and aftermost frames were actually cant (angled) to coincide with 
the turn of hull curvature at each extremity. Much design work was required to ensure 
that the shape produced provided good underwater lines specially at the fore and after 
ends where hull entry and exit gave the least resistance to water without detriment to the
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other design requirements; buoyancy and capacity. Frames are categorised into two 
groups: Main frames and filling frames. The former comprised 13 pieces as follows;
a. One Floor.
b. Two E‘ Futtocks.
c. Two 2”“ Futtocks.
d. Two 3"^“ Futtocks.
e. Two Futtock
f. Two Toptimbers
g. Two Lengthening Pieces.
In effect a main frame was a series of separate timbers fayed and bolted together to 
produce a double thick timber. One half comprised a floor, two 2"“ futtocks, two 4“' 
futtocks and two lengthening pieces. The other portion consisted of two futtocks, two 
3'“ futtocks and two toptimbers. The disposition of each main frame was such that it 
formed either the fore or after boundary of the gunports at each deck level (Fig. 1/1). To 
determine this each frame was set along the keel at a predetermined ‘room and space’ 
(approx. 2 ft 9 ins or 0.83 m), this dimension however diminished towards the fore and 
after ends in order to joggle in the cant frames.
General practice directed that there were two filling frames fitted equidistant between 
each main (or double) frame. The components that made up a filling (or single) frame 
varied according to its location. For simplicity the filling frames will be called A and B, 
the former being 7 pieces, the latter 6, the sum of which amounted to 13 parts which 
collectively formed a main frame as discussed earlier. Components were as follows;
Filling Frame A. Filling Frame B.
a. One Floor. a. Two E^  Futtocks.
b. Two 2"“ Futtocks b. Two 3*^“ Futtocks.
c. Two 4“' Futtocks c. Two Toptimbers
d. Two Lengthening Pieces
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As can be seen from the above table each were half of a double frame, and so disposed 
that each dictated an image of its adjacent main frame. Above the waterline filling 
frames would be terminated in wake of gun ports sills and then continued above the 
respective lintels (Fig. 1/2).
Of note, a recent survey of the Victory has revealed that filling frame disposition differs 
from accepted practice. It was found that there were three filling frames fitted between 
the main frames in wake of the middle gun deck ports as opposed to the common two. 
This corresponds on both sides of the ship. Whether this practice was a result of a later 
repair or originates from ‘as built’ has yet to be decided however recent investigation has 
revealed that some of these timbers probably pre-date her 1800-03 refit. The only 
other instance where a third filling frame was employed is at the ‘dead flat’ where it may 
have been necessary to adjust frame spacing in order to attain conformity of ’room and 
space’.
Furthermore frame disposition, irrespective of type (main or filling) altered in the fore 
and after body of the ship. Those fitted in the fore body had their floor timbers set afore 
and those in the after body abaft. The division between the fore and after body was 
denoted by the ‘Dead Flat’ indicated on the draught by the symbol 0 . The dead flat was 
the frame placed at the greatest breadth. In many cases the frame at the dead flat was of 
the single type with either main frames or single frames either side. Again this was 
dictated by the ‘room and space’.
Most of the framing was prefabricated before setting up and once all were set up in 
position the entire assembly was integrally locked together by fitting a longitudinal 
Keelson. On Victory the keelson is made from 6 pieces of straight oak 19 inches 
(48.26cm) square. To ensure strength, all keelson scarphs were set giving shift to those 
of the keel. By this period it had become practice to bolt all frame floor timbers through 
both keel and keelson. The extremities of the keelson were extended with a stemson 
forward and stemson aft. The framing of the ship was completed by fitting the stern 
timbers above the wing transom and the hawse pieces forming the bow of the ship and 
the beakhead bulkhead. Irrespective that fore and after areas rendered a potential
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weakness in warship construction; i.e. easily penetrated by enemy shot, design was at 
this period very much entrenched in conservative tradition. These points will be 
expanded hirther in Chapters 2 and 7. Once all the framing of the ship was complete the 
entire structure was temporarily secured with battens called harpins and ribbands and left 
to ‘stand in frame’ for one year. This period permitted the timbers to season and also 
permitted implementing any adjustments if necessary.
Though the practice of ‘standing in frame’ was conceived as the best policy to ensure 
that a hull was well seasoned before planking was applied there were some drawbacks. 
This related to distortion of hull framing and premature decay, a problem that was 
primarily due to geographical location together with climatic conditions rather than 
ignorance. All depended on the relative orientation of the building slip to the sun and 
prevailing winds. Observations revealed that many ships built at Deptford, Chatham and 
Portsmouth were found on launch to be lopsided. It appears that they "did not swim 
upright; and it is certain that one side o f them decays sooner than the other” To 
expand, ships built at Deptford, where radiated sun heat and wind action acted more 
profusely onto the larboard (port) side of the hull, the completed ships tended to list to 
starboard. At Chatham and Portsmouth where the geographical orientation differs, the 
problem was reversed. In short a ship dried out quicker and subsequently became 
lighter on the side of the prevalent heat source. Obviously, to counteract this inherent 
problem, more ballast was generally placed on the ‘lighter’ side of a ship. Oddly enough, 
the Victory was given more ballast on her larboard side when first launched, and not the 
starboard side as would be expected. Why this was so is still to be investigated. 
Obviously the ship is symmetrical so this should not alter the ballast distribution. The 
only theory raised so far is that for some reason the timber used on the starboard side 
was denser but why this should be so is unclear especially when one accounts for the 
weight difference of ballast used.
Completing the hull not only involved hull and deck planking, it also included fitting 
beams, knees and other internal strengthening timbers such as riders, etc. Though the 
planking formed the ‘skin’ of the ship some particular groups of strakes also acted as 
longitudinal strength members. This not only braced the hull together but also
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counteracted potential hogging and sagging, problems pertinent to most wooden ships. 
Consider the hull as a single beam, hogging is the tendency for the beam to droop at its 
extremities, while sagging relates to the drop of the beam along its centre of length. It 
was virtually expected that the hull of a standard man of war would hog 6 inches when it 
took to the water. Externally the Victory was constructed with three heavy bands of 
plank called wales; main wale 10 inches (25.4cm) thick, middle wale 9 inches (22.9cm) 
and channel wale 8 inches (20.3 cm) thick. One of these was set below each row of gun 
deck ports. The wales were built with a pronounced sheer rising towards the extremities 
of the hull in order to counteract the hogging and sagging effect. Between the wales the 
ship was planked up with boards of lesser thickness. Below the main (lower) wale the 
ship’s bottom was planked with diminishing strakes, bottom plank and a garboard strake 
adjacent to the keel.
Internally the hull is longitudinally braced with heavy bands of spirketting varying 
between 7 and 4 inches (17.8-10.2cm) thick, and deck clamps (beam shelves) at each gun 
deck level. The spaces between were lined with thinner boards called ‘quick work’. 
Below the main gun deck is a series of stringers called ‘thickstuff that are wrought over 
the scarph joints of the frames, the lowest, which runs parallel to the keelson, being the 
limber strake. The spaces between the thickstuff are lined with bands of footwaling and 
the thinner ceiling.
Transversely the hull was braced with deck beams supported at their extremities to the 
ship’s side with vertical hanging knees and horizontal lodging knees. Many of the 
hanging knees were later replaced with beam end chocks integrated with iron plate knees 
(See Chapter 7). Intercostally worked between the beams were longitudinal carlings and 
transverse ledges. Further transverse support was given with the aid of deck and breast 
hooks, crutches and sleepers while in the hold were riders, internal frames that ascended 
to just below the lower gun deck. Finally longitudinal strength was added by laying the 
deck planking.
All fastenings were of either iron or copper bolts, treenails and iron spikes (nails). The 
bolts themselves were in effect only metal rods driven through pre-drilled holes and
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clenched over roves and consequently could work loose under certain conditions. As can 
be seen the entire stmcture relied entirely on longitudinal and transverse construction 
which itself incurred considerable weaknesses with respect to limited lines of stress 
loading when the ship endured labouring in heavy seas. This, together with relatively 
weak or ineffective fastenings and inherent rot problems, limited a ship’s durability. 
Deficiencies of this form were, to some degree, being analysed by Thomas Slade and his 
contemporaries however it was to be a few more decades before innovative changes in 
construction and designs were implemented. This was chiefly done though more 
thorough investigation by such persons as Gabriel Snodgrass and Robert Seppings, each 
of whom in turn would influence the development of the Victory during her career.
Considerable material was required to construct a first rate ship. Timber used for 
building the Royal George, launched February 1756, amounted to some 5760.1/2 
loads, a load being 50 cubic feet. From this the actual capacity of timber used before 
conversion is estimated as 288,025 cubic feet. Furthermore the weight of one load 
averaged about one ton (1.016 tonne). Since the Royal George was marginally smaller 
than the Victory it can be reasonably estimated that some 300,000 cubic feet of timber 
went into Victory's construction. It must be noted that 1 acre, which yielded about 40 
trees, could produce about 60 loads after a period of sixty years. This amounts to 
3000 cubic feet which equates to 1% of the timber needed to construct the Victory. By 
simple rule of thumb it can be stated that a ship required 1 acre for every gun borne.
Building material at this period comprised Straight Oak, Compass Oak, Dantzic Oak, 
Elm, and Fir. By calculation the percentages of timber used in comparison to capacity 
before conversion are as follows;
English Straight Oak - 44.64 %
English Compass Oak - 45.60%
Dantzic Straight Oak - 3.75%
Elm - 2.32 %
Fir 3.70%
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The above figures are derived from timber tables given for each class of ship by 
Charnock. ^  Though figures are based on the Royal George, inspection reveals that 
percentages vary little between any V\ 2”* or 3'^ '* rate ship of the line.
As seen, some 94% of the constmction material comprised oak albeit English or 
imported timber. This figure later decreased as lighter weight Dantzic or Prussian Deal 
or Fir became more prevalent for deck planking towards the end of the 18‘^* century. 
With disregard to the lower gun deck, which remained entirely planked in oak, it became 
common practice to use oak only for waterways and adjacent to coamings on other 
decks. Not only did this change reduce weight and expense it also served to conserve the 
more valuable oak which was fast becoming scarce. The ratio between English and 
imported oak was also to alter towards the end of the century. Elm was primarily used 
for keels, garboards and lower strakes of bottom planking. Other uses were limited to 
fittings which related to water such as brake pumps, chain pump cisterns and pump dales. 
Fir was used for various applications where strength was not such a premium such as 
bulldieads, sheathing boards (see Chapter 6) and later for deck planking. In the interests 
of conserving oak and expense experiments were also made by building frigates entirely 
of fir. Five 28 gun frigates, based on the lines of the Unicorn class, built of this material 
were ordered as part of the emergency building programme in 1756. These ships 
were not however entirely successful. With the exception of the Hussar, which was 
captured, the remainder, Boreas, Shannon, Actaeon, and Trent were all sold off within 7 
to 13 years as ‘unservicable’. In addition other timbers used were ash and beech, the 
former for tillers and capstan bars, the latter for filling pieces and minor works.
English oak (Quercus quercus or Quercus peduncalata ) used for the Victory was 
procured fi'oin Kent and Sussex. Trees indigenous to the Weald were particularly good 
due to the heavy clay soil which promoted slower growth producing a close grained 
tougher timber. Oak grown in less suitable ground; e.g. low lying marsh, promoted 
various deficiencies such as rapid growth, long open grain and subsequently weaker and 
rapid decay. It was not so much that English oak was the most suitable ship building 
material against other types of oak moreover that it was more readily abundant. Foreign 
oak such as Baltic, Italian, Prussian [Danzic] Canadian and American, were equally
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preferable but their supply could easily be constrained by war or other unforeseeable 
trade difficulties. Some imported timbers were also inherently inferior. Baltic oak, better 
used for wainscot, was not fit for planking due to its spongy sap wood. This was 
generally caused by excessive frost.
Of the most suitable North American oaks, Canadian White oak (Quercus alba) and 
American Red Oak (Quercus rubra), were subject to decay within 5 years. The only 
exception was Live Oak (Quercus virens and Quircus semper virens) which, native to 
Florida, proved a very superior material. Two examples of ships built with live oak are 
the frigates USS Constitution launched in 1797 (still in existence) and the Essex. Of the 
former, the fact that this ship is still afloat today leaves little more to say. Regarding the 
latter ship mentioned, it was found that twelve years after her launch, only six defective 
timbers were found from the original 507 pieces used in her construction.
The most suitable trees selected for use of ‘straight oak’ were about 100 feet (30.5m) 
high and had a girth of between 12 and 50 feet (3.66 to 15.25m). ‘Compass oak’, ideal 
for the curved futtocks that formed the frames of the ship was usually selected from 
shorter oaks growing in hedgerows. The best timber was obtained from trees felled 
when between 70 and 100 years old. This point was well clarified by the classical writer 
Pliny who stated, "To have good timber, the trees should be cut down that are o f middle 
age, for neither young poles nor old runts are f i t  for durable building”. Seasoning 
was also very important thus much of the wood used for the Victory had been selected 
and left to air dry for 13 to 15 years before build.
Elm (Ulmus procera), a wood primarily indigenous to England, was suitable for use 
where timber needed to withstand damp environments or long immersion in water. Trees 
of this type grew to similar proportions but "in less than an age ” to that of oak. As 
stated previously, elm was primarily used for the keel, not only for its natural inherent 
properties but its irregular grain permitted the intrusion of many bolts without splitting. 
It was also common practice to fit about ten strakes of elm planking from the garboard 
upward on the ship’s bottom. The other property associated with elm was that it could 
withstand a certain degree of shock and not was easily fractured when knocked. For
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this reason it was also used for the manufacture of rigging blocks. This timber was also 
adopted for making pump dales, cisterns and capstan whelps. With regards to pumps, it 
had long since been observed that the common decay of severed boughs remaining on a 
tree produced natural conduits, a point readily adopted by man for pipes, etc. Wych 
Elm (Ulmus glabra) was used for thinner planking especially with for small boat 
construction.
The Fir used, though common to the same family (Pinaceae), would have varied 
depending on source: Silver Fir (Abies alba) and Norwegian Spruce (Picea abies). As 
stated before the practice of laying fir deck planking on uppermost decks was becoming 
more common in the second half of the 18^ '^ century, mainly due to its lower weight and 
cost. This timber was also used for internal bulkheads subdividing the hold, the 
magazines, and the various compartments fitted on the fore and after platforms of the 
Orlop. Thin boards of fir were also employed for sheathing the bottom of the hull prior 
to the introduction of copper (see Chapter 3).
Pine was also necessary for manufacturing masts and yards. Most timber required for this 
purpose was, at the time of Victory's build, imported from the New England colonies. 
The timber trade which supplied the Royal Dockyards from this part of the globe had 
flourished since 1652. The accession of William and Mary in 1689 opened up hostilities 
with France. As a result a sustained programme of naval expansion was introduced thus 
the demand of timber from this quarter increased. To ensure continuity of supply a Broad 
Arrow Policy was passed which controlled colonists rights regarding timber activity. This 
policy was vigorously implemented between 1691 and 1729 and remained in force until 
the American War of Independence in 1775. England’s rights on mast timber were a 
highly contentious issue surrounding the colonial grievances leading to the war. After 
this date the Broad Arrow Policy continued in Canada only, while elsewhere 
alternative supplies were sought, the Baltic becoming the predominant source.
On matters of mineral materials, iron, copper, and mixed metal (bronze), etc., sources 
were variable and often subject to the influence of war or politics. The best iron was 
generally imported either as natural ore or cast ingots known as pigs. The best quality.
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colloquially named Orgrounds Iron, was imported from Sweden. This was found more 
suitable for the production of wrought iron and the manufacture of steel. Alternative 
supplies, other than native iron, were imported from Spain or the American colonies. To 
expand on the latter, it must be remembered the Iron Act of 1750 prevented the colonies 
producing their own iron goods. By 1761 overall imports of iron for national use 
amounted to some 47,250 tons (48,006 tonnes) this being 3,000 tons (3,048 tonnes) of 
pig iron from the colonies, and approximately 44, 250 tons (44,958 tonnes) of bar iron 
from other countries. With Cort’s innovation of the dry puddling process in the 1780s 
(refer Chapter 13), where low quality English iron could be made into high quality 
malleable wrought iron, the necessity to import iron was reduced. Irrespective of iron 
manufacturer, iron was supplied to the Navy by contract. Though there were various 
contenders, the primary tender appears to have been executed through Andrew Lindgren 
and Company of London. Cast iron ballast was supplied through either David Tanner 
of Monmouth or Richard Parsons of Cadoxton-juxta-Neath, Glamorgan. Obviously, 
as industry expanded, much spurred by Watt and Cort, the supply of iron to the Navy 
extended to cover multifarious sources.
Primarily there was little requirement for copper and other non-ferrous metals thus 
supply was less concentrated, however when copper sheathing was introduced for both 
Naval and Mercantile shipping during the 1780s demand increased dramatically. At about 
the same period the copper industry expanded to such extent that Britain monopolised 
the international market at this period. This was mainly due to the industrialist Thomas 
Williams whose entrepreneurial leadership amalgamated the various companies. The 
main source of copper ore was obtained from the mines of Parys and Mona in Angelsey, 
alternative supplies being obtained from Cornwall. Smelting was generally undertaken in 
South Wales, Initial supplies to the Navy were made through the agents Gnoll Co., 
from the Royal Mines Co. at Neath, and from Charles Roe and Co. of Macclesfield, the 
main contractor being William Forbes of Deptford.
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Figure 1/1. Main and Filling Frames.
Key:
1. Lengthening Pieces.
2. Toptimbers.
3. 4^ Futtocks.
4. 3*^  Futtocks
5. 2“^  Futtocks.
6. Futtocks
7. Floor Timbers.
8. Gun Ports.
9. Port Lintels.
10. Port Gills.
11. Keel.
12. This figure denotes all Filling Frames.
3  2"  ^Main frame in the after body of the ship.
1 1®‘ Main frame in the after body of the ship.
0  Dead Flat (point of extreme breadth).
A  1®‘ Main frame in the fore body of the ship.
B  2"  ^Main frame in the fore body of the ship.
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Chapter 2.
Slade the Designer and the Influence of French Construction.
The Victory was initially designed by Sir Thomas Slade (1703/4 -1771) who, jointly with 
William Bately, had replaced Sir Joseph Allin as Surveyor of the Navy in 1755. Slade, 
though originally a humble shipwright, had come from a distinguished shipbuilding 
family. Family namesakes were Benjamin, Second Assistant to the Master Shipwright at 
Plymouth in 1740, William, an overseer at Kings Lynn and Ipswich in 1741, and a 
second William, a shipwright at Bristol.^
By 1742 Thomas Slade was already established as the Master Shipwright’s Assistant at 
Woolwich Dockyard and was also employed designing a harbour at Sandwich. In 1764 
he forwarded a new design for Sheemess Dockyard but this scheme was shelved due to 
the discovery of the shipworm ‘teredo navalis’  ^ (refer Chapter 3 : Copper Sheathing and 
Fastenings). Making his name as a shipbuilder and designer Slade quicldy rose to the 
post of Master Shipwright at Deptford.  ^ Slade’s abilities were soon recognised by Lord 
Anson who had served on the Admiralty Board since 1744. It appears that Anson and 
Slade jointly worked towards proposing revolutionary concepts of ship design that 
effectively vanquished the constricting authority of the Establishments since their 
introduction in 1706. Much criticism has been made regarding the Establishments 
especially towards their conservatism which restricted scope for inventiveness. 
Irrespective of this view, the initial reasons for their introduction must be fully 
understood. The main aim of the Establishments was to attain uniformity within each rate 
or ship type and to maintain the principles established by experienced shipbuilders. 
Second, by standardising equipment sizes, the supply of stores, masts, etc. could be 
ensured. The notion that lay behind the Establishments was not an entirely new concept 
for the French, under the administration of M. Colbert, had introduced a similar system 
some 20 years earlier than the English for the same reasons. Similarly, the French also 
abandoned the system due to the constraints imposed, again earlier than the English.
The initial credit for the progressive work undertaken by Thomas Slade cannot be fully 
attributed to him alone as much was influenced by Benjamin. In effect both were working
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directly under Anson. In short Benjamin Slade was talcing lines off captured French 
vessels and passing them to both Thomas Slade and Anson. From these actions new 
design concepts were introduced.
During his tenure as Surveyor of the Navy (1755-1771), Slade was responsible for 
designing 181 ships, the types, names, and date of launch are given in Appendix I. Much 
influenced by the dimensions of French warships Slade became instrumental in the 
introduction of new class types, size increase and capabilities of British men of war. The 
Romney, a 50 gun ship laid down at Woolwich during the same year as the Victory, was 
a fine example of Slade design. This vessel, which was actively deployed for forty years, 
was considered a superb ship of her class. Her dimensions were as follows;
Dimension feet inches (metres)
Length on the Gun Deck 146 0 44.5
Length of the keel for Tonnage 120 8.1/2 36.8
Extreme Breadth 40 4.1/2 12.3
Depth in the Hold 17 2 5.23
Burthen in Tons 1046.1/94
Proportion of Breadth to Length 1:3.61
Between the years 1757 and 1760 a new class of rates frigates were introduced to the 
fleet, most designed by Slade. These included, three 36 gun ships, most of the thirteen 32 
gun frigates and nineteen 28 gun ships.  ^ The dimensions of the principal ships of each 
class were as follows; ^
Table 2/1.
Name Guns Launch
Date
Length of 
Gun Deck
Length of 
Keel for 
Tonnage
Extreme
Breadth
Depth 
in Hold
Burthen 
in Tons
Proportion 
of Breadth 
to Length
Feet. ins. Feet. ins. Feet. ins. Feet. ins.
Pallas 36 1757 128 4 106 4 35 11 12 4 728 1: 3.58
Stage 32 1758 125 2 103 8 35 10 12 0 706 1: 3.50
Argo 28 1758 118 6 98 1 33 11 10 6 601 1: 3.69
Note: Figures have been rounded to eliminate fractions.
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Common consensus is that the design of the Victory is based entirely on English ship 
development and to suggest otherwise would be considered rather controversial. If 
however we are to analyse the fundamental issues influencing design at the period of her 
construction it is quite clear, irrespective of the irony, that the origins lay rooted with 
our adversaries across the Channel.
As previously stated, the Establishments authorised by the Navy Board were restrictive 
leaving little scope for improvement and inventiveness. This problem was very much due 
to Allin and Ackworth who, for many years, had jointly held the office of Surveyor. 
Both men were elderly and very conservative in their outlook, an attitude which reflected 
the general opinion of most naval shipbuilders holding office at the time. This fact was 
very soon highlighted by the Admiralty when it was soon realised that the 1745 
Establishment was a failure. New ships being produced were to a degree crank and 
carried their armament too close to the waterline. Problems had also arisen due to little 
understanding of hydrodynamics inasmuch that the lines produced, especially those in 
the after body of the hull, rendered poor sailing qualities and inherent steerage 
difficulties. These points are evident from the many complaints submitted from sea 
officers. ^
The French on the other hand had long since modified their approach to ship building. 
This revolution had commenced during the reign of Louis XIV under the innovative 
authority of his Minister of the Marine, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. ® From 1671 Colbert 
systematically initiated a more scientific approach to ship design using the resources of 
mathematicians and applied technological skills. Such personnel were drawn from the 
Académie Royale des Sciences, an institute that was set up in the 1660s to serve both 
science and the crown.  ^ One fact that must be clarified is that Colbert was well aware 
that the English shipwright Anthony Deane had recently developed a theoretical 
‘Doctrine of Naval Ai chitecture’ in 1670. Motivated by this concept Colbert used this as 
a measure to restructure the French fleet. To achieve this he called upon Admiral 
Abraham Duquesne, his grande maitre des constructions, to provide a similar doctrine, 
informing him that it was “the most important business o f the Navy”. Duquesne was 
also responsible for introducing the ‘galiote a bombe’ - bomb vessel which carried large
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mortars for coastal bombardment. This concept was the ingenious invention of the 
Basque, Bernard Renau D’EHcagaray. In 1673 the first theoretical works relating to 
the behavior of bodies moving in fluids were published by the Jesuit Father Ignace- 
Gaston Pardies. This work was later expanded by Paul Hoste in 1697 which, 
though erroneous by a small degree, first established shipbuilding on a theoretical level. 
Also in 1673 Colbert introduced a ‘règlement’ that standardised dimensions and 
scantling's specification for five rates of ships. This pre-empted a similar scheme, 
called an Establishments of Dimensions, which was later introduced in England in 1706 
which continued, albeit amended on occasion, in use until 1745.
Later in 1683 Colbert directed that individual ship models where to be manufactured for 
training shipwrights and designers. These models were of considerable size far 
exceeding the standard 1:48 scale Navy Board models made in England. Effectively the 
French had provisionally formulated a professional corps of naval constructors giving 
them a marginal advantage over their English counterparts. This concept was further 
expanded in 1741 by Henri Louis Duhamel Du Monceau, the Inspector General of the 
French Navy. Duhamel set up a training school, the ‘Petite Ecole’ where Chief 
Surveyors could sent their best students to study theoretical ship design.
The limitations of English ship design and the constraints of the formal Establishments 
were soon ratified due to the capture of the Spanish 74 Princessa in April 1740. This 
vessel was found to be far superior inasmuch that it took three of our 70 gun ships {Kent, 
Lennox, and Orford) six hours to overcome her. As result, current specifications were 
reviewed and new Establishments were introduced in 1741 and 1745, the latter 
formulated by a committee led by Sir John Norris. Irrespective that standardisation was 
improved and that dimensions were marginally increased, the fundamental issues of 
design remained neglected.
To reiterate much criticism had already arisen regarding the specifications authorised in 
the 1745 Establishment, especially those related to the 80 and 24 gun ships. The former, 
which mounted their armament on three decks, were considered too crank and could 
only use their lower battery in very mild sea conditions. Unfortunately the initial
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proposals submitted by the Admiralty in favour of replacing these vessels with two 
decked 74s based on the French and Spanish designs had already been thwarted. In 
answer the Norris Committee stated that they were, “sorry to differ with your Lordships 
therein, but having observed on many occasions the advantage which 80 gun ships with 
three decks had over those with two and a half judged it for the benefit o f the service 
that so useful a class should be continued. ” However the concept of the 74 was not 
fully dismissed. With regard to the 24 gun ships all were found to have poor lines 
especially in the after body.
On 3rd May 1747 Admiral Anson, flying his flag in the Prince George (90), captured the 
French 74 L Invincible off Cape Finisterre. L ’Invincible was the first of a new class of 
two decked 74 gun ships developed by France in the 1730s constructed under the 
direction of M. Maurapas, the Minister of the Marine. These vessels were part of his 
re-development programme aimed at increasing the capacity and capability of the French 
Navy since its demise after the Colbert administration. This ship, built at Rochefort by 
Pierre Morineau in 1741, was launched on the 2P^ October 1744. L ’Invincible and her 
sister ship the Magnanime were considerably larger and more expensive than previous 
built French 74s such as the Dwc d ’Orleans (1738) and Terrible (1739). Ships based on 
the Invincible design of the 74 gun ship were to become the predominant line-of-battle 
ship in both the French and English navies for the next 70 years. The original French 
L ’Invincible class included the Conquérant, Intrépide, Monarque, Sceptre, Florissant, 
Magnifique, Temeraire, Redoutable and Couronne,
On inspection Anson found that dimensionally the 74 gun Invincible (now re-named) 
was actually larger than his own 90 gun Prince George, and wrote to the Admiralty that 
the Invincible was, “a prodigious fine ship, and vastly large. I  think she is longer than 
any ship in our fleet, and quite new”. Furthermore reports from later commanders, 
including Keppel, highlighted her remarkable sailing qualities. Naturally with a longer 
hull she could, with a speed of 13 knots, out-sail any English ship of equivalent class. 
Moreover, her design was to have a far reaching impact on English ship construction.
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In 1751 Anson was formally appointed as the First Lord of the Admiralty Board. Though 
younger than many of his predecessors he proved to be a superb administrator. Well 
aware of the shortcomings of the fleet, and unrestrained from the old conservative 
regime, he soon became the prime mover behind the development of English warship 
design. Using foresight he encouraged the most suitable people of the constructor corps 
such as Thomas Slade and William Bately into his organisation. Considerable influence 
was also provided from Thomas Slade’s kinsman Benjamin who was currently serving as 
the Assistant Surveyor at Plymouth. In view of Anson’s obvious intention to improve 
ship design it appears that each of these men were already supporting him outside the 
official channels of the Navy Board. Evidence supports the fact that Benjamin, working 
directly under Anson’s private instructions, was ordered to construct a 24 gun ship based 
on the lines of the captured French privateer Tyger. Futhermore this information was 
also being directed to Thomas Slade. A comparison of lines was made between the Tyger 
and existing 24 gun ships which, as already pointed out, were badly designed. Bejamin 
reported as follows; ^
My Lord
I  have sent by the waggons (sic) from Plymouth the draught o f the Tiger french 
privateer taken by the Falkland , & the SvhilQ french man o f war taken by the Portland 
& Winchelsea, and desired M’’ Slade Assistant o f Woolwich Yard to wait on your 
Lordship with them, have compared the common lines o f those ship on the back o f the 
draughts, also the ‘sending and pitching lines o f the Tiger with new 24 gunships o f the 
master builders designs, which appeard (sic) to me very necessaiy for your Lordships 
consideration; the point o f contact is in the middle o f the ship at the main waterline in 
her sailing trim, afore the lower edge o f the false keel is three feet under the surface, 
and abaft ranges up to the counter in a straight direction, which gives form to the lines 
compared, and by them seems to demonstrate the prodigious difference there is abaft, 
and little afore in those ships. I  am strongly o f opinion the present draughts o f the 24 
gunships are too fu l  (sic), and that the Tiger is as much the contrary, but withal her 
more certainly o f going better to windward, and the other before the wind; We have laid
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down the body and molded most o f the frame o f the Unicorn, i f  we had men to go on 
with her would launch her before Christmas, But the Ipswich and Mars repair, ships 
coming into refit, sheath f i t  the Bottom o f the Charles and Ruby, /  am afraid will 
prevent it. The Mars will be a good ship when done, little inferior to our own ships, and 
appear very agreable (sic),' wil (sic) take o ff the Body o f the Two Crowns as soon as we 
have a dock to put her in, and send your Lordship a true draught o f her. I  pray My 
hearty congratulations and your new dignity may be acceptable and ever attended with 
the most distinguishing marks o f true merrit (sic) and a glorious conclusion; having 
tired your Lordship with my long epistle, I  have only to ask pardon for doing so and to 
pray your Lordship wil (sic) give me leave to subscribe myself.
Your most Obedient faithful 
humble Servant
Plymouth Yard
Signed (Benjamin Slade)
Other captured ships were also inspected and their lines taken off. As a result various 
new ship types, based on lines of the aforesaid captured French ships, were developed. 
These were as follows;
Table 2/2.
French Ship New Class Name Rate Guns Date Surveyor/Builder
Tyger Unicorn 28 1747 Benjamin Slade
Invincible Dublin 3rd 74 1748 Thomas Slade
Invincible Valiant 3rd 74 1757
Fougueux Ardent 3rd 64 1761 Thomas Slade
Note: For clarity the French name L ’Invincible has been altered to its English equivalent.
Dimensionally, French ships were also larger than their English counterparts thus we also 
see an increase in vessel size from this period. Irrespective that the French preferred to
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build ships of lighter construction for speed, the English concept was to design ships that 
would endure lengthy periods at sea upholding blockade duties. Thus although French 
lines were adopted the English practice of constructing ships with heavier scantlings 
primarily remained in order to accommodate these principles. As a result new designs 
were introduced, the major class being the 74 gun ship which was to form the backbone 
of the British fleet for the next 60 years.
Another influential factor was the manner in which draughts were drawn. The 
conventional practice was based on using the ‘rising line’, this however produced a 
marked hollow in the bows. Slade adopted the French practice of using the ‘diagonal 
floor ribband’ system. This method, which provided better scope for determining the 
bends of the frames, was first noted by Mungo Murray in his treatise published in 1756.
The French had success&lly been using this system for the previous ten years This 
fact is noteworthy inasmuch that Murray’s work was directly based on that previously 
published by Duhamel du Monceau in 1752, It would prove beneficial to determine 
how much Murray’s work influenced Slade. Murray served as a shipwright at Deptford 
Yard.
French design also affected change to the angle of the sternpost. Close inspection of 
ships draughts dated from 1719 to 1783 reveals a distinct point of change circa 1750 
(refer Table 5/2). Standard English practice was to have the sternpost angled at about 
13 degrees, a feature that probably lay rooted in the design concepts indoctrinated by Sir 
Anthony Deane during the late 17‘‘* century. The fundamental reason for this 
modification was to improve the torque of the rudder. Second, with the refinement of 
buttock lines aforesaid, the effectiveness of the rudder was greatly improved if hung 
nearer the vertical. Obviously this minor difference from English practice was quickly 
identified by Slade when inspecting the French ships at Plymouth Yard. Moreover, a 
more vertical sternpost provided greater support to the after end of the Gun Deck and 
subsequent stern construction above it.
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Table 2/3.
COMPARISON OF STERN POST RAKE 1719 TO 1783.
Date Establishment Ships Name Guns Rake Angle Surveyor
1 719 Yes Britannia 100 13 Hayward
1719 Yes Centurion 60 12 Allin
1733 Yes Saint Albans 50 12 Lock
1741 Yes Devonshire 80 12 Holland
1741 Yes Newark 80 13 Ward
1745 Yes Royal George 100 10 Establishment
1741 Yes Kent 64 12 Ward
1741 Yes Ramillies 90 16 Lock
1755 No Dublin 74 3 Slade
1755 No Sandwich 90 4 Slade
1759 No Victory 100 5 Slade
1759 No London 90 4 Slade
1771 No Duke 98 4 Williams
1783 No Caesar 80 4 Hunt
Note: As seen from above, there is a distinct change in Stern Post angle after c. 1750.
Other influences taken from the French relate to ironwork. Though listed within the 1719 
Establishment onward, little iron work, other than bolts, etc., was employed in ship 
construction until the turn of the century. If used it was generally isolated to the fitting of 
standards which were inverted knees fitted between the ship’s side and the deck. The 
French, on the other hand, had adopted the practice of fitting iron brackets in place of 
wooden knees far earlier. Examples of such were found on the L Invincible launched 
in 1744. The subject of ironwork is expanded further in Chapter 7. Other aspects, 
which derive from French origin, are highlighted within their respective chapters.
Although it appears that Britain extracted considerable technological knowledge from 
the French, the direction that information was transferred was not wholly one way. In the 
1730s Blaise Gislain visited our Dockyards, likewise, during the brief peace after the 
American Revolutionary War representatives from France often officially inspected our 
Dockyards and our manufacturing sites related to the Iron and Copper industry.
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Chapter 3.
Copper Sheathing and Fastenings.
Very little protective copper sheathing remains on the bottom of the Victory today with 
the exception of the entire rudder and isolated fragments at the keel, the details of which 
are covered later (Fig. 3/1). Most of the sheathing had been removed during successive 
restoration work carried out from the 1950s onward and stored nearby. The last 
recorded date relating to sheathing the hull was when the ship was docked for emergency 
repairs between 20 December 1887 and 14 October of 1888.  ^ To what degree copper 
was replaced is unknown but costs recorded appear to indicate that this was a large 
repair rather than a complete recovering. This is indicated by the fact that copper plates 
inspected reveal three separate manufacturers names. Some copper sheathing was 
probably replaced on the larboard side after the accident when the Neptune, which was 
being towed to the breakers, inadvertently rammed the Victory in 1903.
When first launched in 1765 the lower hull of the Victory, like all other men of war at the 
period, was sheathed with thin boards of deal to protect her from the ravages of the 
marine boring mollusc ‘teredo navalis’ commonly known as ship worm. Originally native 
to tropical waters this worm had, due to ships returning from the West Indies, etc., 
become prevalent in the waters of the Medway, especially Sheerness, and to a lesser 
degree at Portsmouth.  ^ Later in 1780 the wood sheathing was removed and replaced 
with copper sheets conforming with the new legislation ordered by the Admiralty. This 
work comprised fitting 3,923 sheets of copper,  ^each measuring 4 feet (1.22 m) long and 
14 inches (35.56 cm) wide. The hull area covered is estimated as about 14,711 square 
feet. In weight each sheet varied between 28 and 32 oz. (0.79 and 0.91 kg) per square 
foot, the heavier plates being fitted in areas more prone to water turbulance. This 
amounted to a weight of 17 tons (17.272 tonne). Each sheet was fastened with 
approximately 80 copper nails, each being about 0.16 oz (4.5 g) in weight.* In total 
313,840 nails weighing some 1.42 tons (1.44 tonne) were used. Some 20 reams of brown 
paper were used to line the hull before the copper sheathing was applied. From 1780
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until 1888 work related to Victory’s copper sheathing amounted to 15 occasions. For 
details refer to Appendix II.
When the actual extant plates were examined on site, it was revealed that the number of 
nails used exceeded 80. It was found that the average plate had about 43 nails along the 
edges of each long side and 12 on each short side. Further to this there were three rows 
of nails driven into the plates across the surface, each row comprising 11 in number. 
From this the average total of nails used per plate was 143, a figure that exceeds the 
original sum by some 63 nails. Obviously this figure would increase the overall weight of 
copper employed. Though the overall weight of copper sheathing and nails was 
substantiial, i.e. 18.42 tons (18.712 tonne), by comparison to wood sheathing, coppering 
would be considerably lighter. This salient point is a contributory factor to why speed 
was improved irrespective that marine growth was deterred.
The concept of using metal to protect ship’s hulls was not new for it is known that the 
Romans often sheathed their vessels with lead fastened with copper nails,  ^ This is 
further supported from archaeological evidence gleaned from the Roman Punic Ship.  ^
There is no concrete evidence of sheathing after this period until 1514 AD when it 
appears that the Spanish were using lead for some of their ships. With respect to England 
the only reference relates to the those ships fitting out for Sir Hugh Willoughby’s 
expedition to seek a NW passage to China in 1553. ^
Apparently little experimentation was undertaken afterwards until 1671 when it was 
decided to furnish the 5th rate Phoenix (42) with lead sheathing held with copper nails. 
Sheathing of this nature was in fact fitted to 20 ships built between 1671 and 1690. To 
facilitate this an Act of Parliament was passed in 1670 granting exclusive rights for a 25 
year period to Sir Philip Howard and Francis Watson for manufacturing milled lead.  ^
Their first patent No. 154, lodged 8 October 1667 permitted them rights for 14 years. 
Further patents were submitted, the last No.254 dated 13 August 1687, comprised, “a  
new manufacture, art, or invention, by certaine engine or roller to draw, roll, or mill
plates or sheets o f lead by them cast or prepared for that purpose as M>ell for
sheathings shipps as for any other use or purpose whatsoever'  ^ It appears that lead 
was not overly successful inasmuch that it was too heavy and that it ‘'was not hard
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enough to endure long the action o f the water”. This point is further confirmed as 
result of trials carried out later in 1768. Moreover, galvanic action induced by lead 
incurred corrosion of iron nails and rudder fittings, as result the old Tudor method of 
sheathing in wood was reverted to. This itself had its drawbacks; though it deterred 
worm to a degree, it produced considerable drag to the ship. Second, hull defects were 
difficult to detect.
On 2 October 1708 a letter was sent to the Navy Board from the Secretary of the 
Admiralty supporting a petition from Charles Perry concerning copper sheathing stating 
that, ‘‘...your petitioners have, with great industry and charge, invented a new method 
o f sheathing ships with British copper, which without hindrance to their sailing will 
preserve them from worms and barnacles in voyages to the East and West Indies, and 
prevent all occasion o f careening and repairing them, which the common sheathing 
frequently requires. ” Unfortunately this suggestion was refused by the Navy Board 
on grounds of the expense. With regards to ships no other proposals were made however 
the idea of using copper was not completely dismissed. In 1717 Sir Isaac Townsend, the 
Commissioner of Portsmouth Dockyard, writing to the Navy Board suggested using 
copper to protect dock gates;
Portsmouth, M thJuly I7 I7
 PS. The enclosed is a proposal from the Master Builder and his Assistant for lining
the gates o f the great basin with copper, to prevent their being damaged by the worms, 
which (it has been observed) were the ruin o f the former; and as it seems to me to carry 
with it a manifest advantage to the service more than sufficient to compensate the 
charge thereof, I  humbly join in opinion with them and pray leave to submit it to your 
consideration.
Resorting to accepted practices wooden sheathing remained the predominant method of 
hull protection for the next half century. The obvious problems prevailed; not only did 
this method fail to deter ship worm it also failed to eradicate encrustation of marine 
growth, the build up of which greatly impaired a ship’s speed. Various actions were
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taken to combat this dilemma: A standard procedure for sheathing ships was authorised 
by the Navy Board 24 January 1727/8 which stipulated the following specification;
...to cover the bottom with thick brown paper and for preserving o f the sheathing from  
the worm to fill with filling brads or nails, first taking care that all the iron work be 
carefully examined and secured, and the seams and butts o f the bottom well horsed up 
and caulked and paid with common-tempered stuff as usual, and the bottoms all over 
with a good coat o f soft-tempered stuff: the seams and butts listed with spun hair, and 
on that to cover the bottom with strong cap bag paper made out o f old cordage and not 
o f the sort made o f woollen rags, each sheet, open, to be 22 inches by 1.1/2 inches, and 
each ream to weigh at least 45 pounds, scarped an inch over each other and tacked in 
each corner: then taking care that the sheathing board is sawed to a thickness, fayed, 
regularly edged, and to have two rows o f holes bored in each butt to prevent splitting, 
and well dried with fire and paid thick with boiling tar, and that covered with hair well 
beat laid very smooth, and a good quantity o f tar and hair: and then fastened to the side 
with sheathing nails about tw>o and half inches asunder, and when the sheathing is 
caulked, to take down edges and butts as smooth as possible, and then fill it with filling 
brads or nails 1.1/4 inch long or so, as not to be more than half an inch in the plank, 
the heads to be about 3/8 o f inch asunder, taking care the nails and brads are regularly 
drove and well soaked up that so the bottom may be as smooth as the nature o f the work 
will admit, and then be well breamed and graved.
As seen the procedure for sheathing in timber was a relatively complex affair. Graving 
compounds were then ‘payed’ over the entire surfaces to discourage weed and barnacles. 
Most compositions used were only successful in the short term. Some 10 patents relating 
to graving compounds were submitted between 1667 and 1779. Whether all were 
actually applied is speculative. One such proposal, submitted by the 10^  ^ Earl of 
Dundonald, was the use of coal tar which did, after trials, appear suitable. The best 
compound found was that introduced by Mr. Lee, the Master Caulker at Portsmouth in 
1737. Lee’s mixture comprised pitch, tar and brimstone. Trials lasting two years proved 
that worm had not penetrated. When the Victory was first built she would have been 
sheathed in a similar fashion to that stated above, however as to which graving
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compounds were used, remains unknown. Perhaps traces may still be found on the old 
timbers which could be analysed.
Experiments, using copper on the keel, false keels, rudder bearding and sternpost were 
undertaken in the late 1750s on the Norfolk, Panther and Medway. This appears to 
have been instigated by the fact that the Invincible, captured from the French in 1747, 
had her keel studded with copper nails.
On 18 October 1761 the Admiralty, under recommendation, authorised the Navy Board 
to sheath the Alarm frigate (32) with copper. This work was, according to the Scots 
Magazine of 1761, completed by the November. Next, the Dolphin frigate was 
similarly furnished for her voyage of exploration in 1764. Sheathing used comprised a 
layer of brown paper covered with copper plates of 12 oz. per the square foot. Each 
were to overlap 3/4 inch (1.9 cm). Plating commenced 1 foot (30.5 cm) below the 
waterline above which were placed elm boards 3 inches (7.62 cm) thick. As with lead 
sheathing, copper sheathing produced its own inherent problems: Ships were still being 
constructed with iron nails, rudder pintles and gudgeons, all of which were found to 
corrode through electrolysis set up by dissimilar metals and sea water. In short this was 
serious, thus, to combat galvanic erosion, further experiments were made. In 1769 the 
Aurora and Stag were first breamed, then all the ends of iron bolts were paid with ‘soft 
s tu ff  (tar and pitch) then covered with canvas and very thin sheet, and rudder fittings 
were covered with lead. Irrespective that the problem was not fully eradicated, the 
concept proved beneficial as shown from Admiral Keppel’s letter 8 September 1778 
concerning his frigates;
Victory at Sea.
I  hope when the other two next dock that your Lordships will try the experiment o f 
coppering their bottoms. I f  action is likely to be provided, I  do think the expense upon 
calculation is not too great that at least ten o f your 74 gun ships should be coppered. ^
The concern to sheath ships with copper became paramount. Like Keppel, Admiral 
Rodney himself wrote, ‘to bring the enemy to action, copper-bottomed ships are 
absolutely neccesary. Without them we should not have taken one Spanish Ship. '
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Irrespective of cost, and the galvanic problem caused by iron fittings, the Comptroller for 
the Navy, Sir Charles Middleton endorsed a policy to sheath ships accordingly. This 
decision had the full support of both the King and the Admiralty. As previously stated 
Victory was sheathed in copper in March 1780. At this period all bolts etc. fitted in the 
lower hull were still of ferrous material, thus she would have suffered the same galvanic 
problems aforesaid. This is highlighted in Captain Ferguson’s letter to his brother, 
March 1783;
Some time ago I  stepped into a dry dock, Where a Ship was under repair, which had 
been Copper’d, and observed the whole Bolts and Iron Work in the Bottom, between 4 
and 5 Inches from the outside corroded and nothing but rusty dust, and having 
mentioned this in different Companies, I  found myself laughed at But on the Victorv 
beins latelv carried into Dock, it is found. That all the Bolts for 4 to 5 Inches inwards 
from the Copper, is sound and all the rest inwards to the Hold, nothing but rust and it is 
the general opinion o f the Officers and Carpenters, who have inspected her, that had 
she touched the Ground ever so slightly she must have gone to pieces. And on further 
Inquiry, I  find  the whole Ships which have been Copper 'd to two years are in the same 
condition, and even My Old Ship Venus, which I  got Copper’d  in Antigua, and as I  
attended closely myself to this Operation.
I  shall relate the Steps, I  caused take to prevent the Copper from eating or corroding 
the Iron. After the Sheathing was riped (sic) off 1. A strong Fire was put under 
her, all the Pitch burnt entire, and every little Nail taken out. 2. Two Strong Coats o f 
White Lead and Oil put on. 3. Over the head o f every Bolt, a Strong Coat o f Pitch with 
Oakum and brown Paper. 4. Over that Canvas and a Plate o f Lead drove on with 
Copper Nails. 5 Then the Copper Plates put over all & nailed down with Copper Nails 
about two Inches long. And it seems now to be the general opinion o f all the officers I  
have met with, That our great losses by Ships foundering at \Sea, have been occasioned, 
by the Iron Work giving way as they were all Coppered.
The manner I  see our Ships Coppered in our Yards at home is P\ A Strong Fire to burn 
o ff all the Stuff from o ff the Bottom. 2. A thick Coal (coat ?) o f Gluey Pitch. 3^ .^ A
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Strong Covering o f pasteboard. 4. Then the Sheets o f Copper put on. As this is the 
Subject o f much Conversation How the Bolts, for 4 to 5 Inches next the Copper are 
sound, and all the rest nothing but dross I  beg my Compf to my Worthy f ie n d  Doctor 
Black, state the Case and let me know what he takes to be the cause o f this.
I  am told, that in the place o f Iron Work, a m ix’d  kind o f Brassy Metal is to be used 
for Bolts &c. But I  gi^eatly suspect it will be brittle, and want answer, for it is out o f the 
power o f man to build Ships so strong but by a heavy gale, they will twist and become 
elastic I  am Sc.
The description given in the above letter verifies the method used to counteract the 
corrosion of iron carried out on Aurora in 1769. The fact that the Victory could ‘have 
gone to pieces ' is particularly disturbing especially with regard to the tragic loss of the 
Royal George in August 1782. The perception of some people at the time was that the 
loss of the Royal George was due to structural failure, indeed one witness at the inquiry 
into the loss testified to hearing a load report of cracking timbers from below decks. 
Although the official result of the inquiry was that the Royal George was lost through a 
series of human errors relating to her being heeled to effect repairs, while simultaneously 
being loaded with stores on the opposite side of the ship, it cannot be ruled out that the 
failure of corroded iron hull bolts contributed to the loss of the ship. Should this have 
been the case, together with the later condition found in the Victory, then the fact that 
the rest of the coppered ships within the fleet were at sea in the same condition must 
have raised considerable concern for the Admiralty. Further research regarding ships 
losses for this period could be revealing.
Dr. Black’s reply to Ferguson’s letter raises some very interesting theories on the causes 
of corrosion. He also infers that the timber itself assists the corrosive process of iron. 
This fact is quite valid inasmuch that it is quite common for the oak surrounding an iron 
bolt to decay, due to the tannic acids inherent within oak reacting with the iron. The first 
indication of this problem is that the surrounding wood begins to turn black, it then 
breaks down and the iron bolt, by now already corroding, works loose.
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Dear Sir,
I  ree f fi'om your Brother a Copy o f that part o f your letter o f the Insf in which you 
relate your observations on the state o f the Iron Bolts in the Bottoms o f several Men o f
War which have lately been inspected being a point o f the greatest importance to
the British Navy. In all the Ships lately examined it appears that the greater part o f the 
Bolts from the inner end o f them to within 4 to 5 inches o f the outside were completely 
decayed and changed into rust. & you suspect that the Coppering may have been the
occasion o f this one o f your Officers, Mr. Yeats & he suggested, a supposition that
in rough weather at Sea the Bolts may be so much fatigued by the working o f the ship 
that water may find  room to pass along the surface o f the Bolt fi^om the outside inwards 
& that the water penetrates in this way receive from the Copper a disposition to corrode 
the Iron in its passage along it, but I  cannot admit this supposition upon any account, 
it being evident that i f  the water passed in this manner & received from the Copper a 
Disposition to corrode the Iron, it w^  ^act most powerfidly upon the first part o f y ‘^ Iron
which it touched or passed along which would be the outer end o f the Bolt let us
suppose that there are originally in the Timber juices or some other matter which 
undergoes a change or Fermentation by time & gradually evaporates or is washed out 
in ships that are not Coppered, but that in coppered ships is confined by the copper &
in consequence acts upon the Iron and destroys i t .............According to it this corrosive
matter o f the Timber should be most powerful toward the outside to which the Copper is 
immediately applied & should have little or no effect towards the inner end o f the Bolt, 
where there is nothing to prevent its evaporating or being washed out in Coppered 
Ships as in others.
What then will you say, could be the occasion o f the rotten state o f the Bolts. The
Suppositions that appear tom e .............but they are merely Suppositions are these -
-One Consequence o f the Coppering is that the Ships require careening & inspection o f 
their Bottoms less frequently than formerly as their bottoms remain clean & f i t  for  
sailing - but it may have been forgot that the Bolts are liable to decay & they may have 
been allowed to remain long without being renewed - 2'^  ^- A l l  the world knows that we 
have been under necessity o f fitting out our men o f War with the gixatest possible 
dispatch during the greater part o f the War, I  can imagine that in some cases when
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Coppered Ships were docked, upon examining their bottoms the outer end o f the Bolts 
being found good and sound which formerly was the first thought that decayed it was 
concluded that the whole Bolt was sound & it was therefore allowed to remain although 
the inner end o f it without being suspected was totally changed into rust - - Perhaps
the Iron which had been used in the Navy for some time past may have been o f a 
different quality from that which was used formerly, & more liable to Rust.........
You mention your having heard o f an Intention or proposal to substitute Brass Bolts in 
place o f Iron ones but you suspect that Brass will not be sufficiently tough and strong to 
serve this Purpose - I  am persuaded however that a proper Composition o f Brass may 
be found which will be as strong & even stronger than Iron <&. which will last 
incomparably longer.......
It is interesting that Dr. Black, who was the Professor of Chemistiy at Edinburgh 
University, states that the problem may have occurred because ships were being 
hurriedly sheathed without care to inspect underwater bolts beforehand. This could imply 
that Dockyard practices were either less stringent than believed; or more likely, that 
pressure of war to return ships to sea led to an oversight. It could also mean that 
Dockyards had not yet fully understood the implications of the process. It also raises the 
point that the standard of iron produced varied according to supplier and that there was 
no true quality control of material, albeit nothing comparable to the standards laid down 
today.
So grave was the corrosion problem that the Navy Board contemplated discontinuing the 
practice of coppering ships. Fortunately a decision was made to substitute iron bolts 
and other fittings on all ships below the waterline with an alternative alloy. This policy 
was given considerable support from Thomas Williams, the prime industrialist behind the 
copper industry who, at the close of the American War, addressed the Parliamentary 
Committee;
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\..a  considei'able alarm was given both in this country and in France from the loss o f 
the famous French ships Ville de Paris and the Glorieaux [sic] and His Majesty's ship 
the Centaur, together with many vessels at the same time, all which losses were 
concluded to be occasioned by the ships being copper-sheathed upon iron bolts and 
other iron fastenings; such was the general shock upon this occasion, I  believe both our 
Admiralty and Navy Boards, on consultations in the latter end o f the year 1782, meant 
to discontinue the practice o f copper-sheathing, however useful it had been found fo r  a 
time, on account o f the great number o f lives that have been lost, and the dangers that 
would afterwards attend it, unless copperbolts could be made sufficiently hard for the 
necessary drifts o f those fastenings; all the copper bolts that had been made use o f to 
that time having been very short ones, that required no tight drifts; and it was supposed 
that the metal was not capable o f being wrought to the hardness necessary. It is of 
particular note that no mention is made to the sinking of the Royal George.
This option of replacing all iron fittings below the waterline was to be very expensive, 
however irrespective of cost Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who more than 
anyone had pressed for sheathing ships with copper, consented to this action. Estimates 
for ships such as the Victory were approximately £2,272. This figure equates to 
approximately 12 shillings per plate. Corroboration between the Progress Book and 
Ferguson’s letter 1®^ March 1783; “being lately carried into Dock”, clearly indicate that 
this work was executed in February 1783. (Refer Appendix II).
Various experiments were being made at this period to produce a tough substitute alloy 
to replace iron bolts and fittings one such was submitted by the industrialist and chemist 
James Keir in 1779, (Patent No. 1240). This comprised “a compound metal capable o f 
being forged when hot or when cold, more fi t  for the making o f bolts, nails, and
sheathing for ships than any metals heretofore used for those purposes,  this
compound metal consists o f one hundred parts o f copper, seventy five parts o f zinc and 
spelter and ten parts o f iron. When those proportions are mixed together, they 
constitute a compound metal, which may be forged either when cold or when heated to 
blood red”
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Keir’s compound metal appears to be the origin of the alloy Cunifer 10 used today for 
sea water system pipework. This modern alloy comprises 87% Copper, 10% Nickel, 2% 
Iron and 1% Manganese. The ‘spelter’ referred to would consist of approximately 59 - 
61% Copper, 0.8 - 1.2% Tin, and 39 - 41% Zink, and was in effect what was termed as 
Muntz metal. The fact that this metal could be used for sheathing as well as bolts, etc. is 
of particular note.
A second patent, (No.l381), was lodged by William Forbes of Deptford 29 July 1783. 
Accordingly this related to; “A method o f manufacturing holts and other fastenings for  
ships in a manner and o f materials never hitherto made use for those purposes". The 
bolts were made of, “copper and spelter, zinck or lapis calaminaris in a proportion o f  
from one pound to sixty o f spelter zinck or lapis calaminaris to on hundred pounds o f 
copper". Forbes’ method of producing bolts involved cold rolling through a series of 
graduated grooves to aquire the determined diameter. If made in pure copper Forbes 
admitted that they were to some degree softer than those made in an alloy.
Another patent (No. 1388), submitted by William Collins in October the same year relates 
to iron bolts which were, “plated with sheet copper or metal which is fixed to the iron 
either with brass or spelter, tin, or lead, alone, or with mixtures o f them. " The most 
significant factor is that industry was, by this period, prepared to experiment in 
metalurgy. This not only applied to the production of non-ferrous alloys, but also 
combinations of ferrous and non-ferrous materials. Besides this Collins, together with 
John Westwood, produced pure copper bolts of considerable strength. In Westwoods 
method after the copper was annealed it passed through adjustable rollers and 
continuously cooled with of jets of water to prevent it heating.
Accepting the problems found with electrolysis and the advance in producing compound 
materials the Admiralty finally authorised the use of the new patent bolts in 1784. These 
were to be fitted on all new ships under construction and to replace iron bolts on the 
older vessels as the opportunity arose. It appears that Forbes alone, through the support 
of Vice Admiral John Byron, attained an exclusive contract with the Royal Navy, and 
afterwards the East India Company. Besides bolts and copper nails, Forbes also 
manufactured mixed metal rudder pintles and gudgeons, moulds being sent from each
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dockyard to Deptford. Initially this did create some problems as those taking moulds off 
the actual ships often failed to account for metal shrinkage in the casting process 
resulting in the returned items not fitting properly. This was overcome in due course. In 
1793 a kinsman, one David Forbes is listed as a contractor suppling braziers and 
founders goods. Three years later another supplier, John Williams, is listed as 
providing copper sheets, mixed metal nails, copper nails, bolts and rings. Demand for 
copper increased as the fleet expanded. In 1803 a ftirnace was installed at Portsmouth 
Dockyard for melting old copper sheathing but it was to be another two years before a 
second furnace was introduced to accommodate refining and rolling machinery to 
produce new copper sheathing plates.
It could thus be concluded that copper plates fitted during the Victory’s career would 
have been supplied from a variety of contractual sources. To determine this point, albeit 
limited, an inspection of the plates removed from the Victory was undertaken in 1996 by 
myself, with assistance from John Bingemen and Arthur Mack, both of whom were 
previously connected with the Invincible wreck project.
With the exception of a few pieces adjacent to the keel and on the rudder, all copper 
plates fitted on the Victory in 1888 have subsequently been removed during recent 
restoration and placed in storage. On examination many pertinent points were revealed. 
Each was found to measure 4 feet (1.22 m) long by 14 inches (35.56 cm) wide and 
approximately 1/64 inch (0.38mm) thick. Others had obviously been cut or trimmed to 
suit a particular surface. Further analysis indicated that all plates were stamped with the 
government ‘broad arrow’ set at intervals of 4 inches (10.16 cm) in the horizontal plane 
and 2.1/2 inches (6.35 cm) in the opposite plane and thus formed a diagonal pattern 
across the sheet. The ‘arrows’ themselves measure 1/2 an inch (1.27 cm) long and 1/2 an 
inch (1.27 cm) broad (Fig. 3/2). Plates were also stamped in one corner with a date 
enclosed within a circle 7/8 inches (223 mm) in diameter. In this particular case it read 
‘OCT 1888’, (Fig. 3/3.c) a date which coincided exactly with the last time Victory was 
coppered. More enlightening is that these particular copper plates were also embossed 
with the contractors Trade Mark and weight of the plate within an oval shaped enclosure 
measuring 1.1/8 by 7/8 inches (28 by 223mm) containing the manufacturer name, ‘JOHN 
BIBBY SONS & CO’. The innermost oval, which measured 3/4 by 3/8 inch (190.5 by
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95.25mm), was marked with the weight of the plate, ‘280Z’ (Fig.3/3.a & d). These 
plates were secured with copper nails 7/8 inch (223mm) long with a flat head 5/16 inch 
(79.4mm) in diameter. The round shank of the nail was found to be 1/8 inch (31.75mm) 
thick. On the particular plate chosen for inspection it was found that these nails were set 
at intervals of 1.1/4 inches (317.5mm) from their centres around the edges of the plate.
Though having identical date stamps, other plates indicated that they had been made by 
alternative manufacturers. Names found were ‘Clifford’, (Fig. 3/3.b) and ‘WF & Co’, 
both being preceded by a weight mark of 28 ozs as previously described. In all 
probability the initials ‘WF’ relate to the aforementioned known contractor William 
Forbes of Deptford who previously manufactured ‘mixed metal’ (cupro-zinc) fittings 
such as gudgeons and pintles during the 1780s. Whether the company of Forbes was still 
in business a century later is yet to be clarified. Moreover it could be questioned whether 
the sheathing plates concerned were originals supplied from Forbes taken out of storage 
and used a century later, or more to the point, earlier plates that had never been 
removed.
Returning to the remaining copper still attached to the rother, or rudder, this apparently 
illustrates the later method of sheathing adopted from the Mercantile fleet into the Navy 
during the 19‘^ ' century where the upper plates overlap the strakes of plates below. This 
method is the reverse to the initial practice sheathing first used in the Navy where the 
lower strakes overlap the upper plates. What little sheathing remains on the keel leaves 
little to formulate any sound opinion on the method used with exception that the copper 
plating sheathing the keel was fitted before the two false keels were fitted. With respect 
to the false keels, sheathing was applied after they were stapled to the main keel with 
copper alloy dogs. In perspective, the same should apply where the horseshoe plate was 
fitted at the forefoot, and the fish plates were attached to the heels of the stern post and 
inner posts. To the contrary, it appears from investigation that the copper sheathing was 
fitted before these heavy fastenings were bolted in position which, taking consideration 
of the logic process of construction and the function of these particular fittings, seems 
impractical. The reasons that lay behind this anomaly are for the present obscure. The 
only logical answer is that the horseshoe and fish plates have at some relatively recent 
stage been removed and refitted.
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Whether the Victory shall ever be re-sheathed with copper plates is conjectural. Not only 
does cost prohibit such a undertaking, for practicality it seems hardly feasible to sheath a 
ship in dry dock. Should such a venture be deemed plausible then perhaps four of the 
uppermost strakes of copper could be fitted along with the appropriate elm boarding at 
the waterline. It has since been found that the practice of fitting elm boards at the 
waterline had been discontinued prior to c.1802, and the copper plating extended 16 
inches above the waterline. As for other preserved ships, the Unicorn frigate at Dundee 
and the tea clipper Cutty Sark at Greenwich, both still retain their sheathing. With respect 
to the Trincomalee, currently being restored at Hartlepool, it is planned to sheath her 
hull in the near future. This action makes good preservation sense as both the 
Trincomalee and Unicorn frigates remain afloat.
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Figure 3/1.
Sketch of the remains of Copper Plating at the after end of the Keel: HMS Victory. 
Key;
1. Lower Rudder Pintle Brace.
2. Fish Plates.
3. Redundant recess for old Keel Staple.
4. Remains of redundant Staple.
5. Short Staple joining 6 inch False Keel to Main Keel.
6. Copper nail heads.
7. Remains of Copper Sheathing on 4 inch False Keel.
8. Medium length Copper Staple.
9. Remains of two Staples.
10. Long Staple.
11. 6 inch False Keel
12. Main Keel.
Note: All Staples are 1.1/4 inches (32mm) by 1/2 inch (13 mm) thick.
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Fig: 3/2: Copper Sheathing Plate removed from HMS Victory, (scale 3/16” - 1”) 
Key:
1. Long edge run of nail holes - approx. 1.1/0 inches aprt
2. Centre row of ‘broad arrows, also middle row of nails holes across plate.
3. Government mark of Broad Arrow.
4. Rows of nails holes across plate.
5. Short edge row of nail holes - aprox 1.1/12 inches apart.
A This corner denotes location of manufacturers stamp.
B The reverse side of this corner denotes date stamp.
Note: Stamps for either manufacturer or date fitted do not always correspond witli tiiose corners 
indicated on tlie drawing.
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Chapter 4.
Stern Construction.
In accord with general shipbuilding practice, when first built the Victory was constructed 
with a square stern with open galleries. These galleries, provided for the pleasure of the 
Captain and Admiral, were fitted at the level of the quarter deck and the upper gun deck 
respectively.
The square stern as we know it derived from the early Tudor period, however its origins 
pre-date this era when medieval ships were first built with an after castle for defensive 
purposes. By the 13^  ^ century this elementary platform had developed into a permanent 
structure and by the 14^ '^  century had become built integral with the hull.  ^ The recent 
built British replica of Cabot’s Matthew (1497) is a prime example. Here the frame 
timbers extend higher to form the side of the cabin structure. As time progressed this 
structure became larger, extending aft beyond the confines of the stern post with 
enclosed cabins to accommodate the ship’s officers. Additional decks were added 
thereby forming what became known as the quarter deck and the poop (L. puppis - 
aftermost deck). This effectively provided more space for the crew. The lower part of 
the hull remained of round tuck form with the wales carried round to the stern post, the 
structure above being supported on brackets. In short this design was structurally 
unsatisfactory. This problem was overcome by constructing the lower part of the stern 
with a flat transom. This modification, known as the square tuck developed sometime 
during the 15“' century however the true origins of this design are little known.  ^The 
upper part of the stern projected aft in a series of counters.
Open stern and quarter galleries where next introduced possibly as early as circa 1480  ^
and remained in vogue. The square tuck remained throughout the Tudor period but 
began to disappear from English ships in the first quarter of the 16“' century, design 
returning to an improved form of round tuck. This appears first evident on the Constant 
Reformation 1618 and later the Sovereign o f the Seas 1637.  ^ The reversion to the round 
tuck was probably made for the following reasons;
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1. More solid construction providing greater strength.
2. Less liable to leaks.
3. Better underwater hull form thereby improving steering capabilities.
4. More aesthetically pleasing.
An analysis of a number of contemporaiy models and draughts of the Victory when first 
built in 1765 show that she was initially constructed with two galleries.  ^ This design, 
known as the open stern, was considerably simple comprising two side counter timbers 
forming the after extremity of the hull above the waterline. These extended from the 
upper edge of the wing transom to the taffrail above the level of the poop deck. Between 
these were six short counter timbers which terminated at the level of the upper gun deck 
beams. The timbers, which formed the divisions of the wardroom lights (stern windows) 
at the after end of the middle gun deck, provided the only solid structure of the stern. All 
of the counter timbers were braced with a series of transverse beams: The wing transom, 
helm port transom, respective deck transoms and a breast rail, the latter at the level of 
the wardroom. At this period, most, if not all, of these transverse timbers were secured 
to the ship’s side using horizontal timber knees. Without the original draught the sizes of 
these knees can only be determined from alternative sources,  ^ estimates being as 
follows;
Table 4/1.
Estimated Dimensions of respective Transom Knees: Victory as built 1765.
Transom Knee. Siding
(ins.)
Arm Length; 
fore & aft
Arm Length; 
athwartships
No. of 
Bolts
Bolt
Dia.
Wing Transom 13.1/2 18ft. 0 ins. 7 ft. 6 ins. 14 1.3/8 ins.
Helm Port Transom. 9.1/2. l i f t .  6 ins. 6 ft. 4 ins. 14 1 inch.
LGDk. Deck Transom. 11 As convenient 5 ft. 0 ins 8 1.3/8 ins
Breast Rail 10 As convenient 4 ft. 6 ins 7 1.1/4 ins
UGDk.Deck Transom. 8 As convenient 4 ft. 3 ins 7 1.1/8 ins
QDk. Deck Transom. Iron - - - -
Poop Deck Transom Iron - - - -
Notes: Where ‘as convenient’ is stated, this refers to the length of tlie arm being tliat space given 
between the transom and its adjacent beam. Where ‘Iron’ is stated, this infers that iron brackets were 
used.
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Outboard of the two aforesaid side counter timbers were two quarter pieces (or posts) 
which formed the extremities of the quarter galleries. Unlike the other counter timbers, 
the heels of the quarter pieces were not let into the wing transom but onto a stool bolted 
to the ship’s side.
The two original stern galleries projected about 3 feet 6 inches (1.07 m) abaft of the hull 
line of the counter timbers. “ Transversely both galleries extended in a graceful curve 
confined within the limits of the two side counter timbers. In effect the after end of both 
the upper gun deck and quarter deck were of open construction, closed only by 
transverse screen bulkheads fitted within the hull at the aftermost deck beam. The screen 
bulldiead fitted in the Admiral’s quarters was fitted at original No. 26 quarter deck beam, 
while that for the Captain’s cabin was fitted at the aftermost poop deck beam. The area 
formed abaft these bulkheads was provided to form open stern galleries which projected 
beyond the confines of the ship’s hull. Screen bulkheads were, by this period, fitted; 
“...with a single sash and shutter: that the height be so divided that the depth o f the 
sash may be equal to the panel below, that both sash and shutter may be buried therein 
when down, ”  ^ for easier removal when clearing the ship for battle. Practical though 
this seems, the main disadvantage was that any ship built in this manner was very 
susceptible to raking shot fired by the enemy through the stern penetrating the full extent 
of the hull causing irrevocable damage and high casualties. Such destruction can be 
gleaned from the result of the raldng broadsides delivered through the stern of the French 
ship Bucentaure by the Victory and successive ships in line at the Battle of Trafalgar.
Access to each of the stern galleries was attained through two doors fitted in their related 
screen bulkheads. By this period quarter galleries were entirely enclosed, access being 
attained through doors leading from their associated cabins, and, in all probability, a 
second entry could be made direct from doors leading from the stern galleries. “ 
Unfortunately original draughts of the Victory do not indicate which door configuration 
was employed. Luckily alternative sources, draughts of the Sandwich, London, and 
Boyne. do provide some indication;
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Sandwich: 2"“ Rate, 98 Guns, 1759:
Quarter deck: 1 door leading from the stern gallery.
Upper gun deck: 2 doors; One leading from the great cabin, one from the
stern gallery.
Middle gun deck: No door shown, however one would have been fitted in 
wardroom. Of note, this omission is, in all probability, 
is drawing error.
London: 2"“ Rate, 90 Guns, 1766:
Quarter deck: 1 door leading from the stern galleiy.
Upper gun deck: 2 doors; One leading from the great cabin, one from the
stern gallery.
Middle gun deck: 1 door leading from the wardroom.
Boyne: 2"“ Rate, 98 Guns, 1790:
Quarter deck: 1 door leading from the stern gallery.
Upper gun deck: 2 doors; One leading from the great cabin, one from the
stern gallery.
Middle gun deck: 1 door leading from the wardroom.
It also appears that the Victory, like all and 2"“ Rates constructed during the 1760s 
and 70s, had four counter or chase ports cut in the lower counter, a trait that continued 
until the 1790s. This is evident from various model and drawing sources. How often 
these ports were actually used for mounting stern chase guns is somewhat obscure. The 
entire concept of mnning guns out with a stern running sea is rather impractical 
especially as Victory carried heavy 42 pounders on board at this period. Second, there is 
very little space to successfiilly mount and operate four guns. In reality, if guns were 
mounted at this location, those outboard would have recoiled into the side of the 
carriages of the aftermost broadside guns. In truth, no additional ordnance was actually 
carried for the stern chase ports; if required, the aftermost broadside guns were removed 
and run out through the stern ports. Counter, or stern chase, ports were more 
commonly employed for running out cables when anchoring astern. Of note, the
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aforesaid model is furnished with window mullions at the out board ports which indicate 
that the main purpose of these ports were to provide light and ventilation to the 
gunroom.
Further study reveals that in order to fit four counter or chase ports, the disposition of 
the lower counter timbers would have differed from those later fitted during Victory \s 
1800/03 refit. Unfortunately, as original plans are now lost, the only reliable source that 
verifies this point is the contemporary model of the ship. This model indicates that the 
line of the lower counter timbers do not correspond to the disposition of the wardroom 
stern lights. In fact the four chase ports fall directly below the lower counter timbers, a 
point that was common to other vessels. From this it is clear that the counter timbers 
comprised two groups; those of the lower counter forming the divisions between the 
chase ports; and those of the upper counter forming the divisions of the wardroom lights. 
Alternatively, depending on their position, some of these frames may have been made 
from canted timbers. Should this have been the case timber selection, especially when 
accounting for the curvature of the counters, may have proved difficult.
Irrespective that Victory’s elaborately decorated stern was graced with superb lines when 
first built, this form of stern was far from practical, and furthermore very weak 
structurally. Unfortunately ship design was very much rooted in conservative 
traditionalism. In 1795 Victory's commander. Captain Grey, reported; “Ihave observed 
that the ship is very weak abaft; the transoms between the lower and middle-decks work 
exceedingly. " This problem was not just confined to the Victory but inherent, in many 
ships. In 1797 it was reported that the tiller of the Pigamemnon (64) ; “traverses entirely 
on the helm-transom ” and that the “stern-post works. ” Some ships actually worked 
the heels of their counter timbers out from the wing transoms in relatively normal sea 
conditions. The Queen Charlotte (100) was reported to have her; “counter timbers 
being tript (sic) in the heel Ll /4  inch. ” In all some 142 reports were submitted 
between 1795 and 1815 by sea officers serving on ships ranging from to 6“' rates, each 
ship suffering similar structural failures. The consequences of design failure cannot be 
emphasised too strongly and may well have contributed to ship losses at sea.
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The fact that all counter timbers did not extend the full height of the stern meant the 
rigidity of the hull form abaft was greatly compromised; lack of structural timbers 
subjected the after part of the hull to considerable racking. Second, by virtue that stern 
galleries extended beyond the hull, structural timbers that were fitted had to bear the 
unnecessary weight incurred. To reiterate the more practical points, ships built with an 
open stern suffered much damage by raking fire. With respect to comfort, many sea 
officers complained that the screen bulkheads did little to deter draughts when ships were 
on constant blockade.
Initially little could be done to completely eradicate the problem as Britain was engrossed 
in war with France however some measures were taken to alleviate the situation. As an 
intermediary remedy, the first measures undertaken were to reduce the galleries back to 
the counter timbers and glaze the space above the breast rail. This appears to have 
been implemented circa 1796. Complete reconstruction, where all the counter timbers 
were extended to the taftrail, was later carried out on the Royal George (ex Umpire - 
launched 16 Sept 1788) followed by the Vanguard m 1798. ^
Initially the Victory would not have been modified with the closed stern. On her return 
from the Mediterranean she was surveyed at Portsmouth in October 1797 and found 
defective and after paying-off was sent to Chatham for conversion into a hospital ship 
and inevitable obscurity. Fortunately, with the loss of the Impregnable (98) off 
Chichester harbour, 18 October 1799, the Victory was given a reprieve. The 
Admiralty, now short of one three decked ship, ordered that Victory be ‘taken in hand’ 
at Chatham. The first survey indicated that she needed a ‘middling repair ‘ and 
consequently work commenced February 1800. As her refit progressed it was soon 
revealed that her condition was more serious thus the ‘middling’ work promulgated 
reverted to a ‘great repair ’ during which she was reconstructed with a closed stern.
In light of the structural complaints submitted earlier by Captain Grey, work would have 
involved the removal of all stem counter timbers including the wing transom. When 
replaced the new timbers extended the full height to the taffrail, all transversely stiffened 
with breast rails as well as deck transoms. All timbers now formed stern lights for the
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cabins on the middle, upper and quarter decks. When rebuilt only two chase ports were 
fitted in the lower counter in preference for the previous four. This improvement was 
applied to all ships under reconstruction.. In effect the entire structure was far stronger. 
The taffrail had also been heightened by a small degree, probably to give greater 
protection for personnel stationed on the poop deck.
Another innovation implemented was the introduction of additional chase ports at each 
respective deck level. These ports were disposed one directly on the centre line and one 
between the second and third counter timbers either side. In effect this gave provision for 
nine guns: Three ports on the quarter deck, three ports on the upper gun deck , but only 
two on the middle gun deck; the latter being the exception as the rudder head protruded 
through this deck level. Access to these ports was made by;
1. Raising the deadlight.
2. Removal of the vertical panels covering the stern timbers to expose 
necessary ringbolts.
3. Removal of the back panel.
4. Removal of the bench seat.
5. Slipping the port lid bolts and pushing the lid downward.
The Victory’s overall fire power aft in 1805 comprised 11 guns: 2 x 32 pounders; 2 x 24 
pounders; 3 x long 12 pounders; and 3 x short 12 pounders. As stated before, no 
additional armament was carried for chase guns, thus guns would have been taken from 
the broadside batteries if required. Irrespective of improvement, the scantlings of the 
stern counter timbers still remained proportionally smaller than those forming the frames 
of the ship’s side. In view of their frailty it is doubtful if guns were ever mounted astern 
as the recoil affect would have been very detrimental to structural strength if firing was 
sustained over a moderate period. Of note, the original lower gun deck armament of the 
Victory consisted of 42 pounders, these were however changed for the more favourable 
32 pounder after her 1800/03 refit. Although the 32 ponder was smaller and lighter in 
weight, advantageously guns of this calibre were far more manageable, and operationally.
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required less crew. They also used less gunpowder - a 10.1/21b (23kg) charge as 
opposed to 141b (30.9kg).
Today, all of the main timbers and framing of the stern remain original from Victory's 
1800/03 refit. The only alterations made, prior to the extensive repair work carried out 
on the stern during the 1970s, are the fitting of additional iron bracing straps. Consensus 
is that these were fitted during her ‘great repair’ at Chatham, however it is unlikely that 
this was the case. Iron work, if fitted, was at this period only used in extreme cases and 
was not officially introduced until 1805. (refer Chapter 7). For convenience ironwork 
currently fitted has been categorised into three distinct functional groups;
Group I: Comprises a series of iron straps worked and bolted over the heels of the 
counter timbers, helm port transom, wing transom, and filling transom. Though of plain 
design, each is fashioned with a cross piece which lays over the wing transom for 
additional security.
Group II: Relates to two large horizontal iron knees which secure the extremities of the 
wing transom to the spirketting. These knees are fashioned with ten lugs to give better 
material strength where bolting. These replaced the earlier heavier wooden knees, the 
size of which must have proved difficult to procure by the end of the 18^  ^century.
Group ni: These are of a series of iron brackets fitted at the extremities of the transoms 
and breast rails securing them to the ship’s side. (Fig. 4/1) These brackets, some 
intricately fashioned and angled in three planes, are manufactured of relatively heavier 
gauge metal than those applied in Groups I and II.
Most of the ironwork seen today was probably fitted during Victory's rebuild in 1814/16, 
but this may not be the complete case. When exactly each type of iron fitting described 
above was installed in the Victory is uncertain, our only clue relates to their design. The 
only method of dating these components with some degree of accuracy is to compare 
them to other Icnown examples of similar type whose design relates to a specific date. 
From this the approximate time of installation can be established. The ironwork as
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described in Group I is of simple design which could indicate an earlier manufacturing 
technique. However in view that Victory’s stern was completely rebuilt in 1800/03 there 
was probably no initial requirement to strengthen this part of the ship. The earliest 
possible date of fitting would be her repair at Chatham in 1806. This refit not only 
restored action damage sustained at Trafalgar, her previous two years service on 
blockade duties and the ‘great chase’ across the Atlantic might well have weakened her 
hull to some degree. Alternatively they might have been fitted during her repair in 1810 
after service in the Baltic.
Turning to Group II, the singular features of the iron knees fitted to the wing transom 
veiy much resemble those designed by Snodgrass in the 1780s (refer Chapter 7). This 
could indicate that these were actually fitted during the 1800/03 refit especially when 
compass timber of this scantling was in short supply. Irrespective of this theory, Steel 
indicates that timber laiees were still being applied, their dimensions having little altered 
from that specified in 1788. This is also applicable to the helm port transom. Again, if 
not fitted 1814/16 then they could also have been installed circa 1810 when ironwork 
was being applied to other ships as result of its formal introduction in 1805.
With respect to Group III, ironwork to secure deck transoms on higher decks had been 
in use since circa 1788. This naturally extended to the breast rails once the closed stern 
had been introduced. Though this point is valid, and that the Victory was so fitted in 
1800/03, the ironwork presently fitted does not correspond to this period. Examination 
has indicated that these fittings, including the iron bracket knees supporting the aftermost 
deck beams, are similar to those introduced by Seppings. (refer Chapter 7). Identical 
ironwork of similar thickness is fitted on the frigate Unicorn (1824). This indicates that 
this design of ironwork, probably introduced circa 1820, could very well have replaced 
earlier iron brackets during Victoiy’s refit in 1824. Any earlier date; i.e. 1814/16, is very 
unlikely as fittings of this nature (with the exception of two which were probably added 
in 1849) are not found on the Trincomalee built in 1817.
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Chapter 5.
Breadth, Middle and Top Riders.
In the second half of the 18th century it was common practice to brace the hull of older 
or fatigued ships to prolong their serviceable life. This practice was also implemented to 
maintain a high complement of ships within the fleet during periods of war. Moreover, it 
was often found that additional bracing was fitted to relatively new built vessels in order 
to make good deficiencies found with initial design. For example, the Blandford, one of 
the many 20 gun ships built to the 1719 Establishment, was later fiirnished with riders in 
the hold. In this particular case no specification for riders was listed within the 
Establishment, however the Master’s Log for the Blandford, dated 25 May 1731, clearly 
states: ""Hauled ashore to the Wharf in order to drive and clench the Bolts o f the Ryders 
on the Larboard side. ”  ^ Such ships though would never have been braced with 
breadth, middle and top riders which were applicable to three decked ships. With respect 
to two-deckers only the breadth and top riders would have applied.
The two major stresses, hogging and sagging, imposed on a hull working at sea were 
well understood, even by the ancient Egyptians. The earliest known technique utilised to 
counteract such force can be found on reliefs found within the mortuary temple of King 
Sahure (2487-2475 BC).  ^ These depict a crude but effective method employing a heavy 
rope, known as a hogging truss, passed from stem to stern that could be tightened by a 
‘Spanish windlass’ device. Many examples are found in tombs from this period 
onwards.  ^ According to Apollonius,'* a similar device called a hypozoma was applied to 
the ancient Greek triremes.  ^ In all probability the hypozoma, like many other things, was 
adopted from the Egyptians, but unlike the Egyptian hogging truss, the hypozoma was 
fitted low down within the hull running parallel to the keelson. ^
Returning to the breadth, middle and top riders fitted on 18**' century men-of-war, each 
was fitted to the inner side of the hull extending from the beam shelf of one deck to the 
bottom of the spirketting of the deck below. The middle and breadth riders gave shift of 
one deck to maintain continuity. In most cases all were set at a small angle varying 
between 10 and 20 degrees to the vertical to counteract stress forces, their disposition
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being dictated by beam, hanging and lodging knee configuration. A typical 74 gun ship 
would have 11 top riders and 12 breadth riders.  ^ The direction of angle also varied 
according to the disposition of adjacent hull structures, some fitted angled forward, 
others aft, the former being more common but there were no hard and fast rules. In 
some cases riders were fitted vertically giving support to adjacent beams. ^
When such riders were first used is now conjectural especially when original draughts 
pertaining to specific vessels were amended at some later date without explanatory 
annotation. One draught of the London (90), designed by Slade, does show that she was 
at some point fitted with 6 top, 3 middle, and 2 breadth riders either side.  ^ Notes 
writtten on this draught which refer to same class ships, the Impregnable fitting at 
Deptford and Prince o f Wales at Woolwich, are dated 1782 and 1783 respectively. 
Whether this relates to the riders fitted in the upper hull is obscure, only extensive 
research through the Navy Board and Dockyard letters could reveal some formal start 
date for fitting this form of rider. It is very unlikely that the Victory was ever fitted with 
riders of this form when first built however evidence provided from later plans implies 
that she was fitted out with 35 such strengthening members each side of the hull. It is 
believed that these were added during her 1787 refit. (Fig. 5/1) This would make sense 
as this date complies with the two dates mentioned in the above paragraph. The 
disposition of Riders indicated on the aforesaid plan are as follows;
T op  Riders - 12 in No.
No. from 
Fwd.
Frame Station Angle Inclination Length Breadth
1 U 7.5° Aft 12 ft. 6 ins. 1 ft. 2 ins
2 Q 23.0° Aft 13 ft. 6 ins 1 ft. 1 in.
3 K 3.0° Fwd 13 ft. 2 ins. 1 ft. 2 ins.
4 F 5.0° Fwd 13 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.
5 D 25.0° Aft 14 ft. 7 ins. 1 ft. 2 ins.
6 . (F) 14.0° Aft 13 ft. 6 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
7 © 8 .0° Fwd 13 ft. 3 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
8 7 20 .0° Aft 13 ft. 5 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
9 15 10.0° Aft 13 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.
10 21 20 .0° Fwd 13 ft. 4 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
11 25 25.0° Fwd 13 ft. 8 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
12 27 4.0° Aft 12 ft. 10 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
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Middle Riders - 11 in No.
No. from 
Fwd.
Frame Station Angle Inclination Length Breadth
1 * Z 17.0° Aft 20 ft. 9 ins 1 ft. 2 ins
2 0 25.0° Aft 14 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.
3 K 22.0° Aft 13 ft. 9 ins. 1 ft. 1 ins.
4 F 24.0° Aft 14 ft. 1 ft. 2 in.
5 B 7.0° Aft 12 ft. 11 ins. 1 ft.
6 (D) 11.0° Aft 12 ft. 11 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
7 5 11.0° Aft 12 ft. 11 ins. 1 ft.
8 11 12.0° Fwd 13 ft. 1 ft. 2 in.
9 19 14.0° Fwd 13 ft. 4 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
10 23 14.0° Fwd 13 ft. 2 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
11 29 27.0° Aft 14 ft. 9 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
Note: The foremost middle rider, denoted * extends from the beam shelf of the forecastle to the lower 
part of the lower gun deck spirketting.
Breadth Riders - 12 in No.
No. from 
Fwd.
Frame Station Angle Inclination Length Breadth
1 Z 1.0° Aft 12 ft. 10 ins 1 ft. 2 ins
2 S 12.0° Fwd 13 ft. 2 ins. 1 ft. 2 in.g P 11.0° Aft 17 ft. 2 ins. 1 ft. 2 ins.
4 H 0.0° Vertical 13 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.
D 10.0° Aft 17 ft. 2 ins. 1 ft. 2 ins.
6 (F) 0 .0° Vertical 12 ft. 10 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.y *** (B) 0 .0° Vertical 12 ft. 9 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
8 3 2 .0° Fwd 20 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.g ** 7 0 .0° Vertical 17 ft. 1 ft. 1 in.
10 ** 12 0.0° Vertical 17 ft. 1 ft. 2 in.
11 23 11.0° Fwd 12 ft. 9 ins. 1 ft. 1 in.
12 ** 29 13.0° Fwd 17 ft. 7 ins. 1 ft. 2 in.
Notes; Those denoted such ** are of greater lengtli and extend below the level of the orlop deck. That 
denoted such *** extends upward to tlie beam shelf of the upper gun deck, and downward to 
the level of the orlop deck.
From the above notes, it appears that the design of some of the riders fitted deviates 
from the normal accepted practices where riders extended over two decks only. The
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anomalies relate to No. 1 middle rider and No. 7 breadth rider which each span three 
decks. Second, it is of particular interest that five of the breadth riders are set in the 
vertical plane. Though length and breadth sizes can be determined from the draught, the 
moulded breadth of the riders fitted on Victory cannot be fully acsertained from firm 
evidence. Dimensions by rule of thumb are; moulded breadth (athwartships) is 1.1/4 
inches for every 1 foot in length (4.233 cm per meter); breadth fore and aft, 3/4 of the 
moulded breadth. ** From the above tables the breadth fore and aft average 1 foot 2 
inches (35.56 cm) thus moulded breadth can be equated as approximately 1 foot 6.1/2 
inches (47.0 cm). (Fig. 5/2) From the draught its appears very unlikely that the scantling 
fore and aft was increased to give support to adjacent beams. This practice seems to 
emerge at a latter date when it was realised that considerable timber could be saved by 
disposing the Riders in such a manner that they served both as a hanging knee and rider 
combined' .
Further evidence that breadth, and presumably middle and top riders, were added to the 
Victory’s structure is clearly indicated within the painting The Death of Nelson by Arthur 
Devis in 1806. (Fig. 5/3) In this painting Nelson is seen laid against what appears to be 
top of a Futtock Rider which terminates directly below a gun-deck beam, (this structure 
has apparently been altered since). Further to the right of the painting a second gun-deck 
beam is shown supported with a wooden hanging knee: Between this knee and where 
Nelson lay is another vertically wrought baulk of timber which disappears behind a 
carling at the deckhead. (Fig. 5/4) By its sheer size and disposition this can only be the 
lower part of a Breadth Rider. The position of this Breadth Rider depicted within the 
painting complies very closely with the Victory profile draught dated c.1787 the title of 
which is annotated with the statement; "with the Riders ticked in Red'. *'*(Fig.5/l)
If the Death of Nelson painting by Devis is an accurate representation which complies 
with the disposition of the Riders as depicted in the draught c.1787 then the assumed 
place where Nelson actually lay and died could be questionable. To re-iterate, the rider 
shown in the painting, is virtually set in the vertical plane and fitted abaft a hanging 
knee. This fact, according to the draught, indicates that the nearest vertically wrought 
Riders were disposed either further forward or aft of the traditional location where
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Nelson died. If fitted, vertical breadth riders were disposed adjacent to Nos. 14, 15, and 
20 lower gun deck beams.(Stations, [B], 2 and 12). Relative to the orlop deck, these 
locations are; [B] a little abaft the cable tier; 2, abreast the main mast; and 12, inside the 
Captain’s steward’s cabin further aft . Ignoring the latter, which is quite impossible, the 
most probable rider is that disposed at station [B], This theory is supported fi'om further 
evidence given in the painting inasmuch that pillars forming the after boundary of the 
cable tier are clearly shown to the right hand side of the painting. On more practical 
grounds the events at the Battle of Trafalgar also have to be considered. The emergency 
action operating theatre was set up in the after cockpit. For convenience casualties 
sustained before Nelson was carried below would have been placed nearer to the 
operating table thus Nelson would have been laid further forward nearer the cable tier, 
space aft being already occupied. The fact that he could have been placed a little further 
aft at Station 2 is doubtful as the rider at this point, if conforming to the aforesaid 1787 
draught was the lower part of an extended middle rider which was not vertical but set 
at 2 degrees: The painting clearly indicates that the rider shown is vertically fayed to the 
adjacent hanging knee. Alternative paintings depicting Nelson’s death do not, by virtue 
of their orientation, show this form of structural detail.
Another source of evidence indicating that riders were fitted comes from entries 
recorded in a ‘Remark Book’ held by Midshipman Roberts who was on board at Battle 
of Trafalgar, Roberts states;
Defects to HMS Victory 5*^  December 1805. Thos. MHardy Esq., Captain. The Hull is 
much damaged by shot in a number of different places, particularly in the wales, 
strings, and spurketing (sic), and some between wind and water. Several beams, knees, 
and riders shot through and broke; the starboard cathead shot away ’
In 1996, as Curator, I undertook a series of surveys on the old timber frames which 
were revealed when planking was being removed from the larboard side of the ship 
during current restoration. The purpose of this inspection was to find physical 
evidence that riders had once been fitted. Unfortunately many of the timbers appeared to 
have been replaced and many of those timbers found that pre-dated Trafalgar 1805 were
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badly rotted through, so much so that the fabric virtually crumbled in the hand. The 
intention of the survey 'was to determine the location of any remaining bolts which may 
have secured the riders, whether they be later cut through or the holes plugged when the 
riders were removed. Unfortunately the survey, which has yet to be hilly analysed, has 
not revealed any conclusive evidence. This point was expected as besides structural 
repairs executed at Chatham in 1806 after Trafalgar, considerable rebuilding work was 
also undertaken during the 1814-16 refit. When rebuilt all top, middle, and breadth riders 
would have been removed due to the implementation of fitting iron plate knees and beam 
end chocks. (See Chapter 7).
To conclude, top, middle and breadth riders were a practical, simple, and effective 
evolutionary step towards reducing the inherent hogging and sagging problems common 
to al wooden warships. Furthermore, they served to brace a weakened hull system. 
Construction was simple as timber used was of the straight form more readily procured. 
In all probability most would have been made from sound timbers removed from ships 
taken apart or from surplus off-cuts. One salient point that is very clear is that their 
application, albeit practical and short term, greatly influenced the later technique 
introduced by Seppings where diagonal timbers were wrought between gun ports. The 
only surviving example of this type of construction can be found on the Unicorn frigate 
at Dundee. This unique ship encapsulates all the classic innovations of the Seppings 
System.
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Figure 5/1.
Disposition of Top, Middle" and Breadth Riders: Copy of llctory Draught c.1787.
Key:
1. Toptimber line.
2. Top Riders.
3. Upper Gun Deck gun ports.
4. Middle Gun Deck gun ports.
5. Hanging Knees.
6. Middle Riders.
7. Side cast Hanging Knee.
8. Breadth Rider.
9. Side cast Hanging Knees.
10. Lower Gun Deck gun port.
11. Hanging Knee.
12. Long Breadth Rider.
13. Hanging Knee.
14. Futtock Rider
15. Orlop Deck
16. Head of Rider
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Figure 5/2.
Cross section of the Victory c.1787-1806 showing Top, Middle and Breadth Riders.
Key:
r. Top Rider,
2. Hanging Knee.
3. Middle Rider.
4. Breadth Rider.
5. Standard (or inverted Knee).
6. . Futtock Rider
7. Head of Rider.
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Figure 5/4.
Working sketch by Arthur Devis for the Death of Nelson painting. 
(Courtesy of the NMM)
Key:
1. Lodging KneeRider.
2. Hanging Knee.
3. Head of Futtock Rider.
4. Lower Gun Deck Beam.
5. Lower part of Breadth Rider
6. Hanging Knee.
7. Standard (or inverted Knee)..
Chapter 6 .
The Quarter Deck, Forecastle, and Poop.
Like other pertinent parts of the ship both the quarter deck and the forecastle were 
modified during the working life of the Victory. When first built both of these decks were 
shorter in length than currently seen. Moreover, both were surrounded with less 
obtrusive bulwarks.
As in all line of battle ships built during the third quarter of the eighteenth century the 
fore end of the quarter deck originally ended a little abaft the main mast. The exact point 
where this deck terminated has, by virtue of consequent alterations, now become 
somewhat difficult to determine. The factors surrounding this not only relate to beam 
disposition but also the position of the main mast itself. According to the draught,  ^the 
main mast was moved aft about 10 inches (25.4 cm) circa 1783. At the same period the 
length of the forecastle was extended aft by a small degree. This modification appears to 
coincide with a decision to move the fore mast which was shifted aft 1 foot 9 inches 
(53.34 cm).  ^ Of note, the dimensions given above for these alterations in mast 
position differ to those given by L G Carr Laughton in his report to the Victoiy 
Technical Committee during the 1920s. The above dimensions of 10 inches and 1 foot 9 
inches have been taken off the draught. These differ by 2 inches and 3 inches respectively 
from the original report. At present it is difficult to fully understand why alterations 
were made to the disposition of both these masts but the reasons must lay behind 
balancing of the rig. If this was the case then the alteration appears early for any possible 
authorised change to the general rigging warrants specified for ship rigged vessels, that is 
ships with three masts; fore, main and mizzen. The bowsprit was never included as a 
specific mast. The most significant modification that would alter the balance of sail at 
this period would have been the introduction of the flying jib boom with its 
corresponding fore and aft sail, the flying jib. This however seems unlikely as the flying 
jib boom was not officially introduced until circa 1794.  ^ The most probable reason was 
in reality far simpler inasmuch that the alteration was made as consequence to the 
requirements of the ship’s Master whose experience would justify any small change in 
order to get the best out of the ship. This point has still to be investigated.
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When initially fitted out the quarter deck was shorter in length. Fitted either side at the 
fore end of the deck were two short fixed gangways which were set a little below the 
level of the deck, these both led to the entry points at the ship’s side. They also led to the 
gangboards that connected the quarter deck to the forecastle, which at the time of 
construction, were only fitted on a temporary basis. At the centre line was a narrow 
projection extending forward to the main mast. This was made in the form of gratings 
supported by longitudinal beams which terminated on the heads of the main jeer bitt pins. 
When the quarter deck was lengthened beyond the mast the gratings were retained in 
order that ropework from aloft; i.e. the topsail sheets, could pass freely to its respective 
belaying points on the sheet bitts sited on the deck below. In recent years these gratings 
have since been removed and closed in with plank placed to reduce rainwater ingress to 
the upper gun deck below. Careful investigation of the current disposition of beams and 
carlings supporting the quarter deck does give some indication of the various alterations 
made earlier.
Furthermore, irrespective that the deck had been lengthened, the two short gangways, 
fitted as aforesaid, were retained the only difference being that they were now set level 
with the quarter deck and terminated farther forward on the aftermost skid beam. 
Likewise the gangoards were also raised level with both the forecastle and quarter deck 
but now fitted permanently. What is curious, is that although now raised and fixed 
permanently to the skid beams, the planking of the gangboards are not laid as a 
continuation of the respective decks but are retained as individual units indicating that 
they were still regarded as a separate item. This point may indicate that a small 
interpretation error may have occurred during the reconstruction process. The fact that 
the planldng is not laid as a continuous unit implies that originally the planks forming the 
gangboards were actually thinner in scantling. The point that they were later fitted with 
boards of similar thickness to those planks used for the forecastle and quarter deck 
relates to the general widening of the gangboards. This together with fiirther lengthening 
of quarter deck and the forecastle was eventually to lead to the closure of the waist in 
most ships by 1832. A fine example of this modification was to be seen on the 
Trincomalee (ex Foudryanf) when employed as a training ship prior to her 
reconstruction at Hartlepool.'*
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Survey of the beams and carlings supporting other parts of the quarter deck also reveal 
significant changes which reflect some of the modifications made during the 1800/1803 
refit where centre line gratings were removed. This was implemented at Nelson’s request 
to give greater area for operating the guns and conning the ship. Evidence of this can be 
seen to the fore side of the bulkhead dividing off the Admiral’s quarters.
The reason for lengthening of the forecastle c. 1783 is less obvious, there being only two 
plausible reasons for modification. First, extending the deck aft gave more protection 
from the weather to gun crews and general requirements on the upper gun deck below. 
Second, and more significantly, the date of alteration complies to the date that the 
Victory received her iron Brodie stove for the galley. This new form of stove, patented 
by Alexander Brodie in 1781,  ^ became the standard cooking appliance throughout the 
navy, contracts being set up with Brodie in the same year. Its size, by comparison to the 
previous form of stove employed, would have meant some alterations to the layout of the 
galley. Though not significant to the Victory, which had her galley placed further below 
on the middle gun deck, the galley on ships of two gun decks would have been situated 
directly below the forecastle. This, like other aspects, was another modification 
indirectly influenced by the progressive steps that had been taken in the iron industry 
where better and cheaper materials replaced conventional practices. Iron stoves had been 
used prior to this date but their design and capability did not always fully accommodate 
the requirements. Brodie, an innovative Scotsman from Peebleshire, had attained the full 
contract for the supply of iron stoves in 1781 that was to continue until his death in 
1811. This contract expanded into other fields such as guns and general iron work. After 
this a new patent stove introduced by Lamb and Nicholson, which superseded the Brodie 
design, was installed on the Victory during her 1814/16 refit.
Irrespective of the research undertaken regarding the Victory, the manner in which her 
forecastle and quarter deck bulwarks were constructed at the time of Trafalgar still 
remains a controversial issue. We do know that at the time of her launch in 1765 her 
upperworks along the sides of the quarter deck and forecastle were very lightly built with 
open spaces left between the drift rail and planksheer, the drift falling with a hance 
abreast the main mast. ® The poop deck was fitted in a similar manner with a shallow rail
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set about 1 foot (30.48 cm) above the drift. This practice, which was quite common on 
all ships at that period, did not provide much protection to the men stationed on these 
decks during battle: protection was only provided by hammocks stowed in nets 
supported by iron cranes ranged along the upper sides of the rails or along the poop 
deck. When reconstructed to her 1805 configuration during the 1920s it was decided to 
build up her quarter deck bulwarks solid, conforming to the contemporary modifications 
being applied to all line-of-battle ships at the period. The original line of the drift rails, 
fife rails, and planksheer was retained both internally and externally by use of mouldings. 
The main contention, which remains unresolved, is whether her forecastle bulwarks were 
built up in a similar fashion or left relatively open.
Built-up bulwarks had been adopted by foreign navies far earlier than the British. Initially 
this was confined to the quarter decks only. A fine example of a Spanish vessel so fitted 
is that of the 28 gun frigate Gram  captured in 1781.  ^ The French had adopted built up 
bulwarks on both the forecastle, quarter deck and poop of their ships during the last 
decade of the IS**' century.  ^ Why the British navy retained open bulwarks for such a 
long period remains uncertain. What did prompt changes very much relates to the 
introduction of the carronade. The first indication of building up the bulwarks on British 
ships appears during the Seven Years War (1756-63). An Admiralty Order, dated May 
1760, directed that all frigates furnished with quarter deck ‘barricades’ were to be 
reduced in height in order for men to fire small arms.  ^ This implies that Captains would, 
under their own initiative, add some form of protection to the open rails. The next 
change came with the introduction of the carronade in 1779. This short barreled weapon, 
which delivered a heavy ball at close range, unfortunately produced considerable muzzle 
flash which, for obvious reasons, was more detriment to the parent ship than the enemy. 
To this effect the Navy Board authorised that temporary barricades, made from rope and 
hammocks, be substituted for timber. The next stage was to berth up the bulwarks 
with elm boards 1/2 inch (1.27 cm) thick ** Though not overly protective, this was a 
move in the right direction, albeit on a temporary measure maintained for the duration 
of hostilities during the American War of Independence. Once peace was restored, 
carronades were removed and by an order of June 1786 the temporary wooden
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barricading was removed. However for other practical reasons, the boarding between 
the drift and fife rails remained.
The quarter deck was the main area to protect, not only was this the conning position of 
the ship, it was effectively the main command centre. The first real approach of 
constructing solid built up bulwarks appears to have been first carried out on the 
Endymion frigate in 1797, following the example of the recently captured French frigate 
Pomone. Once again it appears that French influence altered English ship design. By 
1800 most frigates were modified accordingly, some with an additional built-up bulwark 
fitted at the forecastle, a practice that became standard by 1805. For examples refer to 
the draughts of the; Caroline (36), màEuryalus (36).
With regards ships of the line, it appears that the first vessel so fitted with a built-up 
bulwark on the quarter deck was the Ajax (74) launched in March 1798, This is 
verified from alterations made to the original sheer draught in November 1796. The 
draught of ths Impregnable (90) dated 16 February 1798 shows a similar modification to 
the quarter deck, but no change to the forecastle or poop. Laird Clowes states that this 
was also carried out on the Boyne and the Union in 1801. This statement is not quite 
true for no construction work was begun on either ship until 1806 and 1805 respectively.
These bulwarks, which were built parallel to the deck, were generally about 5 feet 
(1.54 m) in height and finished with a square hancing. Thus it became practice for all 
ships under construction or refitting to be so fitted, the Victory being one. Oddly, 
although modifications to design were implemented, no reference to built-up bulwarks is 
recorded by Steel. “
When Victojy was refitted in 1800/03 her existing quarter deck bulwark was removed 
and built-up solid terminating with a square hance in line with the main mast. This would 
have involved removing the existing toptimbers and lengthening pieces and replacing 
them with longer sections of timber. Running parallel to the deck, the bulwark was 4 feet 
9 inches (1.45 m) in height. This measurement, taken from recent restoration plans, ^  
complies with common practice. Whether her forecastle bulwarks were so built is, to 
reiterate, a controversial issue; construction was in a transitional phase at this period. 
Interestingly, an earlier draught of Victory, undated but presumed to be circa 1787, is
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marked up with solid bulwarks on both the forecastle, quarter deck, and the poop. 
Considering the date it is improbable that this alteration was done at the time, but more 
likely later; either circa 1800, or prior to her rebuild in 1814/16. If the former, i.e. 1800, 
then it would appear very plausible that she had solid bulwarks on both quarter deck and 
forecastle when at Trafalgar. According to the draught, the measurements of the 
bulwarks are;
Forecastle. Length: 45 ft. 9 ins. (13.94 m). Height: 4 ft. 6 ins. (1.37m).
Quarter deck. Length: 46 ft. 2 ins, (14.07 m). Height: 4 ft. 6 ins. (1.37m).
Poop deck. Length: 53 ft. 0 ins, (16,15 m). Height: 4 ft. 6 ins. (1.37m).
Though the forecastle bulwark was restored to the pre-solid type with protruding 
timberheads during the Victory's restoration in the 1920s, the issue of whether she had a 
solid bulwark was raised by L G Carr Laughton. The matter was deferred until the 
Dockyard had assessed estimates to make the alteration. The matter was again raised by 
Sir George Hope and irrespective of the new plans provided by Professor Callander, and 
that work had already been undertaken to fit the open bulwark, the proposal to fit built- 
up bulwarks at the forecastle were rejected on the grounds that additional work was to 
cost £382. In support of Carr Laughton’s theories, the draught of the Dreadnought, 
dated 24^ March 1802, is worth analysing inasmuch that this ship was modified with 
built up bulwarks on both quarter deck and forecastle, the poop being closed with a 
‘roughtree’ rail. Authoritive paintings by Deighton, Dodd, Nicholas and Stanfield imply 
that the Victory, like the Boyne, had built-up bulwarks throughout, ^  however we 
cannot be too certain of their reliability. Likewise, the Carmichael painting in the Royal 
Naval Museum also depicts the ship constructed in this form. The fact remains that until 
new documentary evidence is found which confirms exactly how the Victory was 
converted in 1800/03, then the present form of bulwark fitted on the forecastle today is 
an acceptable compromise that relates to the practices introduced in the Ajax and 
Impregnable. Hypothetically, though proposed, the forecastle bulwark may have been
83
omitted as reconstruction costs soared during Victory’s 1800/03 refit. Moreover, 
proposed work may have been cancelled in order to complete the refit quickly as the 
prospect of re-opening war with France became reality.
With respect to a built-up bulwark on the poop stated earlier, this was not the case at 
Trafalgar. On this issue we do have evidence clarifying precisely what was fitted. The 
Carpenter’s Expense Book for the Victory dated 1805 lists the following entry for 
August;
To Making new Hammock Boards on the Poop, old decayed. -Deal Brds - Six in No.
That fact that the Carpenter used deal boards implies that the timber employed was 
probably no thicker than 1.1/2 inches (3.81 cm) which would easily decay, especially 
after the ‘great chase’ across the Atlantic. Furthermore, the light construction inferred 
relates to the point that weight on the upperworks was kept to minimum, and that only 
the external sides of the iron hammock cranes were berthed up. The more significant 
point is that the poop deck of the Victory had actually been armed with six 18 pounder 
carronades after her refit in 1782. This date complies with the temporary barricading 
ordered to be fitted on frigates during the War of American Independence. This also 
complies with the proposals given on the 1789 draught. In view of the evidence it would 
therefore seem highly probable that the boarding mentioned above relates to that which 
was initially fitted to prevent muzzle flash back. Whether the inboard faces of the 
hammock cranes were similarly furnished is conjectural at this moment. That the ship is 
not thus fitted in this manner today remains unanswered, especially when there is strong 
evidence to support this point. In all probability the restoration committee at the time 
could not make a firm decision.
Although the bulwark configuration of the Victory at the period of Trafalgar remains 
somewhat unresolved, how she was later fitted during her ‘rebuild’ 1814/16 can be 
confirmed from other documentary evidence. In all respects the ship was altered to 
conform with the then current fashion - high bulwarks throughout with the exception of 
the gangways at the waist, and even these were modified. To fully comprehend trends in 
construction it is well to look at alternative draughts. With respect to the Union, her
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quarter deck bulwark was 4 feet 9 inches (1.45 m) high rising to 6 feet 2 inches (1.87 m) 
at the fore side of the gun port just before the break of the poop. The bulwark at the 
forecastle was 4 feet 10 inches (1.47 m), and that fitted on her poop, 4 feet 6 inches 
(1.37 m). The dimensions given on the draught of the Boyne, dated January 1808, 
are effectively a mirror of those given for the Union.
Further changes were later introduced and probably implemented when the Victory was 
taken in hand in 1823. It was probably during this refit that the poop bulwark was 
extended forward and terminated with a quarter circle hance. It was also at this period 
that the hammock cranes and nettings were removed and replaced with the closed 
wooden hammock stowages similar to those seen on the Unicorn frigate today. This, 
together with the other alterations, altered her appearance to become somewhat more 
‘wall sided’ as seen in all the extant photographs taken before she came into No. 2 Dock 
in 1922. Though Carr Laughton infers that these changes were made in 1823, it seems 
odd that such work was undertaken at this period and not earlier in 1816 as one would 
expect, especially in view that her sea service career was definitely finished. If these 
alterations were definitely made as late as 1823, then it may well reflect her new role as 
Flagship for the Port Admiral.
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Chapter 7.
Iron Knees, Braces, and Brackets.
Today the hull of Victory is braced with considerable amount of iron work, either in the 
form of Robert’s plate knees, various designs of breast hooks and other supportive 
strapping. Popular consensus is such that most of this iron work was present at the 
period of 1805, however closer analysis of the ship and supportive evidence suggests 
that this is not entirely true. What we do see on Victory is a transition in ship 
construction technique, albeit a preliminary countermeasure to strengthen weakened hull 
fabric, the form of which is merely an improvement on earlier methods.
With exception to bolts and nails and other more minor fittings, the first serious 
indication we have of iron being used as a substitute for timber components was circa 
1670 when the naval shipwright Sir Anthony Deane, a protégé of Samuel Pepys, built 
the r ‘ rate Royal James at Portsmouth. However Pepys, then Clerk of the Acts, 
rebuked Deane for using materials not authorised by the Navy Board. After visiting the 
dockyard, he wrote to Deane stating;
“that you have o f your own head, without precedent, as well as without the advice, or so 
much as the privity, o f this Board or the Commissioner upon the place, presumed to lay 
aside the old secure practice o f fastening your beams in your new ships with standards 
and knees, and in the room thereof taken upon you to do it iron ^
Deane, defending the case that his ‘iron dogs’ were a stronger method of securing beams 
replied;
“between you and myself, the King must build no more ships, i f  nothing can be 
invented but knees..., we having not one knee in the yard”. ^
The King, later seeing Deane’s letter, supported his actions. Deane’s allegations 
supported the fact that there was already a serious problem regarding a shortage of 
timber. In all probability this was incurred by resources being directed towards rebuilding
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London after the Great Fire of 1666. Unfortunately we have no knowledge on what the 
actual iron fittings looked like as the Royal James was burnt and sunk at the Battle of 
Solebay 28 May 1672. That Deane referred to his fittings as ‘iron dogs’ hints that their 
design may have been similar to the simple iron clamps found on wrecks at Amsterdam 
of what is believed to be English colliers circa 1820.  ^ In these cases the beams were 
secured with iron ‘U’ shaped brackets that embraced the actual ship’s frames, the arms 
being clamped to the sides of the beam. However this supposition is only theoretical, 
hopefully underwater archaeological survey of the Royal James wreck site may resolve 
this matter. Deane is renowned for his work ‘Doctrine of Naval Architecture’ published 
in 1670’.
Although there is no further mention regarding iron fittings in English ships until the 
introduction of the 1719 Establishment, the French had already begun experimenting 
with iron knees (courbes de fer) as early as 1707. These were introduced by M. Golbert 
then Deputy Inspector of Shipbuilding. To what degree French practice influenced 
English construction has yet to ascertained. The 1719 Establishment specifications
include an annex titled. ‘Dimension and Weight o f Iron Standards on the Gundeck,
Middle deck. Upper deck and Quarter deck o f Royal Naval ships \  ^ Of note this list
relates to standards (inverted hanging knees) only. From the dimensions given these
fittings were of considerable size: i.e. Dimensions of standards fitted on a 100 gun ship;
Extract from Adm. 170/429.
Gundeck. Length o f the: Arm at the Sides.................6 f t  7 ins (2.006 m)
Shortest Arm ......................5 f t  Oins (1.524 m)
Thickness: Throat..........................................11 ins (27.94 cm)
Next to it ................................ 6 ins (15.24 cm)
At the Ends 3 ins (7.62 cm)
No. & Size o f Bolts: Arm to the Side.............. 4 o f 1.1/2 inch dia. (3.81 cm)
Beam.........  4 o f 1.1/2 inch dia. (3.81 cm).
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Furthermore this source appears to indicate that the specification for iron work was 
formalised at the time two ships built to the 1706 Establishment, the Torbay (80) and 
Nottingham (60), were being rebuilt in 1719. Those fitted on the gundeck of the Torbay 
were 4 cwt. and 2 qtrs. (228.82 kg) in weight, those fitted on the Nottingham being 3 
cwt. 1 qtr. (165.26 kg) and 2 cwt. 3 qtrs. (139.83 kg). The fact that iron fittings are 
listed in the Establishment specifications does not infer that they were used extensively in 
ships. There are many reasons why application was limited, these are; quality of iron, 
cost, tradition, and personal interests.
At this period, most wrought iron produced was very brittle and subject to fracture. This 
was mainly due to the impurities introduced from coke during the smelting process. This 
problem was resolved by Abraham Darby II in 1750,  ^unfortunately little is known about 
how he applied this new technique. Much of the iron industry was still centred in the 
south east, Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire, primarily because these areas provided a 
plentifiil supply of wood for smelting. Because production processes wei;e involved, iron 
remained an expensive commodity for the first half of the 18*^  century. Costs were also 
high because a considerable quantity of iron was imported from Sweden and the 
American colonies; iron from these countries was of far better quality than English iron. 
However as industrial technology improved change became inevitable.
Shipbuilders, traditionally conservative in attitude, still considered timber preferable to 
iron and thus were often reluctant to adopt alternative materials irrespective of the 
advantage. With regards to personal interests, many officials connected with the 
government, the navy, and the mercantile trade had private involvement with the timber 
trade, thus it was in their interest to support their investments.
Irrespective of authorised specifications it appears that the design of iron standards and 
knees varied according to place of manufacture. Evidence supporting this is provided 
from French sources. In 1733 Blaise Gislain, under instructions from Maurepas, Minister 
of the Navy, visited the English dockyards of Chatham, Deptford and Woolwich to make 
observations of our ship construction techniques. His report clearly indicates variations 
in the design of iron standards; those made at Chatham and Woolwich being rather plain
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with a thick throat, that from Deptford being braced with a curved stay. (Fig. 7/1) He 
also records a form of bracket, or iron dog, used to retain deck beams, (Fig. 7/2). 
Subsequently, the French improved the design and adapted iron fittings in place of timber 
to their ships more readily than the English. Such modifications, introduced by Duhamel 
Du Monceau are clearly shown in his treatise published in 1752. ® Knees illustrated in 
Duhamel’s treatise (Figs. 7/3 & 7/4) are formed from three pieces of flat iron bar, some 
being a complete angle with a stay. Others have the angled corner omitted, the beam 
being additionally supported with a second plate fitted underneath, its vertical arm 
abutting the ship’s side. Knees of the same fashion were being manufactured at Brest 
under the authority of Deslongchamps in the same year. In 1754 the English shipwright 
Mungo Murray translated and published Duhamel’s treatise.  ^ This was to be the first 
serious English doctrine printed since Sutherland’s works of 1711 and 1717. This 
work, together with the capture of the Invincible and the appointment of Sir Thomas 
Slade as Surveyor of the Navy in 1755, very much influenced English opinion in design, 
materials, and construction techniques.
The iron fittings illustrated in Duhamel’s treatise closely resemble the iron knees found 
on the wreck of the Invincible (74) which foundered and sank off Spithead in 1758. 
Designed by M. Morineau, and launched at Rochfort in 1744, this vessel, was later 
captured by Anson at the Battle off Cape Finisterre in May 1747. The Invincible was 
built with quite a number of iron knees, some of which were boxed in with timber, a 
system of which predates any similar practice adopted on English ships. All of these iron 
knees dated from her construction 1740-44. In size the length of the iron knees fitted on 
Invincible (Fig. 7/5) measure approximately 5 ft 5.1/2 ins (1.67 m), the metal being 4 ins 
(10.16 cm) wide and 1.1/2 ins.(3.81 cm) thick. “
Iron fittings soon influenced current building trends especially with the ever increasing 
problem of procuring good compass timber for knees and riders, etc. towards the end of 
18th century. This problem was expounded especially during the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars when there was necessity to expand warship construction. Besides 
the improved smelting process aforesaid, other developments were happening in 
Britains’s iron industry. In 1754 the first iron rolling mill was opened at Fareham
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producing stronger iron bar for bolts. Importantly, this is a site not too distant from the 
Royal Dockyard at Portsmouth.
The greatest breakthrough in technology came in 1784 when Henry Cort of Gosport 
patented a new method for converting pig iron into malleable wrought iron in a 
reverberatory furnace heated by common coal. The process involved a ‘puddler’ to stir 
the molten mass. As it was stirred the metal was decarbonized by air circulating through 
the furnace. The major advantage was that the iron remained separate from the coal fuel. 
This innovation was not entirely acredited to Cort, as similar processes had been tried 
previously by both the Cranage brothers at Coalbrookedale and by Peter Onions.
After further experimentation, Cort invented a new method of making better quality iron 
bar and eyebolts, etc. using grooved rollers which he patented in 1783. Instead of the 
old process of hammering or cutting rolled plate in a slitting mill, Cort’s system could 
produce about 15 tons of iron bar in 12 hours. Stronger iron bolts were very 
necessary to ship construction especially with the introduction of plate knees, etc. He 
then went on to provide stronger anchors for Naval ships.
To assist Cort’s experiments, old iron ballast was supplied to his foundry at Funtley near 
Fareham from Portsmouth Dockyard. Experiments, in the form of destructive testing, 
were carried out at each Royal Dockyard comparing items manufactured with Swedish 
iron and Cort’s iron. In March 1787 the results were published in a report supported by 
Lord Sheffield, David Hartley Esq. and Dr. Black (see Chapter 8). The processes 
involved are superbly recorded in an extract of Hartley’s letter dated 19 June 1786, 
enclosed within this report.
The overall result proved that lower grade English iron could be converted to a malleable 
iron far stronger than that of better quality iron supplied from Sweden. This fact is 
clearly emphasised from part of the report;
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SWEDISH IRON CORTsIRON
An anchor 43 cwt. 2 qrs. 14 Ib. . An anchor 44 cwt. 3 qrs. 0 Ib.
On the ninth o f May, the arms o f the two anchors were placed over the sides o f two
building slips which lie parallel to each other, (chocks  )  and the shanks lay
horizontally, with the rings opposite each other; the straps o f two treble fa ll tackle 
blocks were then put through the rings o f each anchor, and wood toggles run through 
the straps to secure them to the rings; a twofold block M^as likewise secured to each 
ring, to increase the purchase; the other two blocks were fastened to each end o f the 
treble tackle falls, they being first reeved through two single blocks, lashed to bollard 
heads. To lead them to the capsterns which were manned with thirty-six men each after 
a very great strain.
The ring o f this anchor broke in three The ring and every other part o f this
places, a piece 2-5ths o f the circumference anchor remained precisely in the same
state o f the ring being separated from it entirely, as before either o f the trials,
and that piece broken again nearly off in 
the middle. In other respects the anchor 
remained in the same state as after the 
former trial.
Not only had the quality of iron improved, the concept of using iron had now became 
more appreciable especially as production had increased rendering it a more cost 
effective commodity. This could not have come at a better time, as besides Sweden, and 
occasionally Spain, our other substantial source of iron had been supplied from the 
American Colonies. As a result of the War of American Independence this source had 
been briefly interrupted. The rules governing the export of iron from the American 
Colonies, introduced under the Iron Act in 1750, were along with many other factors, a 
contributory point of contention that initially lead us into the war. Irrespective of our 
own expansion Swedish iron, timber, and other raw materials supplied from other Baltic 
States continued to be imported. So necessary were these materials for our shipbuilding
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industry and war effort that trade had to be given considerable protection during the 
pending wars with France (1794-1801 & 1803-1815).
Taking advantage of new technology, Gabriel Snodgrass, the Surveyor of the East India 
Company introduced an innovative system using iron knees, riders, and braces to the 
new EIC ships being built in the 1780s. (Fig. 7/6) Finding his scheme successful, he 
submitted his proposals before the Admiralty in 1792. From contemporary publications it 
appears that it was at this point that Britain took the lead over France on the extent that 
iron was employed in ship construction. (Fig. 7/7) This was due to three factors: 
France was financially crippled after supporting the American cause; industrial 
development was thwarted by the revolution; and last, Cort’s puddling process was not 
introduced in France until circa 1818. Though no immediate action was taken by the 
Admiralty at this stage, it appears that Snodgrass’s ideas greatly influenced subsequent 
designs submitted by Robert Seppings who was later to become the Surveyor of the 
Navy in 1813. Iron fittings, based on the Snodgrass system, appear to have been adopted 
on warships circa 1795. These, introduced by the sub-surveyor Mr. Roberts, comprised 
a combination of wooden chocks braced with iron plate knees. The advantage of such 
a system was that surplus short lengths of straight grained wood could be utilised 
without wastage, a very important issue by this period. Such a design can be seen on the 
Victory and Trincomalee today. Their use however should be regarded more as a 
structural repair or strengthening measure fitted to existing ships rather than a formalised 
building practice. Besides Roberts, other similar designs were submitted though how 
extensively they were used is undetermined. It was to be a further decade before iron 
knees were formally introduced by the Navy Board Order of 6th May 1805.
By 1801, the dockyards were now using some 1400 tons of iron annually. To meet 
this requirement Dockyard facilities had to be upgraded. In 1797, a weighbridge was 
constructed at Portsmouth Dockyard to ensure that incoming loads from contractors 
were correctly measured. Likewise all iron bar supplied was cut to expose its end grain 
and often further examined by heating the ends and beating the material to test tensile 
strength. Use of iron was not restricted to ships construction but other lesser fittings. A 
new Iron and Brass Foundry was built within Portsmouth Dockyard 50 yards north of
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the Block Mills. During expansion in 1803, a new furnace was installed for smelting iron 
and copper. With the Block Mills now operational, a metal mill was set up incorporating 
purpose built machinery designed by Brunei to produce iron pins for the blocks. This was 
opened in 1806. And thus, the technical infrastructure of Portsmouth Dockyard moved 
steadily towards the iron ship building era. A similar process was undertaken at other key 
Royal Dockyards.
Production of pig iron in England rose slowly from 17,000 tons in 1740 to 45,000 tons 
in 1785 - the time of Cort’s innovation. After this date growth increased rapidly arising 
to an annual output of 700,000 tons by 1830. And within a further nine years production 
reached 1700,000 tons, an increase of one hundred percent over a century. This fact 
very much reflects the advantages gained by Cort’s puddling process. Besides industrial 
expansion import restrictions caused by war also generated greater use of English even 
while iron was still imported from Sweden. Obviously it was imperative to maintain open 
trade links with the Baltic. However these were threatened on two occasions.
The first was caused by the Armed Neutrality - formed by the Baltic states of Denmark, 
Sweden, Prussia and Russia. This coalition was coerced by Napoleon to ensure neutral 
ships ignored the British right of search. In brief this would effect Britain’s trade supplies 
and assist trade to France and Spain. Inevitably this forced Britain to use alternative 
sources and now that relations with the former Colonies had improved, iron, and other 
necessary ship’s stores such as masts, tar, and turpentine, were again being sent from 
what was now the United States of America. However, the northern coalition was soon 
broken with the defeat of the Danes at the Battle of Copenhagen by Nelson in 1801. This 
effectively brought Napoleon to heel and subsequently the war closed with the signing of 
the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802.
Peace was not to prevail, with the failure on both sides to adhere to the recent treaty the 
war reopened in 1803. Baltic supplies remained restricted, only 11,000 ships passing 
through the Sound in 1805. This figure had fallen to 6,000 by 1807 the decrease being 
mainly due to Napoleon’s enforcement of the Continental System which banned all 
European trade with Britain which effectively reduced the import of crucial supplies.
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After the destruction of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1807 a potential threat and 
assistance to Napoleon was removed. From then onwards the import problem began to 
improve, and to counteract any ftjrther restrictions, the theatre of war was expanded into 
the Baltic with a British fleet led by Admiral Saumarez in the Victory. Saumarez himself 
re-opened diplomatic relations with Sweden ensuring that the export of iron and other 
raw materials to Britain was maintained. By 1809 the trade situation had considerably 
improved, and by 1812, regular supplies of raw materials, including iron were provided 
to the dockyards. ^  In consequence, the use of iron in ship construction and fittings 
increased.
During the war, the scarcity of timber had become a relatively acute problem. Attempts 
were made to use alternative woods such as fir and beech but these did not prove overly 
successftil, and although introducing iron fittings would alleviate matters, the situation 
was further exasperated by the reservations raised by the Navy Board in April 1804. To 
quote “However eligible plans which have from time to time been suggested , the result 
has not always answered the expectations formed from them”, and the Board should, 
“act with caution”. They advised the Admiralty that, and I quote, “previous to the 
adoption o f any general plan which has not the authority o f practice, to prove the utility 
proposed hy it however plausible it may be in appearance ”
The fact that no formal introduction of iron was made until 1805 is supported from 
draughts of the Caledonia (1807), and a draught showing the modifications made to 
the Union in 1810. From this evidence it is clear that the existing iron plate knees 
currently seen on the Victory today, were not extant at Trafalgar but introduced during 
her ‘great repair’ of 1814. This point is wholly substantiated from Devis’s painting of 
‘The Death o f Nelson \ This well documented painting clearly indicates that the gun 
deck beams were still supported with wooden hanging and lodging knees. In addition 
other fittings, now non-existant, are also shown (see Chapter 10). Unlike new ships 
built, iron plate knees fitted on the Victory were only placed at selected areas; Middle 
Gun Deck (Fig. 7/8), and Orlop. (Fig. 7/9) Those fitted on the former deck, which 
supported the upper gun decks beams, are only found at every other beam, the remaining
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beams were furnished with the older system using hanging and lodging knees. This point 
infers the following;
1. When refitting 1814/16, only half of the upper deck beams were replaced 
incorporating the fitting of beam end chocks and plate knees.
2. The practice of only altering every other beam could have been undertaken to keep 
costs of timber and iron work to a minimum.
3. Beam replacement complies with all those fitted under the upper deck gun ports thus 
the new method was adopted where greater strength was required to support the 
ordnance.
4. The practice of only altering every other beam could have been undertaken to ensure 
maintaining the line of the deck. Such measures are still carried out today when 
restoring the ship’s frames where alternative defective frames are removed over a 
given span. When replaced and lined with the original frames, the remaining old 
frames can then be removed and new fitted and lined with the new frames previously 
replaced. This method ensures that the run of the hull shape is never compromised.
In short it appears that a good compromise was taken between improving strength and 
cost. The point stated in 4 above complies with standard ship repair practice. Recent 
survey has shown that those beams supported using wooden knees were found be in 
a greater state of deterioration than those beams fitted with chocks and plate knees. This 
fact confirms that the latter stated are considerably newer.
The average dimension of the iron plate knees fitted on the range of the middle gun deck 
were found to be 3 ft. 4 ins (101.60 cm) long on the athwartships arm and 3 ft. 8 ins. 
(111.76 cm) long on the ‘up and down arm’. The width of the plate arms varied. The 
athwartships arms measure 4 inches (10.20 cm) wide, the remaining vertical and angled 
arms being 3.1/2 inches (9.00 cm) wide. Metal thickness is 2 inches (5.08 cm) at the 
throat tapering to 3/4 inch (1.91 cm) at the extremities. Each were fastened with 11
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bolts; 4 in the athwartships arm, 2 in the angled portion forming the lodging knee, 4 in 
the vertical arm and 1 in the angled arm. The entire thiclcness of the plate knee was found 
to be set into both the beam and chock, the exception being the lodging arm which is 
fayed and bolted to a packing piece. Furthermore, the athwartships arms are fashioned 
with two lugs about 4 inches (10.20 cm) wide and 2.1/2 inches (6.35 cm) deep. These 
provided an increase in metal width to permit better security in wake of bolts. This 
particular design, which does not exist on any other preserved vessel, is a rather unusual 
feature. Each plate knee is secured with 11 bolts two of which are driven through the 
lodging knee portion. Chock knees in wake are checked into the underside of the beams 
in such a manner that a fore and aft slot was formed between the upper surface of the 
chock and lower face of the beam. This was made in order to fit opposed iron wedges 
that they can be tightened if components worked loose at sea. The slot itself is lined with 
a copper sleeve. ^
With regard to the beams of the quarter deck and forecastle, these remain supported with 
standard wooden hanging knees with some iron lodging knees. More odd is the fact that 
middle gun deck beams remain supported with wooden hanging and lodging knees. This 
implies that none of these beams were replaced since circa 1803 until restoration was 
undertaken between 1989 and 1994 from No. 1 to 12 beam.
The iron knees wrought in wake of the lower gun deck beams differ slightly in design 
from those fitted on the middle gun deck inasmuch that there are no lugs and thus their 
manufacture is much simpler. These measure approximately 4 feet (121,9 cm) in length 
and depth; the vertical, horizontal and angled arms being 5 inches (12.7 cm) wide; metal 
thickness varies from 1.1/8 inches (2.85 cm) at the extremities, the throat being 3 inches 
(7.62 cm) thick. Each are secured with 11 bolts, two of which pass through the portion 
forming the lodging knee. As previously mentioned the thickness of metal is recessed 
into the adjacent woodwork of the beam and beam end chock. Likewise all are furnished 
with opposing iron wedges within a copper lined slot. ‘Rase marks’ on relevant beams 
and chocks indicate that this work was undertaken during Victory’s 1814/16 refit. The 
design of these iron knees correspond to those fitted on the Trincomalee frigate of 46 
guns which was launched at Bombay in 1817, (Figs. 7/10 & 7/11). The fact that this ship
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was under construction while Victory was being extensively rebuilt confirms that by this 
period a common pattern of iron plate knee had been adopted in all naval ships.
As stated there is a difference in the design of the iron plate knees between those fitted 
supporting the lower gun deck and those of the upper gun deck. This fact does suggest 
that each type may have been installed at different dates, the latter stated possibly being 
earlier in 1810. This point could be verified by the fact that the iron knees supporting the 
upper gun deck are fashioned with lugs, a feature similar to those previously introduced 
by Snodgrass, however further analysis is necessary before this point is fully confirmed.
When iron bracing was fitted between the heels of the counter timbers and the wing 
transom on Victory is at present uncertain but again certainly later than Victory’s. 
1800/03 refit. The square stern, which had changed little since the Tudor era, was not 
itself an overly successfial design. Later Sir Robert Seppings was to strongly criticise 
stern construction as seen by the content of his letter submitted to Lord Melville 1st 
January 1822. This paper, which lists defects observed from some 62 line-of-battle ships 
and 80 frigates, includes the Victory herself; For details refer to table on next page.
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No. 1 - Ships referred to in the preceding Letter.
Rate Guns Ships Names Captains Name Date Nature of Defect.
2 98 London Grifftth Dec 1795 “The stern works and strains when 
blowing fresh from the quarter. Find 
tliat by the ships getting aground, her 
stern-frame is very much broke and 
strained. The carlings of tlie lower- 
deck have worked out of their scores in 
the transom.”
3 64 Asia McDougall Dec ‘95 “The poop works work veiy much.”
74 Colossus Jenkins Jan ‘96 “Wales, topsides, stern frame and 
standards, work very much.”
64 Africa Horne Aug “ “The poop and knees in the great 
cabin work very much at sea.”
1 100 Victory Grey Sept “ “I have also obseiwed that the ship is 
very weak abaft; the transoms 
between the lower and middle-decks 
work exceedingly.”
3 64 America Blankett Dec “ “The heels of tlie stern-timbers almost 
worked out their steps.”
1 100 Queen Charlotte A. S. Douglas Jan 1797 “The stern-frame works so much, it 
breaks tlie wooden ends of counters 
and buttock seams. The tiller transom 
works very much.”
3 74 Cumberland Rowley ditto “ “The stern-timbers work veiy much in 
their scores in the wing-transom.”
Venerable Fairfax Sept. “ “The counter-timber-heels worked out 
of their scores in tlie wing-transom.”
64 Agamemnon Fancourt ditto “ “The ship has dropped so much abaft, 
that the tiller traverses entirely on the 
helm-transom, and it is supposed that 
tlie stern-post works.
The gravity of the problem can be seen from the short extract above. The problem was 
frirther expounded by virtue that the stem of all two and three decked ships were 
constructed with open galleries which added unnecessary weight abaft the hull line. Well
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aware of the inherent failures of stern construction design the Admiralty and the Navy 
Board abolished galleries and introduced the closed stern 1798. This action alleviated the 
problem temporarily but it was to be a further two decades before Seppings 
revolutionised design. Following this trend, the Victory was rebuilt with a Closed Stern 
during her 1800/03 refit. The additional iron bracing that we currently see today would 
not have been fitted at this stage but incorporated in 1814/16 or later. This statement is 
supported by the fact that analysis of the various iron straps and brackets fitted (Figs. 
7/12 & 7/13), within the various after cabin areas (Captain’s, Admiral’s and wardroom) 
reveal that all iron work is, by virtue of the gauge of metal employed, very much 
characteristic of the bracketing later introduced by Seppings circa 1820. If not fitted 
during her rebuild it may well have been fitted in 1824 when Victory was being furnished 
out as the port admiral’ s flagship. Bracing with iron was the only short term solution. 
Like Snodgrass, Seppings advocated using iron on a considerable scale.
Once Seppings had taken office, he could introduce his innovations that would 
revolutionise ship construction. The use of iron plate knees (Figs. 7/10. 7/11. & 7/16) 
with wood chocks, clearly seen in the construction of the frigate Trincomalee built in 
1817, had now become standard shipbuilding technique. With timber conservation in 
mind, this practice was soon superseded by forging a complete iron knee in the form of a 
bracket without the angled stay which thereby virtually eliminated the use of the wooden 
chock and required only a packing piece. The design of these knees varied accordingly 
to their application as seen on the Unicorn frigate (Figs. 7/14 & 7/15) built in 1824, and 
to reiterate, the iron bracketing employed supporting the stern timbers of the Victory. 
By this period iron was also being used for, deck hooks, breast hooks, and crutches, thus 
giving greater support to the fore and after ends of a vessel. Their “introduction 
eliminated the necessity to employ large pieces of compass oak previously used, the size 
of which had always been difficult to procure. This practice was earlier used as 
backing plates to strengthen breasthooks, etc. fitted in the Victory in 1814. More 
unusual is the plate fitted on the upper surface of the breasthook fitted at the fore end of 
Victory’s orlop deck. Inspection confirms that this fitting complies with Seppings 
designs. (Fig.7/17),
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The use of iron was to have an even more profound effect on ship construction. On the 
10th March 1814, Seppings addressed his paper on a ‘New Principle o f Constructing His 
Majesty ’ Ships o f War before the Royal Society. Using the principle of a ‘five barred 
gate’ Seppings showed that ships could be built more rigid. The current construction 
system, which relied entirely on the cohesion of transverse frames and beams, and 
longitudinal strength members and planking, was, because forces acted in two planes 
only, susceptible to ‘hogging’ and ‘sagging’. In both cases, the strength of a ship’s hull is 
compromised due to the flexing incurred: Seams would open up easily and decks move 
out of true; the hood ends of hull planking could be forced out of their rabbets. To 
compensate, the initial practice was to use wooden breadth, top and middle riders, each 
fitted against the ships side, spanning two deck levels. This is clearly seen on an updated 
draught of the 98 gun Dreadnought, and evidence that Victory was so fitted is 
indicated in the well known Devis painting aforementioned. In short, Seppings proposed 
that the inherent transverse forces would be counteracted if a hull was braced with 
diagonal laid riders.
The principle of diagonal bracing was first , “successfully adopted in the 74 gun ship 
Kent in 1805”. Seppings later improved this design by fitting diagonal timbers 
between the gun ports and fitting diagonal carlings between beams and laying diagonal 
deck planking. This became universally known as the ‘trussed frame’ system. This 
was not an entirely new innovation as diagonal riders had been used experimentally 
before both in France and America, though not on a wide scale. The USS 
Constitution of 1797 itself is a surviving example and recent reconstruction has 
incorporated such timbers in accord with Humphries’ specifications. One advantage of 
Seppings design was that short lengths of timber could be used thereby reducing timber 
wastage. Seppings also introduced a method of stiffening a hull by inserting opposed 
wedges in the spaces between the floor timbers thereby producing a continuous rigid 
form. It was now but a short step before the diagonal timber riders were substituted with 
those of iron. A classic example of diagonal iron bracing can be seen on the frigate 
Unicorn now at Dundee, (Fig.7/18). This vessel, built at Chatham in 1824 is the 
archetype of a ship encompassing Seppings innovative designs: the round bow, round 
stern, iron knees (Fig. 7/19), riders and stanchions, and built-up solid bulwarks. The
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original timber crutches and breasthooks used on both the Victory and Trincomalee were 
now made entirely of iron giving greater strength afore and abaft. The overall effect of 
Seppings’ work was that ship length was now less restricted and in 1832 a new class of 
ship was introduced, these having 90 guns, mounted on two decks only as opposed to 
the 3 decked 90’s some thirty years earlier.
Prior to this other proposals were submitted in an effort to reduce hogging. One such 
innovation comprised fitting ‘U’ shaped iron braces set between the main frames in wake 
of gun port sills and ledges. Whether this rather unique system was actually adopted on 
any particular ship as an experiment is now speculative and may have been abandoned in 
view that it was both complicated and expensive.
Higher production of cheaper and better quality iron soon lead to the construction of 
iron warships, the first, HMS Warrior, completed in 1860. This revolutionary step in 
ship development heralded the eclipse of the traditional wooden man-of-war which had 
reigned supreme since the Tudor period. However there is an ironic conclusion, 
inasmuch that the concept of adopting iron with timber construction, albeit first 
initialised without authority by Sir Anthony Deane in 1670, was later utilised, together 
with Seppings principle of diagonal timbers in the design of Scott’s Discovery built in 
1901. This vessel, now preserved at Dundee, was purposely constructed to withstand 
the rigorous environment of Antarctic exploration. What is less obvious is that the 
introduction of iron fittings, in whatever form, based on the Seppings system permitted 
even greater changes: The advent of steam propulsion, with its weighty machinery, 
boilers, and its extensive paddle or propeller shafting required a stable platform to give it 
considerable support. This necessity could only be provided from a rigid hull form braced 
by iron.
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Chapter 8.
Bow Construction.
Like all 2"^ , and 3"^  rate ships of the 18^*‘ century, the Victory was initially designed 
with a beakhead bulkhead constructed transversely across the fore end of the upper gun 
deck. This form of bow, which had fully developed during the Tudor period,^ was to 
remain in vogue in most line of battle ships until the early part of the 19^ *' century.
What we see on Victory today is in effect a replica of the beakhead form she retained 
until her bows were modified during her ‘great repair’ of 1814/16. The only difference 
however is that today there is a false beak deck built some 18 inches (45.72 cm) above 
the level of the upper gun deck  ^ This nonconformity, fitted during restoration work 
carried out in the 1920s, was added in order to raise the level of the ship’s head and 
sheer which had fallen due to extreme hogging. Hogging at the fore part of the ship was 
found to be about 18 inches (45.72 cm). The cause of this appears to lay in the fact that 
the Victory was riding on her moorings from 1816 to 1922, a period of 106 years, which 
was not what was expected of any wooden built ship.
During her 1920s restoration other measures were also undertaken to counteract the 
fallen sheer problem. Beside fitting a false deck, the forecastle also had to be raised in 
order to revert the ship to an acceptable external appearance. Here, additional beams 
were fitted over the originals to chock-up the deck.  ^ This effectively raised the 
Forecastle some 8 inches (20.32 cm) at the fore end. During further restoration, carried 
out in the 1980s, both the original beams and the ‘chocks’ were removed, and the new 
beams being fitted in their room were actually raised up accordingly to retain the level of 
the deck. This, although still deviating from her 1765 construction, at least provided a 
somewhat more acceptable internal appearance. Obviously, clamps (beam shelves) and 
the lengths of hanging knees fitted in wake had to be adjusted to accommodate this 
alteration.
To reiterate, when first built, the beak deck was actually an extension of the upper gun 
deck. The beakhead bulkhead itself was, by comparison to the ship’s bulwarks, rather
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lightly built. Construction comprised eight stanchions set with their heels tenoned into a 
collar beam set across the deck. The heads of these stanchions, which terminated above 
the flat of the forecastle forming a fife rail, were bolted to the fore face of both the cat 
beam and cat tail. Each stanchion was disposed such to form the sides of four access 
doors; two leading to the beak declc, and two to the roundhouses. There were also two 
chase ports. Originally only the fore side of the bulkhead was planked up, this 
comprised short deals 1.1/2 inches (3.81 cm) thick let into rabbets cut into the 
stanchions.
As seen from the above description, structurally the beakhead bulkhead was defensively 
weak and highly vulnerable to raking fire from ahead. The fact that no structural 
alterations had been made to ship’s bows for well over a century reflects the conservative 
attitude to how ships fought. The standard Tine of battle’, where ships sailed in line head 
to stern firing broadside to broadside with the enemy, had not really changed since first 
introduced by Monck during the Dutch Wars and formerly authorised circa 1690.  ^
Though well tried, and rigidly adhered to, strategically this tactic did not always permit 
officer’s to get fully to grips with their opponents. Time taken to form a squadron, or 
squadrons, in line ahead, and simultaneously to gain the weather gauge, was often 
impeded due to wind conditions with the result that the advantage sought was often lost. 
Towards the latter part of the 18 '^ century, much to the credit of the amateur tactician 
John Clerk of Eldin,  ^current battle tactics employed were being analysed and modified 
to form the strategy of ‘breaking the line’ or ‘crossing the T’. This manoeuvre, first 
adopted to some degree by Rodney at the Battle of the Saintes 1782, and later by Howe 
in 1794, was eventually to culminate in the brilliant tactics used by Nelson at Trafalgar. 
These revised tactics released captains of ships from the restrictions imposed by Article 
20 of the Admiralty instructions. ^
It was only then, now that ships could expose their heads and sterns to the enemy, that 
the weak structure of the beakhead bulkhead became apparent and that ship design 
needed to be reviewed. The concept of constructing ships with a full round bow was not 
new; Frigates had been so built since circa 1760, and smaller vessels some 30 years 
earlier, round bows had long been common in merchant ships including, due to
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Snodgrass, those of the East India Company. The round bow had also been used on 
foreign men-of-war before its adoption by the British navy. ® One example was the 
Venetian 64 gun ship Vulcano captured by the French in 1797 and renamed Causse. This 
ship was later captured by the British at Alexandria in 1800.  ^ The fact that the beakhead 
bulkhead was a liability in battle is a factor that was later very much emphasised when 
Seppings submitted his letter to Lord Melville concerning the principle of introducing 
circular sterns, to quote;
Navy Office, Januaiy, 1822.
My Lord,
.............other. It may be right to remark here, when speaking o f circular bows, that
previous to their introduction, the upper decks were exposed, and liable to be raked: 
and, as a instance, I  beg to state, that after the battle o f Trafalgar, the Victory was 
repaired at Chatham, in which yard I  was then Master-Shipwright. It struck me forcibly, 
how much she had suffered on the upper or main deck, through the beakhead, when 
bearing down on the enemy at the commencement o f memorable action, arising from  
the want o f continuing the circular bow with regular timbering, &c., from the upper, or 
main deck, above the forecastle, as is now practiced; and it was perfectly evident that 
had this ship be so formed , many a life would have been saved, as no shot o f any 
description appeared to have entered the lower or middle decks, where the bow was 
regularly and solidly built. ; whereas, on the contrary, the common grape shot had raked 
her through the slight bulkhead., at the fore part o f the main or upper deck, where her 
bow was so built. All this was fully acknowledged by Sir Thomas Hardy, her then 
Captain; in consequence if  which, I  came to the determination to recommend that ships 
o f the line should, in the future, be built with circular bows, and referred to a ship so 
treated (Namur) at my recommendation, some little time before; but I  did not succeed in 
establishing this principle, until the naval administration o f the Right Honourable 
Charles Yorke.
The Namur, referred to in Seppings’ letter, was initially a 2"^  ^ rate of 90 guns launched 
in 1756 designed by Bately to the amended 1745 Establishment. The letter infers that
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this vessel was the first purpose built warship furnished with a Round Bow, this was not 
exactly true. On the January 1802, with recommendation from Seppings, the 
Admiralty proposed to the Navy Board to “take off the Namur's upper deck as was 
lately done with the Blenheim”}^ The 90 gun Blenheim, designed by Slade, was 
launched at Woolwich 5^ July 1761. Like all 90s built at that period she was reclassed in 
1778 as a 98 with the addition of 8 guns on her quarter deck. The fact that the 
Blenheim was converted to have a round bow during her refit between October 1798 
and May 1801 is verified from the Progress Book. Consequently the Namur was cut 
down and modified to a 74 with a round bow. This was implemented in 1804. 
Modification was simply made by removing the entire upper gun deck, and consequently, 
the beakhead bulkhead. The fore part of the middle gun deck, which was already built 
full, effectively became the built-up round bow. All was still experimental at this stage. 
After inspecting the Victory in 1806 Seppings already saw the advantages of constructing 
ships with this form of bow therefore on the 28 May 1807 he submitted his proposal to 
the Navy Board that all ships should be constructed with round bows. Finally, after 
four years, the Admiralty abolished the beakhead bulkhead and authorised the 
introduction of the round bow to all ships of the line. This was implemented by 
Admiralty Order dated 29^ *' May 1811. Not only was this implemented on ships 
constructed in home dockyards but also abroad. Copies of the draught of the 
Conquestadore were sent to Bombay as a guide for building the Cornwallis, launched 
May 1813, and the Wellesley, two years later. The Benbow, building at Chatham 1813, 
was also fitted accordingly. The Victory, which discontinued active service at the end 
of 1812, pending she was to be retained, would in turn be so fitted.
In March 1814 the Victory commenced a large rebuild at Portsmouth during which her 
beakhead bulkhead was removed and a round bow constructed in its stead. How this 
was actually implemented is now lost forever as, in the haste of reconstructing the ship to 
her Trafalgar configuration with a beakhead bulkhead, little archaeological survey work 
was undertaken. Frame timbers forming her round bow were simply removed or 
shortened accordingly to produce the desired effect. If there was any further evidence, 
then this too has been lost as her entire bow section was again rebuilt during the 1980s.
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With exception to old photographs, extant plans, and the Dockyard lines taken off 
before her bows were reconstructed in the 1920s, the manner in which she was physically 
constructed with a round bow can only be theoretically ascertained. In view of this fact 
it can be assumed that when being rebuilt in 1814/16, all cant frames and hawse pieces 
would have been cut back to form suitable scarphs. These timbers were then lengthened 
by adding new pieces that extended to the height of the forecastle. All appropriate 
capping pieces, rails, etc. were then installed. All upper gun deck ship’s side planking: 
spirketting, lining, and beam shelves; were then extended forward to the bow. Extra 
beams with their relevant knees were then fitted to support the now lengthened 
forecastle. Externally, planking strakes and rails, etc. were continued around to the bow 
in the normal manner. With exception to a few minor fittings; i.e. boarding fitted across 
the head rail to provide more modesty for the ship’s heads (toilets) little changed over 
the proceeding years until the Victory was reconstructed with her Trafalgar style 
beakhead bulkhead in the 1920s.
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1Chapter 9.
The Orlop Deck.
The root of the word orlop is Germanic relating to a temporary surface, ‘to overloop the 
hold’ with planks. In all probability boards would have been laid over the ‘tuns’ carried 
in medieval Cogs forming a false deck for other stores or to provide living space. In 
naval vessels the term orlop originally related to the lower gun deck This fact is verified 
from various sources: An early treatise c. 1620-25 states that, ‘The Orlop, which is the 
first deck above the hold, is chiefly for the use o f ordnance: upon which there are divers 
ports cut through the ships side to place them in. The fore part thereof is called the fore 
pyeke (sic. peak) and in ships that have low hawses a part thereof called the manger.... ' 
 ^ Sir Walter Raleigh also wrote, “...we carry our ordnance better than we were wont, 
because our nether-overloops are raised commonly from the water,.... We have also 
raised our second decks and given more vent thereby to our ordnance, tying in our 
nether-overloope ”.  ^ Here Raleigh refers to the after part of the gun deck which was 
once stepped at a different level, a fact that is further clarified later by Carr Laughton’s 
article on Tudor guns.  ^ By 1765 the concept of the orlop had altered and had become 
firmly established as ‘ a temporary deck below the lower [gun] deck o f large ships for  
the conveniency o f stowing away cable. ^
When first built the orlop in the Victory did not extend the full length of the ship as it 
does today. In all seven extra beams have been fitted in addition to the original twenty 
specified. For Rate ships Steel states the following specifications;^
To have beams in number..............................................................................20.
Aftside o f the after beam afore the after perpendicular...............................25 ft.
Fore-side o f the foremost beam abaft the foremost perpendicular.............10 ft.
From the above criteria, together with extant draughts, it is clearly indicated that deck 
planking did not extend beyond the foremost beam or abaft the breadroom bulkhead. In 
effect, the breadroom utilised the entire aftermost space from the underside of the gun
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deck to the ceiling of the hold. Three beams have since been added abaft No.20 beam 
purely for utilising space.
The fact that the orlop was ‘a temporary deck’ is of vital importance: First, this deck did 
not extend the full length of the ship: Second, with exception to the two fixed platforms, 
one afore and one abaft, the main portion of this deck was very lightly constructed. 
Planking between the two platforms comprised short thin boards of about 1.1/2 inches 
(3.80 cm) thick set between the beams. To permit this the top edges of the beams were 
themselves rabbetted 1.1/2 x 1.1/2 inches (3.80 x 3.80 cm) to receive the ends of the 
short planks aforesaid. Again this fact is clarified by Steel; ^
Plank or Boardfor the Orlop flat, thick.........................................................2 ins.
And let on to rabbets taken out o f those beams, and those carlings which are even with 
the upper sides o f the beams.
The thickness of planking quoted above relates to the normal short boards and not the 
plank used for the platforms.
Close inspection of orlop deck plans show the rabbet lines on deck beams between the 
established platforms, those disposed at the platform extremities being rabbetted on one 
side only. . Steel clearly states; “ but in the midships, from the fore part o f the spirit 
room, to the after part o f the fore magazine, the beams are laid level with the surface o f 
the deck, and the planks rabbitted (sic) in from one beam to another. ^
Recent survey has shown that the carlings (with exception to the side tier) and ledges 
wrought throughout this section were also set down 1.1/2 inches (3.80 cm) below the 
upper surfaces of the beams. Investigation also revealed that the short planks laid over 
carlings were reduced in width in order to form a land on the carling to receive the edges 
of adjacent planks. (Fig. 9/1) On Victory, these particular boards were found to be 6 
inches (15.24 cm) wide whereas the other planks varied between 8 (20.32 cm) and 12 
inches (30.48 cm) in width. ^
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All of the particular features aforesaid are clearly shown on the model of the Royal 
George (1756) currently displayed in the National Maritime Museum.  ^ Inspection of 
this model indicated the following points;
a. The after side ofNo.l beam and fore side of No. 2 beam are rabbeted to receive 
thin boards.
b. Rabbets are omitted between the after side of No. 2 beam and fore side of No. 6 
beam.
c. Rabbets are omitted from the after face of No. 16 beam to No. 20 beam, the aftermost 
beam of the orlop.
d. All beams set in the rooms between the after side of No. 6 beam and fore face of No. 
16 beam are rabetted on both sides to receive thin boards.
e. The side tier of carlings were fitted level with the beams.
The advantages of adopting this form of construction technique were as follows;
a. The upper face of the planking was level with the upper surface of the beams. Though 
very marginal, this effectively increased headroom.
b. Light construction minimised weight.
c. Use of short planks reduced timber wastage.
Originally, these boards were never fastened down and could be removed. Likewise 
respective carlings and ledges fitted between the beams could also be unshipped. Carlings 
wrought in wake between the fore and after platforms were found to be 1.1/2 inches 
(3.80 cm) less in depth than those fitted afore and abaft, (Fig. 9/2.) the difference 
accounting for the thickness of the thin boards. In effect, it was only the orlop beams 
and fixed platforms which formed an integral part of the ship’s structure. The facility of 
having portable boards, carlings, and ledges, was provided for the following reasons;
a. To attain access, where convenient, to the hold below. (Refer Note 1 below).
b. To allow the wet anchor cables to drain into the hold.
c. To extend storage of casks, etc. beyond the limit of the hold. (Refer Note 2 below).
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Of note, it proved far more convenient, especially when water casks needed refilling, to 
embark or remove stores by a direct vertical route rather than manipulating heavy casks 
fore or aft to either the main or fore hatchways. On another point, the specification 
‘Depth in Hold’, which is always written on a ship’s draught, was always a measurement 
taken from the underside of the gun deck planking to the upper surface of the ‘Stake 
next the Limbers’. This dimension totally excludes the fact that there was an orlop deck 
fitted between the two points measured.
As previously stated there were also two fixed platforms. These were initially 
constructed with 2.1/2 inch (6.35 cm) planks laid on top of the beams in the 
conventional manner. Furthermore the edges of these boards were cyphered or rabbeted 
together and caulked forming a hermetic seal to the compartments below. Where 
platform planking terminated, the boards were sealed with a transverse fillet. This fillet, 
which was usually of quarter radius cross section, prevented water ingress into the end 
grain of planks.
The primary function of the fore platform was to provide a protective shield over the 
grand magazine and its adjacent light room below. It appears from one existing Victory 
draught that the fore platform extended from No.2 to No.5 beam. This does not appear 
to comply with the standard practice clearly defined on the Royal George model as 
stated above, i.e. No.2 to No.6 beam. It also does not comply with other contemporary 
works which state that the platform extended from “forward to beam number six”.^ ® 
Irrespective of period the aftermost transverse bulkhead of the grand magazine on 
Victory was always fitted at No. 6 beam. The reasons why the platform was drawn 
terminating at No. 5 Beam (Fig.9/2) remains unresolved and in all probability could 
simply be a drawing error.. Alternatively, it is possible that the after bulkhead of the 
grand magazine could have been fitted at No. 5 beam when Victory was first built (1765) 
and repositioned later when the magazine was extended aft to terminate at No.6 beam. 
Unfortunately no original ‘as built’ draught exists to verify this point. If a modification 
was made then it was probably introduced in the repair of 1783 when the after powder 
magazine was removed and two hanging magazines were installed in its room. With the
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absence of an after powder magazine, the capacity of the grand magazine may have been 
increased to provide additional space to store more gunpowder barrels.
Irrespective, firm evidence supports the fact that the fore platform of all V\ 2*“^ , and 3"^  
rate ships extended between beams No. 2 and 6, or more specifically, to the beam that 
supported the after riding bitts.
The after platform (Fig. 9/3) was also laid with 3 inch (7.62 cm) plank which again was 
cyphered and caulked for similar reasons. On initial build, this platform extended from 
No. 15 beam adjacent the aftermost bulkhead of the main hold and terminated at No. 20 
beam. To reiterate, there was no deck laid aft beyond this point. The function of the 
after platform was to protect the after powder magazine and the spirit room each of 
which held potentially hazardous materials. Further details of standard construction are 
to be found on many contemporary draughts.
Of singular note, recent survey has revealed that lodging knees wrought in wake of 
platforms were set down 1.1/2 inches (3.81 cm) below the upper edge of their respective 
beams. This fact applies to the platforms only and does not correspond to the normal 
practice of fitting lodging knees level with the top of a beam as found throughout the 
remainder of the orlop deck. This also applies to lodging knees fitted in wake where the 
after platform has been extended to new No. 16 beam.
It was also discovered that within the confines of the platforms, corresponding ledges 
wrought between the outer tier of carlings and lodging knees at the ship’s side remained 
fitted level with the beams. In some cases, these ledges extended to the ship’s side and 
were fashioned accordingly to lay over the lodging knees. It appears that the space 
produced above the lodging knee permitted better ventilation.
In theory every lodging knee fitted throughout the ship should be fitted in this manner 
with exception to those fitted in the midship section of the orlop. This opinion is based 
on evidence found that other knees, currently considered as fitted in the conventional 
way, were found to have rotted within the enclosed parts of the knee; i.e. the upper and
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outboard surfaces. The only evidence regarding the air spaces can be found in the 
Shipbuilder’s Repository. However, at present, this fact is not proof enough for 
should this have been the case then all lodging knees would have been fitted in the 
Victory with spaces accordingly.
Changes in orlop construction were introduced circa 1808. This relates to the 
lengthening of the platforms. Evidence supporting this fact is taken from two draughts; 
The Caledonia, (Fig. 9/4) launched 25th June 1808 and Hibernia, (Fig. 9/5) as 
modified in 1821. With respect to the former, the fore platform had been lengthened in 
two directions, forward to No. 1 beam, and aft to No. 9 beam located at the fore side of 
the fore hatchway leading to the hold. (Refer drawing: Appendix III). The modification 
implemented to the Hibernia involved fitting an extra beam forward and extending the 3 
inch (7.62 cm) planking in both directions, the after part terminating at the fore 
hatchway. As before a transverse fillet was fitted to prevent water ingress to end grain. 
This alteration appears to have been introduced for the following reasons;
a. To extend the protective area covering the grand magazine with its integral filling 
room and adjacent light room.
b. To provide greater security to the three storerooms fitted between the grand 
magazine and the hold. These rooms were: larboard - Boatswain’s store; starboard - 
Carpenter’s store; and centreline - a coal hole. Evidence suggests that the deck of 
each of these storerooms were laid with loose fitted planks. Below these rooms was a 
shot locker.
c. To provide a greater fixed deck area to comply with recent modifications to Fore
Platform compartment layout.
This modification was adopted to the Victory during her ‘great repair’ carried out in 
Portsmouth between 1814 and 1816. (Fig. 9/6) Recent survey undertaken during 
restoration of the foremost orlop beams disclosed some interesting points regarding the
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construction of the fore platform. The main planking, which extended aft to No. 8 beam 
(originally No. 7 beam) comprised boards 10.1/2 inches (26.67 cm) broad and 3 inches 
(7.62 cm) thick. All were found to be rabbeted 1.1/2 inches (38 mm) along their edges, 
the seams being caulked in the standard manner. Caulking material used was 1/8 inch 
(3.18 mm) thick. All planks were fastened with iron spikes. Overlaying these planks was 
a cladding of thin deal boards 9 inches (22.86 cm) broad, varying between 1/2 and 5/8 
inch (12.7 and 15.88 mm) thick. (Figs. 9/6 & 9/7) All were laid fore and aft directly 
over the seams of the main planking underneath and secured with plain round sectioned 
nails. No evidence of caulking was found.
Fitted to the underside of the main planking was a second cladding (Fig. 9/7) comprising 
short deals wrought in the athwartships direction. Each were fitted, as convenient, 
between respective beams, carlings and ledges. These boards varied in thickness, some 
being 1.1/2 inches (38 mm), others 3/4 inch (19 mm). Those boards 3/4 inch thick were 
doubled to form the desired thickness of 1.1/2 inches (38 mm) as dictated by adjacent 
locations. Whichever the case all were loose fitted and retained with deal battens 3/4 
inches (19 mm) wide and 1 inch (25.4 mm) deep nailed to either the adjacent beam, 
carling or ledge as required. Of particular note, these boards only extended fore and aft 
between No. 3 and No. 6 beam, and transversely between the outer of carlings, the 
reasons for which are explained further. Furthermore, to reiterate an aforesaid point 
concerning the lodging knees and outer tier of ledges, their disposition at this location 
was found to differ from standard construction practice.
Obviously the entire construction, the two layers of cladding, lower set lodging knees, 
and the outer tier of ledges raises considerable question. By comparison to other existing 
historic ships, Trincomalee (1817) and Unicorn (1824), the manner in which the 
platform on the Victory was laid is somewhat more complex. Furthermore, it appears 
that additional beams were fitted during the 1814-16 refit. Beam No. 1 was replaced 
with a timber of greater scantling, and a new beam was fitted in the room between No. 6 
and original No. 7 beam. As result No. 7 beam, which originally formed the fore 
boundary of the fore hatchway leading to the hold, effectively became No. 8 beam. Of 
cautionary note, the new No. 7 beam could have been fitted during the 1800-03 repair
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and modified later in 1814-16. This point complies with other contemporaiy draughts
circa 1798.
My hypothesis are that extra beams were fitted to provide greater strength to a now 
aging ship also their addition complied with the then current building specifications. 
Original practice indicates that beams in wake of the platforms were often laid at a lower 
level than the those fitted amidships. This was done to compensate for the thicker 
planking laid on the platforms thereby effecting a constant level surface throughout the 
orlop. An earlier draught of Victory, assumed to be dated after her repair in 1783, 
clarifies this fact. This specification is also stated in Steel’s Aava/ Architecture',
Orlop Beams: The upper sides to be below the........A fore ...........7 f t  S ins, ( 2.20 m).
under side o f the gun-deck plank......Midships......7 f t  1 in. (2.16 m).
at the middle o f the beam ................ A baft  7 f t  3 ins. (2.20 m).
The difference in depth of 2 inches (5.08 cm) closely corresponds to the existing 1.1/2 
inches (3.81 cm) variation found between beams and lodging knees currently fitted on 
Victory. This fact implies that the beam height was altered during her 1800-03 refit, if 
not earlier, and that the lodging knees were retained in their original positions to reduce 
work. This point also accounts why the ledges were fitted over the lodging knees. Why 
design changed is obscure; however in all probability this modification was introduced 
to simplify construction.
With regard to the aforementioned deal cladding fitted under the platform between No. 3 
and 6 beam, this appears to be an accepted precautionary measure fitted to prevent 
ingress of damp in to the grand magazine only. For similar reasons, cladding was also 
found fitted to the underside of the lower gun deck planking in wake of the Carpenter’s 
and Boatswain’s cabins on the orlop.
The thin cladding boards laid over the platform planking were fitted much later for a very 
different purpose. When removed during subsequent restoration deposits of sand and grit 
were discovered laying under the boards. Photographic evidence circa 1905 clearly
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indicates that the entire fore platform was devoid of any compartments whatsoever, 
these being installed after 1923. This point is validated from existing drawings. 
Furthermore, there is no visual evidence provided on the underside of the lower gun 
deck beams to confirm that these compartments were ever rebuilt during the ‘great 
repair’ of 1814-16; there was no requirement as the ship was to be temporarily placed in 
‘ordinary’. ‘Rase’ marks inscribed into the aforesaid beams clarify they were fitted
c. 1814/15. Also, the photograph supplies no visual indication that the upper surface of 
the platform was originally clad. At that particular time, the entire area was utilised for 
the stowage of chain cables which themselves carried sand into the ship hence the residue 
found. In view that the thin boarding did not extend over the entire platform but only in 
wake of the storerooms, etc. reconstructed in the 1920s, their function was entirely 
cosmetic to level a somewhat worn deck surface.
The after platform had also undergone various modifications during Victory’s career. ‘As 
built’ in 1765 the platform extended between original beam Nos. 15 and 20. This 
platform was later extended forward to terminate at the original beam No 14. (new beam 
No. 16). For additional support to the platform two more beams were added in the room 
between new beams No. 16 and 20. The planking of the extension was wrought in the 
conventional manner. Transverse under cladding 1.1/2 inches (3.80 cm) thick was only to 
found wrought in wake of the original after platform and not laid up below the extended 
section. Of importance, this fact indicates that this unwritten feature, whether fitted afore 
or abaft, was standard practice when the Victory was first built. The deck area between 
the transverse bulkhead defining the Surgeon’s dispensary and breadroom, and the fore 
side of the spirit room hatchway has been sheathed with a thin cladding of deal boards 1 
inch (2.54 cm) thick. Like that fitted on the fore platform, this appears to have been 
added to level the surface. Proof that this is not original lays with the fact that it does not 
extend abaft the transverse bulkhead, nor does it extend outboard within the cabins and 
storerooms either side of the ship.
Returning to the midship section of the orlop, today all of the short length boards 
wrought between the beams are secured firmly with nails. The fact that they are currently 
fixed is not for modern convenience but an evolutionary step in ship construction. To
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reiterate, these boards were once portable and, together with respective carlings and 
ledges, could be removed to attain easier access to the hold especially when watering 
ship. Water puncheons, which held either 150 or 184 gallons (681.9 or 836.46 litres) and 
weighing between 2/3 and 3/4 of a ton (0.68 and 0.77 tonne), were extremely 
cumbersome and time consuming items to load.
In 1814, a breakthrough was made to alleviate this task. Experiments of using iron water 
tanks in place of wooden casks had proved successful. This innovation also proved valid 
for other reasons. '"The use o f iron tanks has preserved the purity o f water, and the 
discontinuance o f shingle ballast removed the unpleasant effluvia, that fixquently arose 
from animal and vegetable substances in a state o f composition, which were sometimes 
lodged therein; or other putrescent matter absorbed. ”
These tanks, manufactured from wrought iron sheet, were made in cubical form about 4 
feet (1.22 m) square. In capacity they contained approximately 400 gallons (1815 litres) 
of water. Obviously there was initial prejudice against their use in the belief that health 
could be impaired due to oxides of iron being able to “enter the water by solution. ” ^  
This was far from true as investigations revealed that water contained within such a tank 
for a period of 5 years remained in a good state. This examination included a chemical 
test using ‘tincture o f galls ' to detect presence of iron in water. No iron could be 
detected.
Here we see a positive result relating from the recent improvements of iron 
manufacturing techniques (refer Chapter 7) and the industry as a whole. More 
importantly, contrary to current thought, the introduction of iron water tanks bears 
considerable weight to alterations in ship construction especially with respect to the 
orlop deck. The advantages gained were many;
a. The task of removing/reloading heavy water casks was eliminated.
b. With respect to ‘a’ above, there was now no further requirement to construct the 
Orlop with portable planking, etc.
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c. Water could be embarked by pumping from lighters direct to the tanks within the 
hold. Likewise water could be easily transferred by pump for domestic use.
d. Water tanks eradicated the use of shingle ballast, thus the trim of a ship could now be 
altered by simply transferring water from one tank to another.
e. The absence of shingle provided a healthier environment.
f. Water capacity was increased thereby improving operation time at sea.
g. Less water wastage caused by leaky casks.
h. Less chance of water contamination.
In consequence to their introduction, two changes occurred: Both platforms were 
extended towards the midship area; the thin loose planking laid at the midship section 
became fixed down with nails. Both these transitional features are evident on the Victory. 
The former relates to the extension of after platform fitted between No. 20 to No. 16 
beam (current beam numbers) which subsequently closes over the after hold. When the 
after platform was extended, two additional beams were also fitted to provide better 
support; one abaft original No. 13 beam, and one abaft original beam No. 14. The centre 
portion of the latter stated beam has since been cut away in order to reconstruct the after 
hanging magazine, firm proof that it was fitted after 1805. The fore platform, as 
previously stated, had been extended aft to in the fore hatchway. With regard to the thin 
boards, all, with exception to those found under the after part of the fore platform 
constructed c. 1814/16, are firmly fixed down.
Though not always apparent another influence that changed construction was the 
introduction of iron chain cable. Although iron cable had long been in existence it was 
both unreliable in strength and expensive to make. This soon altered with the then 
present changes in industrial technology; newer manufacturing methods providing 
stronger and cheaper iron chain. Initial proposals to use chain were submitted to the 
Admiralty by Lieutenant Samual Browne in 1811, but not fully implemented until circa
1817 26
Iron cables necessitated a different type of stowage other than the standard cable tiers 
which primarily took up most of the midship section of the orlop. Unlike hemp cables,
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which needed air circulation to dry, there was no requirement to remove boards for iron 
cable. As result the thin boards became fixed. By the 1830s, new ships being built were 
constructed with a continuous orlop using the conventional planking system laying on 
top of the beams while existing ships, like the Victory, where simply and cheaply 
modified by fixing the short loose planking down. Such modifications are also reflected 
on other draughts. Obviously with the introduction of chain cable a new design of 
riding bitt had to be adopted. These designs were variable, some purpose built for new 
ships building while other were simply modifications to existing riding bitts fitted to ships 
in service. Those on the Victory were altered to accommodate iron cable in 1824. 
These however were removed shortly after 1924 when restoring to her 1803/05 
configuration.
To conclude, the overall change in orlop construction between circa 1760 and 1835 had 
far- reaching ramifications: Initially this deck of was of limited length comprising two 
short fixed platforms and a central section of thin loose boards. New technological 
innovations, such as iron tanks and cables, entirely altered the function of the Orlop. 
Within the aforesaid time span, this deck had evolved into that of a continuous planked 
deck with reduced cable tiers giving greater space for storerooms, sailrooms, and cabins. 
Finally, the fact that the deck was now planked in the conventional manner hull strength 
was considerably improved. This corresponded fully with other innovative changes in 
hull design at the time. New design criteria called for a more rigid hull system by use of 
diagonal riders and iron fittings. Such modifications, supported from a new breed of 
constructors such as Tucker, Lang and Edye were officially authorised by Sir Robert 
Seppings when he was appointed Surveyor of the Navy in 1813. Now, with the fully 
planked rigid orlop effectively closing off the lower regions of the ship, the path was laid 
to meet the introduction of steam machinery into the wooden warship. The orlop on the 
Victory however was to remain in its transitional form.
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Figure 9/L Victary\ Orlop deck coa&truetion pre 1816 
Key;
L Qriop Standard
2. Threshold fillet
3. Lodging Knee.
4. Side tier of fixed Ledges - 5 x 4  inches.
5. Lower Gun Deck Clamp (or beam Shelf).
6. Internal ship’s side planking.
7. Orlop Deck Clamp (or beam Shelf).
8. Orlop Deck.
9. 1.1/2. X 1.1/2 inch rabbet to receive 1.1/2 inch loose deck boards.
10. Fixed Carling - 1 0 x 9  inches; rabbeted 1.1/2 inches on inboard edge.
11. Loose fitted Ledges. - 5 x 4  inches.
12. Loose fitted Deck Boards -1.1/2 inches thick.
13. Loose fitted Carling -10x8.1/2. inches.
14. Loose board fitted over Carling - 6.1/2 x 1.1/2 inches.
15. No. 6 Orlop Beam.
16. Fore Platform planking -10.1/2x3 inches with 1.1/2 inch rabbeted edges.
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Figure 9/3. After Platform of the Orlop Deck: ViciQty, prel814/16 construction. 
Key:
1. Lower portion of Breadth Rider.
2. Aftermost Orlop Beam (No. 20).
3. Standard (or inverted Hanging Knee).
4. Mizzen Mast.
5. Fore Bulkhead of Bread Room.
6. Spirit Room.
7. Side cast Hanging Knee..
8. Fish Room.
9. After Platform planking - 3 inches thick.
10. After Hold.
11. Foremost end of After Platform.
12. Lower portion of long Breadth Rider.
13. After Hanging Magazine.
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Figure 9/7* Victaryx Post 1816 Fore Platform deck construction*
Key;
1. Under cladding boards. - Ll/2 inches, thick.
2. Ledges - 5 x 4  inches.
3. Carling - 1 0 x 9  inches.
4. Orlop Beam.
5. Retaining battens - 1 x 3 / 4  inches.
6 . Ledge - 5 x 4  inches.
7. Fore Platform planking -10.1/2x3 inches with 1.1/2 inch rabbeted edges.
8 . Deal cladding boards - 9 ins. wide x 1/2 inch thick.
Chapter 10,
Summary of Discussion.
The development of H.M.S. Victory throughout her active career epitomises the general 
progression of war ship design for the period 1759 to 1823. More importantly, and 
though less obvious, the ship also provides us with a living epitaph portraying the 
expansion of applied sciences, technology, and the new manufacturing techniques, which 
collectively relate to what is termed the Industrial Revolution. It was this technological 
thrust that gave Britain the capacity to maintain her sustained and effective war effort to 
support the political policies that finally defeated Napoleon in 1815. The aftermath of 
this struggle was to have even more far reaching effect. Trade and industry flourished on 
an international scale thereby creating a solid foundation for an expanding British Empire 
which, albeit short lived by historical standards, exceeded that of any previous nation in 
the modern world.
The fundamental issues surrounding ship development concern two factors, cause and 
effect, neither of which are predominant as both are inter-related. In short, the basic 
criteria that influenced changes in ship design, which though multifarious, are very much 
integrated, are:
1. Design concept.
2. Tactical requirement.
3. Material procurement
4. The iron and copper industry.
In short, each successive refit or rebuild that the Victory underwent reflected new 
developments of technology be it design or material related:
a. 1759 - 60: Initial build using and innovative design based on French influence.
b. 1780: Application of copper sheathing.
c. 1783 : Changeover in hull fastening materials from ferrous to non-ferrous
mixed metal’ bolts.
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d. 1787: Application of breadth, middle, and top riders to strengthen the hull,
which in effect, was a preliminary measure that probably formed the basis 
of the ‘trussed frame’ system later introduced by Seppings.
Pole masts replaced with made masts using Baltic pine. These were 
bound with iron hoops.
e. 1800 - 03 : Raising of the bulwarks due to the introduction of the carronade.
Closed stern reflecting change in battle tactics and defense.
f. 1810: Possible fitting of first group of iron knees and other ironwork.
g. 1814-16: Fitting of iron knees, bracing and brackets.
Reconstruction with the round bow reflecting change in battle tactics, 
defense together with improved structural design.
Change to orlop construction with the introduction of iron water tanks.
h. 1823 : Further changes to the orlop and other fittings with the introduction
of iron chain cables.
To expand, design concept not only relates to the issues raised in Chapter 1; i.e. length, 
breadth, depth and tonnage, &c; and the finer points of hull form influenced by foreign 
design discussed in Chapter 2; design was also centred around tactical requirements 
listed above. When the Victory was first built the standard method of fighting in fleet 
actions was to form the squadron in Tine ahead’, that is in single file, bow to stern. This 
arrangement produced an almost impregnable wall of gun-fire directed towards a 
similarly formed enemy line, ships passing broadside to broadside discharging their 
ordnance into one another. This method of fighting had been strictly enforced by the 
Admiralty codes since the Dutch wars of the 17‘*' century. The disadvantage was that it 
left officers little room to use their initiative or freedom to manoeuvre when wind 
conditions altered..
At the battle of Cape St. Vincent, 14 February 1797, Nelson himself left the line to 
prevent the Spanish ships escaping, and by doing so gained an advantage that won the 
day. Had he failed to achieve his farsighted objectives, his career may have been severely 
damaged for counteracting the formal Admiralty instructions.
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Not only was it sometimes difficult to get ships into formation, but often the advantage 
of attaining the ‘weather gauge’ was lost in doing so. In battle it was always the 
preference to achieve the weather gauge, i.e. to lie to windward of the enemy, in order 
to take advantage of any wind alterations. This also meant that gun-fire smoke would 
drift away from the ship towards the enemy thereby hindering the opponents. It also 
ensured that the gun decks remained free of gun-smoke. The disadvantages of being 
down wind effectively meant that vessels lying to leeward heeled over exposing the 
lower part of their hulls to receive shot between ‘wind and water’. The other 
disadvantages were that guns would have to be hauled into the firing position up an 
inclined deck and that vision was also impaired by the gun smoke that bore down from 
windward. Moreover, having the weather gauge provided the opportunity to either give 
chase or break off action when necessary. While this form of fighting remained the 
accepted practice there was no real necessity to provide greater protection to the head 
and sterns of men of war; the primary objective being to ensure that the broadsides were 
built strongly to withstand damage by shot.
A change in tactics brought about through Clerk, and immortalised by Nelson at 
Trafalgar instigated modifications in design. Not only did new fighting methods attain 
more decisive results but ships became more exposed to enemy shot from ahead and 
astern. As a result the closed stern, with additional gun positions was introduced circa 
1798, likewise the round bow in 1811. From the constructional view, these innovations 
produced a far stronger hull less penetrable by shot. Furthermore, lower casualty rates 
increased morale.
Although the round bow itself did not dramatically increase the complement of ordnance 
borne, its form very much influenced the introduction of the circular stern proposed by 
Seppings in 1822.  ^ This, with its disposition of gun ports provided an all round 
defensive arc of fire power. An alternative design, the more aesthetic elliptical stern, 
supposedly submitted by the sub-surveyor Mr. Roberts in 1819, was introduced some 10 
years later, circa 1829. The origins of this design has however been connected with a Mr. 
Blake. ^
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Gunnery also played its part in the development process. The introduction of the 
carronade in 1779 necessitated the fitting of built-up bulwarks. Initially these were fitted 
on a temporary basis during hostilities only to provide better protection for gun crews 
and the ship from muzzle flash from the new form of gun. Obviously, and very much 
related to change in tactics, it was found that these modified bulwarks also gave greater 
protection from enemy small arms fire for those stationed on the upper decks, hence their 
formal introduction at the turn of the century.
Material procurement greatly altered ship construction techniques. Long periods of war, 
and the expansion of both the Naval and Mercantile fleets, put considerable pressure on 
native timber supplies. In addition, the canal building programme, general civil 
engineering, and the iron industry also contributed to the depletion of vast tracts of 
forests. This problem was not so acute as some historians have emphasised, however the 
fact that timber was being consumed on a considerable scale did cause reasonable 
concern at the time. True, good ‘compass’ oak for futtocks and loiees was scarce 
therefore more economic methods of construction had to be developed, for example, the 
beam end chocks introduced by Mr. Roberts. However this form of construction also 
relied on the use of iron, which is discussed further.
Imported timber was also used for planking and for the manufacture of masts and yards, 
etc. As expected, imported materials were subject to the ever changing climate of 
international politics; moreover imports were hampered by constraints implemented by 
war. From the time that the Victory commenced building until 1815, a period of 56 
years, Britain was in conflict for 31 years. These wars comprised; The American 
Revolutionary War - 1775 to 1783: The French Revolutionary War - 1793 to 1802; and 
the Napoleonic War - 1803 to 1815. In addition one could count the Seven Years War - 
1756 to 1763. Ignoring the Seven Years War, which actually expanded the available 
timber resources, each of the other confrontations brought their own constraints.
The American Revolutionary War temporarily crippled supplies of good timber, 
especially New England pine which grew to suitable girth and length for making lower 
masts. Being manufactured from a single tree these masts were termed as ‘pole’ masts.
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To alleviate the situation Britain had to rely heavily on supplies of Baltic pine, which 
unfortunately did not grow to sufficient size. As a result we turned to manufacturing 
masts using several trees carefully shaped and scarphed and bolted together, intrinsically 
forming what was termed a ‘made mast’. Coincidentally the French had adopted a 
similar method of mast construction before Britain. This was probably prompted due to 
her loss of similar timber supplies from Canada after the Seven Years War. In the long 
term the ‘made mast’ proved far stronger than its predecessor. In all probability, the 
Victory received her lower masts of this form during her refit of 1789. It was only during 
the 1790s that American policy regarding timber altered in Britain’s favour but this was 
short lived as the position deteriorated again when the United States introduced the 
Embargo Act in 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act the following year. Britain then had 
to look to Canada for suitable timber, a course of action further encouraged by the levy 
of duties on imports fi-om the Baltic. ^
As stated earlier Britain’s alternative supplies of timber, as well as other necessary naval 
stores; tar, pitch, turpentine and hemp, etc., came from the Baltic. Imports of this nature 
were crucial for maintaining British warships. The supply of these materials became 
threatened by various factors. First, in May 1807 the French took Danzig which was a 
major outlet for exported timber. Second, in July the same year, Napoleon introduced 
the Treaty of Tilsit permitting him to introduce the continental system and close all 
Russian and German ports to English shipping thereby hampering essential trade. To 
compound the problem further, as part of the coalition of the Armed Neutrality, 
Denmark posed a threat to close the Sound and Great Belt to English merchant ships. 
This potential hazard was soon eradicated with the seizure of the Danish fleet and 
bombardment of Copenhagen by the British navy in September 1807. After this date 
trade slowly improved mainly due to the presence of the Baltic squadron which operated 
between the spring and autumn each year until 1812. This was led under Admiral 
Saumarez in the Victory, Nonetheless the damage had been done, for faced with the 
initial shortages of imported timber, iron and copper, Britain had to look inward at its 
own resources and expand its industry accordingly. With respect to ship construction, 
scarcity of timber called for more economic use; e.g. chock knees, and greater use was 
made of native produced wrought iron by Cort’s process for the manufacture of brackets
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and knees, etc. To reiterate from Chapter 7, fittings of this form were fully authorised in 
1806, before the second Battle of Copenhagen.
Notwithstanding that Abraham Darby had discovered a better method of smelting iron 
using clod coal in 1710 the iron industry was still very much reliant on the use of 
charcoal in 1760. This was an inefficient and costly process. In 1763 Darby II improved 
the smelting process by introducing the use of coke, coal was not to become commonly 
used for another decade. Using coke or coal permitted cheaper production thereby 
making iron a more attractive commodity, thus by 1790 the British iron industry had 
began to expand rapidly.  ^ In 1783 Henry Cort had perfected a cheaper and more 
efficient method of producing high quality malleable wrought iron. This commodity 
proved a superb alternative material as a substitute for timber which itself was becoming 
short in supply. Iron fittings, such as brackets, plate knees, and strapping, became 
commonly used in shipbuilding especially after 1806. Furthermore its initial use was, 
together with the innovative guidance of Sir Robert Seppings, Surveyor of the Navy 
from 1813, to have a far reaching influence in ship design. In addition to the standard 
iron fittings seen on the Victory, later ships were fitted with large diagonally laid iron 
riders to counteract hogging problems. Examples can be seen on the Unicorn frigate at 
Dundee. In addition to structural fittings, the introduction of iron water tanks replacing 
wooden casks altered the future construction of the orlop deck. These tanks also 
eradicated the use of shingle ballast which, though not directly related to construction, 
did eliminate the potential health hazard to the seamen. Over a long period the shingle 
began to harbour foul substances from various sources, rotting stores, etc. which gave 
off obnoxious gases. Not only did better iron production prove suitable to ship 
construction, it was also to improve armament manufacture. Eventually these factors 
were to lead Britain into the Steam Age.
Although British industry was prospering well in 1760 it was not yet a revolution as 
such.  ^ To some degree Britain was slow to rise towards an industrial expansion in the 
wider sense. Though this could mainly be viewed as natural conservatism, it was also 
initially bereft of support from the government. Any innovation was left primarily with 
the individual entrepreneurs who could see potential opportunities arising in their own
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specific fields. France on the other hand was less constrained, her government provided 
greater patronage towards the development and expansion of her industries related to 
iron, steel, textiles and coal. This attitude had been firmly established from an earlier 
part of the 18^  ^ century.  ^ In all, France gave positive encouragement to the Arts, 
Manufacture and Commerce. ® This point is quite evident in comparison to the various 
points raised regarding their scientific application towards ship design expressed earlier 
within this thesis. However, once Britain understood the fundamental issues of industrial 
expansion, the pace developed rapidly and she soon overcame her adversary across the 
channel. Why France began to lose headway was, in all probability, due entirely to the 
economic difficulties bought about from the following circumstances;
1. Fall in trade due to the loss of colonies in India and Canada after the 
Seven Years War.
2. Her costly support of the American cause in 1778.
3. Poor harvests.
4. Revolution in 1789.
These, followed by 22 years of conflict with Britain from 1793 until 1815 momentarily 
damaged the industrial advance that France had formerly held. For example, as stated 
previously, the puddling process introduced by Cort did not take effect in France until 
1818. It could be argued that the financial burden borne by the British for the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars equated with that of France, however unlike France, 
Britain’s national debt was supported by her ability to maintain an economy based on her 
international trade which was well protected by the Royal Navy.
Turning now to the non-ferrous materials, the copper industry had progressively 
expanded from the last decade of the 17^ century. Initially most of the ore was supplied 
from the Cornish mines. Prior to this the bulk of copper was imported from Sweden via 
Holland, and occasionally from Barbary. The supplies from Sweden however fell off in 
the 17^^^  century due to the disaster that befell the main mine at Falun in 1687 thus copper 
from Cornwall became a more important source.  ^ Further development of the industry 
was instigated by the introduction of coal as a substitute for wood and charcoal in the
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smelting process, the latter materials becoming scarce. The discovery of a large ore 
source at Parys Mountain greatly enhanced the industrial output inasmuch that Britain 
had, by the 1780s, become the world’s major exporter of copper. Much of the credit for 
this was due to the industrial entrepreneur Thomas Williams who from 1787 
monopolised the entire industry. Besides the Cornish mines, at this period he controlled 
two large mines in Angelsey, smelting works in Lancashire and Swansea, mills at 
Holywell and in the Thames Valley, and warehouses in London, Birmingham and 
Liverpool.
It could be conceived that the expansion of the copper industry was related directly with 
war. Quite the contrary, in truth this material was not part of munitions and other 
requirements necessary for war, and only became a contributory factor from 1780 when 
sheathing with copper was needed for naval vessels, and later the mercantile craft.
Britain made considerable advances in metallurgy to produce ‘mixed metal’ bolts, etc. for 
ship construction. This alleviated the initial problems of electrolysis between dissimilar 
metals when sheathing ships with copper. The whole process of the industrial revolution 
was not primarily to produce cheaper and better products, it was an awakening for 
people with ingenuity to experiment with new materials ‘fit for purpose’. The new alloys 
produced for general ship building very much resemble the modern alloys used today on 
naval vessels.
The most common factor that indirectly contributed towards the development, design, 
and construction of the warship was coal. This ftiel alone, which proved a valuable 
alternative to the dwindling supplies of coppice wood and other timber used for smelting 
processes, became the major lynch pin of industrial technological progression. Used in a 
minor capacity for many years, this commodity first made its impact as an industrial fuel 
in the process of glass manufacture circa 1612. After this date its use remained relatively 
restricted until circa 1760, when it was first employed in the smelting process of iron.
With the exception of the new methods of manufacturing masts, there remained little 
change in the approach towards the sailing attributes of ships and its development, the
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standard ship rig having already reached it zenith. True, the production of sailcloth, 
ropes and other subsidiary processes had by this period become mechanised with the 
advance of industrial machinery. The greatest impact in this field lay with the 
introduction of Brunei’s block making machinery which was installed at Portsmouth 
Dockyard in 1803. Built by Maudsley, this machinery effectively became the first mass 
production apparatus in the world.
To conclude, thorough analysis of the hull fabric of the Victory can provide us with an 
account of the advances made in industry between 1760 and 1830. First and foremost 
was copper sheathing, which through cheaper production, permitted our ships to be 
maintained at a higher state of seaworthiness and thus spent less time in refit. The effects 
were multifarious;
a. Refit costs were marginally reduced.
b. Greater deployment of warships to confound the enemy throughout the various 
theatres of war.
c. More ships available to maintain the blockade of enemy ports.
d. More ships available to carry out escort duties to protect commerce.
As a by-product to copper, various innovative non-ferrous alloys were introduced to 
eliminate the problems of electrolysis caused between copper and iron fittings. The 
origins of these ‘mixed metal’ materials were effectively the forerunner of the necessary 
compound metals used in connection with early steam plant machinery and sea-water 
associated systems employed today.
Improved iron manufacture, as we have seen, directly or indirectly influenced various 
aspects of ship design. To recap, these were;
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a. Iron braces, bracketing and knees;
i. Eliminated procurement problems of timber.
i. Implemented a greater strength to weight ratio for the hull.
ii. Reduced hogging and sagging problems.
iii. Paved the way for Seppings’ Trussed Frame system of construction.
b. Ordnance;
ii. Stronger guns of the Blomefield design gave greater confidence to the actual 
gunners as rate of fire could be increased without fear of the guns exploding.
iii. In consequence to the success of the carronade, ships construction was altered by 
introducing protective built-up bulwarks.
iv. Orlop Deck construction was modified and strengthened by introducing iron 
water tanks.
What an archaeological analysis of the Victory has also shown us is that the Admiralty 
and the Navy Board were far more foresighted and aware of the contemporary advances 
made in industry and material manufacture than we may originally have thought. More 
importantly, the Navy as a whole were quick to adopt new technology, a fact that is 
contrary to the viewpoint of some twentieth century historians. The realistic attitude 
taken at the time is well reflected in the contemporary publications, documents, and 
papers written by such men as Tomlinson, ^^Fincham, and Knowles, to name a few.
Besides the alterations in fighting tactics, and improved production of iron, copper and 
its associated alloys, the advances of industrial technology were to have an even greater 
influence on ship construction. While the Victory underwent her great rebuild in 
1814/16, steam machinery, fueled by coal, was already being adopted within small 
ships as an alternative motive force independent from the constraints of the natural 
element of wind power. It was this concept that was shortly to eclipse the long era of 
the sailing man-of-war that the Victory represented and give rise to the metal fighting 
ships; The ironclad Warrior of I860, and the steel hulled Dreadnought of 1906.
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APPENDIX I,
S H I P S  D E S I G N E D  B Y  S I R  T H O M A S  S L A D E ,
Between the years 1749 and 1769, Slade designed a total of 181 ships of 
war of varying size and purpose. Quite a considerable number his ship took 
part in the notable actions during die Seven Years War, The War of the 
American Revolution, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War.
Most notable is the Victory 1765, which served some forty seven years 
active service.
Notes:
1. For historic reasons the table has been rearranged in annual succession.
2. Class Types are indicated in bold type.
3. Class Names for each class type are listed first irrespective of date.
4. With exception to Class type, ships are arranged according to 
launch date.
5. Those denoted with and asterisk are vessels on which Admiral Lord 
Nelson served.
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Year Designed Class/Ship Name Rate No. Guns Launch Date
1749 Hazard Sloop 8 3.10.1749
1753 Lowestoffe 5 tu 32 17.05.1756
1753 Tartar 5‘^ 32 3.04.1756
1753 Argo 5*" 32 24 .04 .1758
1753 Guadaloupe 5'" 32 5.12.1763
1755 Sandwich 2 nd 90 15.05.1759
1755 Blenheim 2 nd 90 5.01.1761
1755 Dublin 3 rd 74 6.05.1757
1755 Norfolk 3 rd 74 28 .12 .1757
1755 Lennox 3 rd 74 25.02 .1758
1755 Warspight 3 rd 74 8.04.1758
1755 Shrewsbury 3 rd 74 23.05 .1758
1755 Resolution 3 rd 74 14.12.1758
1755 Mars 3 rd 74 15.03.1759
1755 Hunter Pink 10 4.02.1756
1755 Bonetta Snow 1 0 4.02 .1756
1755 Spy Snow 1 0 3.02 .1756
1755 Merlin Snow 10 20.03.1756
1756 Hero 3 rd 74 28.03.1759
1756 Hercules 3 rd 74 25.02.1759
1756 Thunderer 3 rd 74 19.03.1760
1756 Edgar 3 rd 64 16.11.1758
1756 Panther 3 rd 64 22 .06 .1758
1756 Firm 3 rd 64 15.01.1759
1756 Venus 5 th 36 11.03.1758
1756 Pallas 5 th 36 30 .08 .1757
1756 Brilliant 5“^ 36 27.10.1759
1756 Southampton 5 ür 32 5.05.1757
1756 Vestal 5 th 32 17.06.1756
1756 Diana 5“^ 32 30.08.1757
1756 Coventry 5 ür 30 30.05 .1757
1756 Lizard 5 th 30 7.04 .1757
1756 Actaeon 5*^ 30 30.05 .1757
1756 Hussar 5 Ü, 30 23 .07 .1757
1756 Shannon 5'^ 30 17.08.1757
1756 Trent 5 th 30 31.10 .1757
1756 Boreas 5  th 30 27 .07 .1757
1756 Liverpool 5‘^ 30 10.02.1758
1756 Maidstone 5 th 30 9.05.1758
1756 Active 5 th 30 11.01.1758
1756 Cerebus I 5 th 30 5.09.1758
1756 Griffin 5 th 30 18.10.1758
1756 Levant 5 th 30 6.07 .1758
1756 Aquilon 5'^ 30 24.05.1758
1756 Carysfort 5 th 30 23 .08 .1766
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1756 Hind 5“' 30 22.07.1785
1756 Laurel 5“‘ 30 Cancelled
1756 Infernal Bomb 2 + 8 4.07.1757
1756 Blast Bomb 2  + 8 27.02.175
1756 Basilisk Bomb 2  + 8 10.02.17
1756 Carcass* Bomb 2  + 8 27.01.1759
1756 Mortar Bomb 2  + 8 14.03.1759
1756 Terror Bomb 2  + 8 16.01.1759
1756 Thunder Bomb 2  + 8 15.03.1759
1756 Etna Bomb 2 + 8 20.06.1759
1756 Vesuvius Bomb 2 + 8 3.07.1776
1756 Terror (11) Bomb 2  + 8 2.06.1779
1756 Thunder (II) Bomb 2 + 8 18.05.1779
1756 Carysfort 5 th 30 23.08.1766
1756 Hind 5‘" 30 22.07.1785
1757 Bellona 3 rd 74 19.02.1760
1757 Dragon 3 rd 74 4.03.1760
1757 Superb 3 rd 74 27.10.1760
1757 Alarm 5^ 32 19.09.1758
1757 Eolus 5 th 32 29.11.1758
1757 Stag 5 th 32 4.09.1758
1757 Minerva 5  th 32 17.01.1759
1757 Pearl 5 ür 32 27.03.1762
1757 Emerald 5“' 32 8.06.1762
1757 Glory 5‘“ 32 24.10.1763
1757 Aurora 5*'* 32 13.01.1766
1757 Niger 5 th 32 29.09.1759
1757 Quebec 5 Ü1 32 14.07.1760
1757 Winchelsea 5 th 32 31.05.1764
1757 Montreal 5 th 32 15.09.1767
1757 Favourite 6 * 16 15.12.1757
1757 Tamar 6“* 16 23.01,1758
1758 Ocean 2"** 90 21.03.1761
1758 Arrogant 3 rd 74 22.01.1761
1758 Cornwall 3 rd 74 19.05.1761
1758 Defence 3 rd 74 31.03.1761
1758 Kent 3 rd 74 26.03.1762
1758 Edgar 3 rd 74 30.06.1779
1758 Goliath 3 rd 74 19.10.1781
1758 Audacious 3 rd 74 23.07.1785
1758 Zealous 3 rd 74 25.06.1785
1758 Elephant* 3 rd 74 24.08.1786
1758 Saturn 3 rd 74 22.10.1786
1758 Bellerophon 3 rd 74 17.10.1786
1758 Vanguard* 3 rd 74 6.03.1787
1758 Exellent 3 rd 74 27.11.1787
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1758 Illustrious 3 r d 74 7.07.1789
1758 Asia 3 r d 64 15.06.1764
1758 Essex 3 r d 64 28.08.1763
1758 Africa 3 r d 64 1.08.1764
1758 Phoenix 4‘“ 44 25.06.1759
1759 Victory* 100 7.05.1765
1759 London 2 « d 90 24.05.1766
1759 Impregnable 2 n d 90 15.04.1786
1759 Prince 2"^ 90 4.07.1788
1759 Windsor Castle 2 « d 90 21.05.1790
1759 Romney 4‘h 50 8.07.1762
1760 Ramillies 3 r d 74 21.07.1765
1760 Terrible 3 r d 74 4.09.1762
1760 Monarch 3 r d 74 15.04.1763
1760 Russell 3 r d 74 12.11.1764
1760 Robust 3 r d 74 25.10.1764
1760 Invincible 3 r d 74 9.03.1765
1760 Prince of Wales 3 r d 74 4.06.1765
1760 Magnificent 3 r d 74 20.09.1766
1760 Marlborough 3 r d 74 26.08.1767
1760 Lowestoffe* 5 th 32 5.06.1761
1760 Diamond 5'" 32 28.05.1774
1760 Orpheus 5«‘ 32 7.05.1774
1760 Mermaid 5 th 30 5.06.1761
1760 Hussar 5 th 30 26.08.1763
1760 Solebay 5 \^ 30 9.09.1763
1760 Greyhound 5 th 30 20.07.1773
1760 Boreas* 5 th 30 23.08.1774
1761 Barfleur 2 « d 90 30.07.1768
1761 Prince George 2 « d 90 31.08.1772
1761 Princess Royal 2 n d 90 18.10.1773
1761 Formidable 2 « d 90 20.08.1777
1761 Saint Albans 3 r d 64 13.08.1764
1761 Augusta 3 r d 64 13.07.1763
1761 Director 3 r d 64 9.03.1784
1761 Ardent 3 r d 64 13.08.1764
1761 Raisonable* 3 r d 64 10.12.1768
1761 Belliquex 3 r d 64 5.06.1780
1761 Agamemnon* 3 r d 64 10.04.1781
1761 Stately 3 r d 64 22.12.1784
1761 Indefatigable 3 r d 64 July 1784
1761 Nassau 3 r d 64 20.09.1785
1761 Nautilus 6'" 16 24.05.1762
1763 Sherbourne Cutter 6 3.12.1763
1763 Ferret Cutter 6 8.10.1763
1763 Lurcher Cutter 6 26.09.1763
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1765 Egmont 3 rd 74 29.08.1768
1765 Worcester 3 rd 64 17.10.1765
1765 Stirling Castle 3 rd 64 28.06.1775
1765 Lyon 3 rd 64 3.09.1777
1766 Elizabeth 3 rd 74 17.05.1775
1766 Resolution 3 rd 74 12.04.1770
1766 Cumberland 3 rd 74 9.03 .1774
1766 Berwick 3 rd 74 18.04.1775
1766 Bombay Castle 3 rd 74 14.06.1782
1766 Powerful 3 rd 74 3.04.1783
1766 Defiance 3 rd 74 10.12.1783
1766 Swiftsure 3 rd 74 4.04.1787
1766 Salisbury 4 H1 50 19.08.1766
1766 Centurion 4'" 50 27.05.1774
1766 Otter 5 “' 14 26.10.1767
1766 Swallow 5“‘ 14 30 .12 .1769
1766 Falcon 5”' 14 15.06.1771
1769 Culloden 3 rd 74 18.05.1775
1769 Thunderer 3„i 74 13.11.1783
1769 Venerable 3 rd 74 19.04.1784
1769 Victorious 3 rd 74 27.04 .1785
1769 Ramillies 3 rd 74 12.07.1785
1769 Terrible 3 rd 74 28.03 .1785
1769 Hannibal 3 rd 74 15.04.1786
1769 Theseus* 3 rd 74 25.09.1786
1769 Roebuck 4 Ü I 44 28.07 .1774
1769 Romulus 44 7 .13 .1777
1769 Acteon 4 th 44 29.01 .1778
1769 Janus 4 t i i 44 15.05.1778
1769 Charon 4 th 44 8.10.1778
1769 Ulysses 4 th 44 14.07.1779
1769 Serapis 4 Ü1 44 4.03 .1779
1769 Endymion 4 th 44 28.08 .1779
1769 Assurance 4 th 44 20 .04 .1780
1769 Dolphin 44 10.03.1781
1769 Argo 4 th 44 8.06.1781
1769 Mediator 44 30 .03 .1782
1769 Resistance 4 "' 44 11.07.1782
1769 Charon (II) 4 th 44 17.05.1783
1769 Guardian 4 th 44 23 .03 .1784
1769 Experiment 4 th 44 27 .11 .1784
1769 Regulus 4 th 44 10.02.1785
1769 Gladiator 4“' 44 20.01.1785
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APPENDIX n .
C O P P E R  S H E A T H I N G  R E P L A C E M E N T  &  R E P A I R S :
H M S  V I C T O R Y  1 7 8 0  - 1 8 8 8 .
1. Sh® (sheathing) taken off and Coppered Mar. 1780. (Sheet No. 3. Folio 4).
2. Copper taken off and Re Copper’d Febr  ^1783.
3. Copper taken off Jan 1788. Re Copper’d Nov 1789.
4. Copper taken off and Re Copp’d Jan 1795
5. Copper taken off April 1800. Re Copper’d April 1803.
6. Copper taken off Mar. Re Copper’d April 1806. (No. 4. Folio 10).
7. Copper repaired . (Nov - Dec 1807).
8. Copper taken off Mar. 1814. recopper’d Jan  ^1816.
9. Copper taken off and recopp**. (Jun - Aug 1823)
10. Shifted 6 upper strakes of copper each side. (May - Jun 1827)
11. Copper repaired Jan  ^1832
12. (Shifted defective copper on bottom April 1854)
13. Repaired Copper July 1857
14. Repaired 3 strakes of Copper, recoppered the Bottom. Sept 1857 ~ April 1858
15. Copper stripped (except keel) & bottom caulked, recoppe’d. Dec 1887 - 14 
Oct. 1888 (No. 10 Folio 219).
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Abbreviations.
Adm. Admiralty.
Drwg. Drawing
MM. Mariner’s Mirror
MS. Manuscript.
MSS. Manuscripts.
NMM. National Maritime Museum
NRS. Navy Records Society
PRO. Public Records Office
RNM. Royal Naval Museum
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